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Abstract 
The River Ouse forms a significant part of the Humber river system, which 
drains about one fifth of the land area of England and provides the largest fresh 
water input to the North Sea from the UK. The tidal Ouse has suffered from a sag 
of dissolved oxygen (DO) during the last few decades, caused by effluent 
discharges from industries and Sewage Treatment Works (STWs). Poor water 
quality during the summer prevents the return of salmon, which is regarded by the 
Environment Agency (EA) as a key indicator of rivers' ecological health. The EA 
proposed to increase water quality in the Ouse by implementing more stringent 
environmental policies. This conventional management option, however, usually 
offers less flexibility in compliance and incurs excessive costs of pollution 
abatement to industries and STWs. 
This thesis explores the potential to improve water management by adopting an 
integrated and cost effective river policy, which allows for variation in the 
assimilative capacity of river water. Various options to improve water quality are 
considered in a comprehensive framework for river policy. Reduction in both 
effluent discharges and water abstraction are considered together with choice of 
location for effluent discharge. Different instruments of environmental policy, 
tax-subsidy scheme (TSS) and tradable pollution permits (TPP) systems are 
compared with the command and control (CAC) approach. A hydrological model 
from the EA is combined with an economic model to identify the least cost 
solution for water quality management in the river system. This thesis provides a 
theoretical discussion of this problem in both static and dynamic settings. This 
framework is then applied to the empirical case of the tidal Ouse for particular 
water quality targets. To achieve the water quality target at least cost is a 
constrained optimisation problem, solved by computing software. The integrated 
river policy is able to achieve a significant improvement in water quality at lower 
cost than is currently incurred. This thesis also compares the different policy 
instruments for delivering this water quality improvement in the tidal Ouse. 
I 
Contents 
Abstract 
Contents 
List of Tables 
List of Figures 
List of Abbreviations 
List of Mathematic Variables 
Dedication 
Acknowledgements 
Author's Declaration 
I 
II 
VII 
IX 
XI 
XIII 
XV 
XVI 
XVIII 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1 INTRODUCTION OF OBJECTIVES 1 
1.1.1 Review of issues in river policy I 
1.1.2 Motivation for the research 6 
1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 8 
CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 11 
2.1 THE HUMBER RIVER BASIN AND TIDAL OUSE 11 
2.2 REGULATIVE SYSTEM OF RIVER POLICIES IN THE TIDAL OUSE 16 
2.3 CURRENT RIVER POLICY AND MANAGEMENT IN THE OUSE CATCHMENT 20 
2.3.1 A Brief history of river policy and management in the Ouse catchment 20 
2.3.2 Water target and effluent discharge consents 21 
2.3.3 The Tradable Water Abstraction License system 23 
2.4 REVIEW OF OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENT 24 
2.4.1 Emission charge 25 
2.4.2 Tradable pollution permit system 27 
11 
2.4.3 Comparing emission charge scheme and TPP system 28 
2.4.4 Command and Control and Market-based Instruments: empirical evidences in 
UK 31 
2.4.5 Policy instruments in the perspective of the UK Government 32 
2.4.6 Integrated river policy for static and dynamic efficiency 33 
2.5 IN-STREAM WATER QUALITY MODELS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS 34 
2.6 REVIEWS OF ECOS3 AND QUESTS ID MODEL 37 
2.6.1 Previous research by ECoS3 Software and HOT model 37 
2.6.2 Previous research through the WRc QUESTSID 39 
2.7 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON HYDROLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF RIVER 
POLICY 42 
CHAPTER 3 RIVER WATER QUALITY MODEL 45 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
3.2 ECOS3 HOT MODEL 
3.2.1 Description of the HOT model 
3.2.2 Simulation of DO distribution 
3.3 QUESTS 1D MODEL 
3.3.1 Structure of QUESTSID model 
3.3.2 Calibrations and validation of QUESTSID 
3.4 MODELLING RESULTS OF THE QUESTS MODEL 
3.4.1 Measures of water quality 
3.4.2 Scenario design and data processing 
3.4.3 Results ofAnalysis 
3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
45 
47 
47 
50 
55 
55 
56 
59 
59 
60 
63 
80 
CHAPTER 4 ECONOMICS OF RIVER POLICY 82 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
4.1.1 Review of regulative system of river policy in the tidal Ouse 
4.1.2 The Structure of the Chapter 
4.2 STATIC ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
4.2.1 The general model of cost efficiency of pollution abatement 
4.2.2 Cost effectiveness analysis with water abstraction 
4.2.3 Policy instruments 
82 
82 
84 
84 
85 
86 
92 
III 
4.3 DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 105 
4.3.1 Dynamic problem with discrete time 106 
4.3.2 Dynamic problem with continuous time 110 
4.3.3 The Convergence and Stability Properties of the Steady State Equilibrium 112 
4.3.4 TSS and TPP system for Dynamic Solutions 121 
4.4 COMPARATIVE STATICS 125 
4.4.1 Short-run Comparative Statics in the Static System 126 
4.4.2 Steady State Comparative Statics in the Dynamic System 128 
4.5 CONCLUSION 130 
4.5.1 Theoretical Analyses 130 
4.5.2 Policy Implications 131 
CHAPTER 5 DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 134 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
5.2 DATASET FOR QUESTS MODELLING 
5.2.1 Data requirement for QUESTS modelling 
5.2.2 Data sources for QUESTS 
5.2.3 Hydrological data processing for QUESTS 
5.3 ECONOMIC DATASET 
5.3.1 Economic data requirement 
5.3.2 Economic data sources 
5.3.3 Economic data processing 
5.3.4 Opinion of new management options 
5.4 EFFLUENT CONSENTS AND WATER ABSTRACTION LICENSE 
CHAPTER 6 STATIC OPTIMISATION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
6.2 CONSTRAINT AND OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS OF STATIC OPTIMISATION 
6.2.1 Constraints: the System of Water Quality Functions 
6.2.2 Objectives: Pollution Abatement Cost Functions 
6.2.3 Costs of Changing the Timing of Effluent Discharge 
6.3 STATIC OPTIMISATION ANALYSIS 
6.3.1 Business as usual (BA U) scenario 
6.3.2 No Constraints (NC) Scenario 
6.3.3 UWWTD Constraints (UC) Scenario 
134 
135 
135 
136 
137 
139 
139 
140 
142 
144 
145 
148 
148 
150 
150 
153 
159 
160 
161 
162 
166 
fv 
6.4 SENSITIVITY TESTS 169 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS 173 
CHAPTER 7 DYNAMIC OPTIMISATION 175 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 175 
7.2 THE ELEMENTS OF DYNAMIC OPTIMISATION 177 
7.2.1 Dynamics of effluent treatment capacity 177 
7.2.2 The effluent abatement cost function 178 
7.2.3 The dynamic optimisation problem 179 
7.3 THE DYNAMIC OPTIMUM 180 
7.3.1 Scenario 1: Dynamic optimisation with the UWWTD constraint 182 
7.3.2 Scenario 2. " Dynamic optimisation with increased BOD5 load 184 
7.3.3 Scenario 3: Dynamic optimisation with current discharge locations and current 
abstraction levels 186 
7.3.4 Shadow Costs of Water Quality 190 
7.4 THE INVESTMENT PATH 
7.4.1 Dynamic equilibrium of 
I; a 
and 
kia 
7.4.2 Stability of dynamic optimum 
7.4.3 Investment path 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER 8 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
8.2 APPLICATIONS OF THE POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
8.2.1 General criteria for selection of policy instruments 
8.2.2. Tax and Subsidy Scheme (TSS) 
8.2.3. Tradable Pollution Permit (TPP) System 
8.2.4 Disadvantages of TPP system in the tidal Ouse management 
8.3 CONCLUSION: POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE TIDAL OUSE 
191 
192 
195 
198 
200 
203 
203 
204 
205 
206 
211 
215 
217 
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 219 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
9.2 MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
219 
220 
V 
9.3 FURTHER RESEARCH 223 
9.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND BROADER APPLICATION 226 
APPENDICES 228 
Appendix I Proof of Expression (4.3.3. a) 228 
Appendix 2 Proof of Expression (4.3.3. b) 229 
Appendix 3 System of Water Quality Functions 230 
Appendix 4 Exponential Cost function of effluent treatment in the Selby industries232 
Appendix 5 Exponential Cost function of effluent treatment in the STWs 233 
Appendix 6 Exponential cost function of reducing water abstraction in the rivers 
Ouse and Derwent 234 
Appendix 7 Cost Details of moving effluent discharges from Selby 235 
Appendix 8 Power cost function of effluent treatment in the Selby industries 236 
Appendix 9 Linear cost function of effluent treatment in the STWs 237 
Appendix 10 Effluent treatment capability function (logarithmic) of capital stock in 
the ETPs of the industries of Selby 238 
Appendix 11 Effluent treatment capability function (logarithmic) of capital stock in 
the ETPs of STWs 239 
Appendix 12 Pollution abatement costs function of capital stock and investment in 
the ETPs 240 
REFERENCES 241 
vi 
List of Tables 
Chapter 3 River Water Quality Model 
Table 3.1: The EWPCS scores and rate of improvements at various discharge 
location 67 
Table 3.2: EWPCS scores of effluent discharge shifting over the Year 71 
Table 3.3: Effects on river water quality of various effluent levels 77 
Table 3.4: Transfer Coefficients Matrix for BOD5 discharge in 1995 78 
Table 3.5: Transfer Coefficients Matrix for BOD5 discharge in 1997 78 
Table 3.6: Transfer Coefficients Matrix for BOD5 discharge in 2001 78 
Chapter 4 Economics of River Policy 
Table 4.1: Short-run comparative statics 
Table 4.2: Steady State Comparative Statics 
129 
130 
Chapter 6 Static Optimisation 
Table 6.1: Coefficients table of the system of water quality functions 152 
Table 6.2: Static Optimal Solutions (NC Scenario) 164 
Table 6.3: Water qualities at WQM sites (NC Scenario) 164 
Table 6.4: Cost of river management (NC Scenario) 164 
Table 6.5: Static Optimal Solutions (UC Scenario) 166 
Table 6.6: Water qualities at WQM sites (UC Scenario) 166 
Table 6.7: Cost of river management (UC Scenario) 166 
Table 6.8: Static Optimal Solutions (Sensitivity Tests) 170 
VII 
Table 6.9: Water qualities at WQM sites (Sensitivity Tests) 170 
Table 6.10: Cost of river management (Sensitivity Tests) 170 
Table 6.11: Static Optimal Solutions for various water targets 171 
Table 6.12: Cost of river management for various water targets 171 
Chapter 7 Dynamic Optimisation 
Table 7.1: Dynamic equilibrium with UWWTD 183 
Table 7.2: Water qualities at monitoring sites with UWWTD (Dynamic) 184 
Table 7.3: Cost of river management with UWWTD (Dynamic) 184 
Table 7.4: Dynamic equilibrium with 50% BOD increase 184 
Table 7.5: Water qualities at monitoring sites with 50% BOD increase 
(Dynamic) 185 
Table 7.6: Cost of river management with 50% BOD increase (Dynamic) 185 
Table 7.7: Dynamic equilibrium with discharge in Selby 187 
Table 7.8: Water qualities at monitoring sites with discharge in Selby 
(Dynamic) 187 
Table 7.9: Cost of river management with discharge in Selby (Dynamic) 187 
Table 7.10: Dynamic Optimum of River Management Options 194 
Table 7.11: Water qualities at monitoring sites (Dynamic Optimum) 194 
VIII 
List of Figures 
Chapter 2 Background and Literature 
Figure 2.1 River Basin Districts in mainland UK 
Figure 2.2 The Humber Catchment 
Chapter 3 River Water Quality Model 
11 
13 
Figure 3.1 The tidal section of Humber, Trent and Ouse system and main 
tributaries 47 
Figure 3.2 Reservoir and transfers of carbon, nitrogen and phosphorus in the 
model 49 
Figure 3.3 (a) The ECos3 simulation and observed DO distribution along the 
river from Naburn to Sea Spurn in summer in 1994 51 
Figure 3.3 (b) The ECos3 simulation and observed DO distribution along the 
river from Naburn to Sea Spurn in summer in 1996 51 
Figure 3.4 Time series of river flows in the Ouse, Trent, Humber and their 
tributaries 64 
Figure 3.5 The Base-run DO saturation for different years 65 
Figure 3.6 5%ile DO profile at various effluent discharge locations in 1995, 
1997 and 2001 66 
Figure 3.7 Effects of changing discharge timing over the year 70 
Figure 3.8 (a) Effects of abstraction return in 1996 72 
Figure 3.8 (b) Effects of abstraction return in 1997 72 
Figure 3.9 (a) Effects of effluent discharges in 1995 75 
Figure 3.9 (b) Effects of effluent discharges in 1997 75 
Figure 3.9 (c) Effects of effluent discharges in 2001 75 
Ix 
Chapter 4 Economics of River Policy 
Figure 4.1 the saddle point equilibrium of steady state 120 
Chapter 6 Static Optimisation 
Figure 6.1 DO% of BAU & No SBOD (BAUNS) 162 
Figure 6.2 DO% under the least cost solution in the UC scenario 168 
Figure 6.3 Change of aggregate costs of river management in tidal Ouse 172 
Chapter 7 Dynamic Optimisation 
Figure 7.1 The simulated DO% of tidal Ouse under scenario 2 186 
Figure 7.2 The simulations of DO% in the tidal Ouse (Scenario 3) 188 
Figure 7.3 The phase plane of investment and capital stock for the ETPs in 
Selby industries 196 
Figure 7.4 The saddle arms of steady state equilibrium 200 
X 
List of Abbreviations 
APS 
BAT 
BATNEEC 
BAU 
BOD5 
CAC 
CAMS 
CEH 
CIS 
CO2 
Defra 
DIP 
DO 
DO% 
EA 
EC 
EPS 
ETP 
EU 
EWPCS 
FOCs 
GAMS 
GIS 
GQA 
HMIP 
HOT 
IPC 
IPPC 
LOIS 
MBIs 
MCA 
Ambient Permit System 
Best Available Techniques 
Best Available Techniques Not Entailing Excessive Cost 
Business As Usual 
Five Day Biochemical Oxygen Demand 
Command and Control 
Catchment Abstraction Management Strategies 
Centre for Ecology & Hydrology 
Common Implementation Strategy 
carbon dioxide 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Dissolved Inorganic Phosphate 
Dissolved Oxygen 
Dissolved Oxygen saturation 
Environment Agency 
European Commission 
Effluent Permit System 
Effluent Treatment Plant 
European Union 
Estuarine Working Party Classification Scheme 
First Order Conditions 
General Algebraic Modelling System 
Geographic Information System 
General Quality Assessment 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution 
Humber-Ouse-Trent 
Integrated Pollution Control 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 
Land-Ocean Interaction Study 
Market-Based Instruments 
Marginal Cost of Abatement 
XI 
ML 
NERC 
NRA 
NH3 
PIP 
PO 
POC 
PPC 
RACS(C) 
RBD 
RE 
ss 
SPM 
STW 
TCM 
TLCA 
TM 
TPP 
TSS 
TWAL 
UKTAG 
UWWTD 
WFD 
WQM 
WQO 
Yw 
Mega Litre 
Natural Environment Research Council 
National Rivers Authority 
ammonia 
Particulate Inorganic Phosphate 
Pollution Offset 
Particulate Organic Carbon 
Pollution Prevention Control 
Rivers Atmosphere, Estuaries and Coasts Study (Coasts) 
River Basin District 
River Ecosystem 
Suspended Solids 
Suspended Particulate Matter 
Sewage Treatment Work 
Transfer Coefficient Matrix 
Tate & Lyle Citric Acid Ltd 
Turbidity Maximum 
Tradable Pollution Permit 
Tax-Subsidy Scheme 
Tradable Water Abstraction License 
UK Technical Advisory Group 
Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive 
Water Framework Directive 
Water Quality Monitoring 
Water Quality Objectives 
Yorkshire Water 
XII 
List of Mathematic Variables 
A Jacobian matrix 
A, ambient water quality at WQM site s 
P,. (q;, a; ) net benefit (profit) of firm 
Bser aggregated BOD5 inload to ETPs in Selby sources 
C, (q1, a; ) production or abatement cost of firm 
ES aggregate impacts of industrial emissions to WQM site s 
HS aggregate impacts of water abstractions to WQM site s 
L Lagrange Function 
H Hamiltonian Function 
QS ambient water quality target at WQM site s 
QS water quality at any WQM site s 
Tie sum of tax and subsidy for effluent discharge from site i 
Tia sum of tax and subsidy for water abstraction from site i 
p exogenous product price 
t time 
P discounting factor 
r interest rate 
j sectors of activity (output, abatement and abstraction) 
q, product output from site i 
a; level of abatement activity at site i 
e; 
Q; 
b; 
s 
di, 
el 
emission level at site i 
water abstraction level at site i 
transfer coefficient of effluent from site i to WQM site s 
transfer coefficient of abstraction from site i to WQM site s 
other environmental factors influencing the water quality 
YS variations not captured explicitly by this function. 
XIII 
As Lagrange Multiplier 
tes tax or subsidy rate for effluent discharge at WQM site s 
tas tax or subsidy rate for water abstraction at WQM site s 
P. permit price for effluent discharge at WQM site s 
Pas permit price for water abstraction at WQM site s 
Pe; permit price for effluent discharge for pollution source at site i 
pat permit price for water abstraction for pollution source at site i 
8r' depreciation rate of capital stock in sector j at site i 
k; ' capital stock in sector j at site i 
I/ investment in sector j at site i 
, u; co-state variables of Hamiltonian 
77 eigenvalues (or characteristic roots) of the Jacobian matrix 
X distance of effluent discharge from the Trent Falls 
SBOD aggregated BOD5 discharged from the sources in Selby 
Ouse average river flow at the head of the river Ouse 
Derw average river flow at the confluence of the river Derwent 
Sna BOD5 discharged from the STW Snaith 
Sand BOD5 discharged from the STW Sandall 
Tho BOD5 discharged from the STW Thorne 
Cost; 
Rd abatement cost of 
industry 
Costs7v abatement cost of STWs 
Costabs cost of water abstraction 
Cost,, 
, cost of moving effluent 
discharge location 
XN 
I DEDICATE THIS THESIS TO MY DEAR PARENTS 
AND WIFE 
YONGJU WANG AND XIAOFENG LEI 
BINGYAN WANG 
WITH LOVE 
xv 
Acknowledgements 
First of all I would like say thanks to Professor Charles Perrings, one of my 
supervisors, for his encouragement during my MSc study, which gave me the 
courage and confidence to take the challenge of doing a PhD research, without 
which this thesis will not be here today. I also thank him for his suggestions and 
comments to my work during these years, which are always prompt (unless he is 
stuck somewhere without internet) and stimulating to my dull mind. 
I also would like to say big thank you to Dr. Jim Smart, who became my 
supervisor after Professor Charles Perrings went to America. Jim is very patient 
and responsible in his full-hearted supervision to my work, tirelessly going 
through each detail of the thesis and our discussion. His support is a great 
encouragement towards the end of my thesis. 
I am very grateful to the members of my Thesis Advisory Committee, 
Professor Malcolm Cresser and Dr. Doriana Delfino for their constructive 
comments on my research work. 
Specials thanks should be given to Richard Freestone and Trevor Hardy of the 
Environment Agency (EA), who helped to utilise the QUESTS ID model into my 
research, and many other people working in the EA who took a lot of efforts to 
provide me the necessary date of the river system. Also I like to thank Dr. Alan 
Tappin of the University of Plymouth and Dr. John Harris of the Marine 
Biological Association for their help in the ECoS3 model. I am especially grateful 
to Dr. Peter Jackson of Tate & Lyle Citric Acid, Amanda Bon-mann of the 
Yorkshire Water for their enormous help for providing me the essential economic 
data and important contacts to other relevant plants in the area, with which I also 
thank the correspondents in Greencore and Rigid Paper for their prompt reply to 
my questionnaire. 
XVI 
Last but not least, I really appreciate the precious and unconditional support 
from my every member of family, to whom this thesis is dedicated. They 
undertake all the difficulties with me during my research and always provide me a 
joyful and peaceful home full of love, without which I can never manage to finish 
this research. 
XVII 
Author's Declaration 
Some results from Chapters 4 and 6 of this thesis have been presented at the 
2006 European Summer School in Resource and Environmental Economics held 
in Venice, Italy from 25th June to Ist July 2006, organized by European 
Association of Environmental and Resources Economists (EAERE), the 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), and the Venice International University 
(VIU). A similar draft of these results was also presented at the Third World 
Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists, held on 3d to 7th July, 2006, 
at Kyoto Japan, organized by the Japanese Association of Environmental 
Economists (SEEPS), the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 
(AERE), the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 
(EAERE), and the Latin American and Caribbean Association of Environmental 
and Resource Economists (ALEAR). 
A draft of Chapter 3 of this thesis has been submitted to the journal of Science 
of the Total Environment, which is now under revision together with Professor 
Malcolm Cresser, Richard Freestone and Trevor Hardy and will be submit again 
very soon. A part of the Chapter 3 of this thesis was presented at the Internal 
Conference of River Basin Management 2005, held in Bologna Italy, from 6-8 
September 2005, jointly organized by Wessex Institute of Technology, UK and 
University of Coimbra, Portugal. 
With these exceptions, I declare that the work contained in this thesis is my 
own and has not been admitted from any other degree or award. 
XVIII 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction of Objectives 
1.1.1 Review of issues in river policy 
Tao Wang 
The tidal section of the Humber system forms a significant part of the Humber 
drainage basin, which is the largest catchment in England, draining one fifth of the 
land area of England alone (Edwards et al. 1997; Jarvie et al. 1997b). The sea 
spurn of the Humber makes the biggest freshwater contribution to the North Sea 
from the U. K, approximately 250 m3/s (National Rivers Authority 1993). The 
tidal Ouse is an upper part of the tidal Humber system, stretching from Naburn to 
Trent Fall where it meets the tidal Trent, and includes four tributaries, the Wharfe, 
Derwent, Aire and Don. Water quality in the tidal Trent has been steadily 
improved over the last three decades (Edwards et al. 1997). However, the tidal 
Ouse remains one of the worst river reaches in the tidal section of the Humber 
system due to a number of factors. The poor water quality in the tidal Ouse has a 
significant negative impact on those of other river reaches in the Humber system 
due to its tidal nature. It also has negative impacts on the ecological systems 
supported by these rivers, on the economic activities related to water quality and 
ecological systems, and on various socio-economic attributes that are to be taken 
into account. 
One of the obvious impacts of the poor water quality in the tidal Ouse during 
the warm summer months is the regular occurrence of dissolved oxygen (DO) sag, 
a common phenomenon of estuaries (Cashman et al. 1999). When the river flow is 
low, suspended sediments in the river move upstream and stay long enough 
around Selby to cause the observed DO sag. Because of the DO sag, the water 
quality in the tidal Ouse is too low to support the return of spawning salmon, 
which is regarded as an important indicator of ecological health of an estuarine 
river. The decline of the salmon stock in the Ouse system is influenced by a 
I 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Tao Wang 
number of other factors external to the Ouse, which may include over-fishing off 
Greenland, commercial netting in estuaries, habitat loss, increasing sediment load 
and river morphology changes. However, the effluent discharges from the 
industries in Selby and sewage treatment works (STWs) along the river are 
regarded as one of the main reasons for the poor water quality and the decline of 
salmon, combined with the water abstraction in the catchment. They are believed 
to cause deterioration in the water quality, which was particularly highlighted 
during the dry summer of 1995,1996 and 2003. The effluent from the industries 
and STWs affect the water quality by the effluents discharged into the river water. 
Five Day Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD5) measures the amount of oxygen 
consumed by biochemical oxidation of pollutants in a five-day period (Standing 
Committee of Analysts 1989) and is regarded by the Environment Agency as an 
important indicator of water quality. 
Some other natural factors also contribute to the decline of DO level in the tidal 
Ouse. Rainfall varies dramatically over space and time in the catchment region, 
with highest rainfall over 1600 mm p. a. in parts of the Pennines due to the 
prevailing wind and in the winter, and much less rainfall in the Southeast 
catchment and during dry summers (Law et al. 1997). The inland penetration of 
tides during low flow transports sediments upstream, while resuspension of 
sediments results in considerable DO consumption. The impact of the suspended 
sediments on water quality in the tidal Ouse has not been investigated in depth, 
but some estimates have been made, based on modelling on its DO consumption 
and transport (Freestone 2003; Tappin et al. 2003). The relatively high 
temperature in summer months, as well as the biomass of photosynthetic plankton 
also decreases the DO level. In addition, large quantities of river water are 
abstracted and transferred through its grid by Yorkshire Water to supply potable 
water for over 3.5 million people, and returned to the river system through sewage 
treatment works. One obvious effect on the water quality in the tidal Ouse related 
to water abstraction is the reduction of clean freshwater flows from northern rivers 
and rising volume of poor quality water returned from the industrial south 
tributaries (Edwards et al. 1997). The most severe DO sag in the summer persists 
in the upper reaches of the river between the Environment Agency (EA) water 
quality monitoring (WQM) sites at Selby and Long Drax. 
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The EA intends to improve river water quality by tightening discharge 
consents in Selby. A new system of pollution control is being implemented in 
order to restore water quality in the Ouse, which is driven by the EU Directive on 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC). The essence of IPPC is that 
operators should choose the best option available to achieve an agreed level of 
protection of the environment taken as a whole. The Best Available Techniques 
(BAT) approach is typically modified by the declaration that the cost of applying 
techniques should not be excessive in relation to the environmental protection it 
provides. However, the IPPC Scheme requires BAT to be applied in the abatement 
of pollution while no clear definition of BAT is provided. A more rigorous way of 
addressing the issue of cost is to identify the most cost effective river policy for a 
given water quality target, by considering not only one but various factors 
affecting the water quality and their relative impacts. 
Water abstraction has direct impacts on river water quality similar to effluent 
discharges, but is rarely considered in water quality regulation. Since river volume 
affects the assimilative capacity, it is apparent that water abstraction has adverse 
impacts on the river water quality, and the impacts are interdependent of the 
impacts of effluent discharged into the river body. The impacts of water 
abstraction on water resources is usually emphasized (Willis and Garrod 1998), 
but not as much in the perspective of water quality change. Therefore, it is 
necessary to include both industrial effluent and water abstraction in an integrated 
regulation system. To date, however, effluent discharge consents and water 
abstraction licenses have not taken into account either the variation in the 
assimilative capacity of river or the interdependence of these two activities. 
Effluent discharge and water abstraction in the tidal Ouse and the Humber 
estuary are currently regulated by two different policies implemented by the EA. 
These are discharge consents for effluent discharge and the system of Tradable 
Water Abstraction License (TWAL) for water abstractions. For the purpose of 
improving water quality in the tidal Ouse, the effluent discharge consents to the 
Selby industries and major STWs along the river have been significantly modified 
during the last few years. Changes in effluent discharge consents for the STWs 
3 
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were recently tightened up by the European Urban Waste Water Treatment 
Directive (UWWTD) (Defra 2002a). Water abstraction in the Ouse and its 
tributaries has not been regulated for the purpose to address the DO sag while 
even more was abstracted during droughts such as 1995 and 1996 to guarantee the 
potable water supply. 
Four plants in Selby were regulated by the improved effluent discharge 
consents: Tate & Lyle Citric Acid (TLCA), Greencore, Rigid Paper and BOCM. 
BOD5 is an important indicator monitored in the effluent discharge consents, so 
are the concentrations of ammonia (NH3), phosphorous and suspended solids 
(SS). The aggregate effluent discharge consents on BOD5 from Selby as a whole 
have been reduced from some 30 tonnes per day to 3 tonnes per day over the last 
few decades. The four companies have continuously invested in effluent treatment 
plants at their home sites in order to comply with the changes in effluent discharge 
consents. Except BOCM, the other three industries are now applying similar 
anaerobic treatment to their effluent before disposal. BOCM has recently closed 
one of its production plants and shut off its direct BOD5 discharge into the tidal 
Ouse. This decision was said purely based upon business and economic 
arguments, but there is a question mark over the influence of the consents upon 
the final decision. In an industrial town with a long history, these plants have been 
contributing to the local economy through direct and indirect means. The general 
recession in manufacturing industry made the industries in Selby more sensitive to 
regulation change and the consequent requirement for investment in their 
pollution abatement processes (Jarvie et al. 1997b; Cashman et al. 1999). Due to 
the lower average income in Selby compared with other towns in North Yorkshire 
and the general recession in manufacturing industry (Edwards et al. 1997; Jarvie 
et al. 1997b), the extra costs imposed by non-cost-effective regulations may have 
significant impact on the local economy and residents. 
The STWs, as stated above, are currently responding to the revision of their 
effluent discharge consents and improving their sewage treatment capabilities to 
meet the domestic requirements of the UWWTD (HMSO 1994; Defra 2002a; 
HMSO 2003). Some major STWs have improved their effluent quality since 2000, 
while improvements in the remaining small-sized STWs are due by the end of 
4 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Tao Wang 
2005 (Defra 2002a). Water quality in the Don and Aire tributaries has also 
improved steadily due to continuous improvements in the STWs and industries' 
effort in these catchments (Edwards et al. 1997; Defra 2003a). Implementation of 
the UWWTD at the small STWs is expected to bring further improvements in 
water quality and reduce the DO sag problem in the tidal Ouse. 
Unlike Southeast of England which now experiences severe drought in summer 
(Environment Agency 2006), the Ouse and Humber catchment is one of the few 
areas have additional water resource available in summer (Environment Agency 
2001), but the water resource need to be well managed to ensure good quality. The 
major water abstraction from the water company and industries is regulated by 
TWAL in the tidal Ouse. An abstraction licence generally states how much water 
can be taken, from where, the way it is to be used and where to it is to be returned 
to the river. It usually takes the form of a fixed and constant amount for each year 
during the period licensed, regardless of the actual river flow volume. In a recent 
amendment, TWAL were suggested to be time limited and can only be renewed 
thereafter upon application (Defra 1999b). Water right trading is encouraged by 
the Environment Agency who expects to facilitate the trading process through 
Catchment Abstraction Management Strategies (CAMS) (Defra 1999b; 
Environment Agency 2002). However, at present there is hardly any transaction of 
trading (pers. comm. Trevor Spurgeon; Environment Agency). 
The aim of the research in this thesis is to evaluate the cost effectiveness of 
water quality management and pollution control, taking into account effluent 
discharges to the river, water abstraction, and other properties of the river. Two 
objectives need to be achieved in order to produce meaningful results, (a) a review 
of the cost effectiveness of the current regulatory system of river policies for the 
Tidal Ouse; and (b) an evaluation of alternative regulation and instrument options 
for water quality control in the tidal Ouse. Investigation of the cost effectiveness 
of alternative regulation and instrument options will be carried out by comparing 
the cost incurred in achieving a given water quality target. It is anticipated that 
integrated river policy that takes into account both effluent discharges and water 
abstraction will offer considerable advantages for pollution control and water 
quality improvement regarding cost effectiveness. This research also aims to 
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investigate the possibility of introducing alternative policy instruments for 
regulating the water qualities in the tidal Ouse and Humber, such as emission 
tax-subsidy or a Tradable Pollution Permit (TPP) system. Furthermore, the choice 
of capital investment for industry under specific environmental policy and target 
is to be determined by the dynamic analysis of investment equilibrium. 
1.1.2 Motivation for the research 
This research will focus on the cost effectiveness of effluent discharges and 
water abstraction in the tidal Ouse in relation to how the EA regulates the 
industrial effluents and water abstraction. There are several sources of inefficiency 
in the current regulatory system. Two of them are considered in this research: a 
disregard for variation in the assimilative capacity of river water, and the 
separation of regulations governing effluent discharges and water abstraction. The 
assimilative capacity, i. e. the ability of river water to self-purify after the 
discharge of pollution, depends on the volume of water in the river, flow velocity, 
surface area, temperature, and the micro plankton in the water. The three mains 
sources of DO recovery in the polluted river water are (a) oxygen in incoming 
effluents or tributary flows, (b) oxygen generated by photosynthesis and (c) 
oxygen from the re-aeration process. Because of this, assimilative capacity varies 
along the river and over time. Since the assimilative capacity determines the 
maximum load of pollution that the river could cope with for a given desired 
water quality, effluent discharge consents to the pollution sources for the desired 
water quality should also vary along the river and over time to avoid imposing 
excessive costs on the industries and to improve the cost effectiveness of pollution 
abatement. It is therefore necessary to include both effluent discharge and water 
abstraction into an integrated regulation system. However, in the tidal Ouse and 
Humber estuaries the fixed consents for effluent discharge and water abstraction 
do not yet take into account the variation in assimilative capacity of the river, nor 
of the interdependence between effluent discharges and water abstraction. 
Because of the inefficiencies in the current regulatory system, excessive social 
costs will be imposed upon the industries involved and on the local economy, if 
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improvement in river water quality is to be achieved by tightening fixed consents 
alone. The alternative pollution abatement options include moving the locations of 
effluent discharge and shifting the timing of discharges and reducing the water 
abstraction. Such management options could avoid imposing unnecessary costs in 
pollution abatement in industries and STWs for water quality control. Savings 
would accrue to the local economy if a more cost effective option could be 
implemented. Cost effectiveness is defined as the method of the least cost in 
achieving particular water quality improvement or pollution abatement. Cost 
efficiency, however, is another indicator used in cost analysis. Cost efficiency is 
achieved when the marginal benefit arising from water quality improvement is 
equal to the marginal cost of the pollution abatement that leads to this water 
quality improvement. Cost efficiency is not used in this research however, due to 
several reasons. The controversies and uncertainties surrounding the 
environmental valuation methods (Willig 1976; Diamond and Hausman 1994; 
Diamond 1996; Navrud and Pruckner 1997) associated with this quantification 
would lead to a less convincing result. The techniques of environmental valuation 
have been improved over the years and applied in many studies in the UK and 
worldwide (Pearce 1998; Gaterell et al. 1999a; 1999b; Bateman et al. 2002), even 
more than environmental issues (Hanley et al. 2003). But certain conditions are 
required for the relatively accurate estimation, which is unlikely to be satisfied in 
this research. Furthermore, environmental policy decisions usually reflect not only 
economic considerations such as cost efficiency, but also a wider set of political 
and ethical factors. Therefore it is less meaningful to investigate cost efficiency 
and argue for setting of environmental targets purely from an economic point of 
view. Rather it is more applicable to look at cost effectiveness in achieving the 
environmental target which has been determined by the authority from various 
considerations including economic cost. 
Direct command instruments for enacting environmental policy, commonly 
referred to as "Command and Control (CAC)", have long been criticized by 
economists. They claim that CAC tends to ignore differences of marginal costs of 
pollution abatement among pollution sources, and differences in marginal damage 
between different locations. The CAC approach also provides little incentive for 
further pollution abatement and affords no flexibility in compliance. Economic 
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instruments such as TPP and emission charges are advocated by economists for 
their advantages compared with CAC in terms of cost saving, providing dynamic 
incentives for abatement improvements and allowing flexibility in means of 
compliance. However, economic instruments have only been implemented to a 
limited extent in environmental policy during the last few decades and "apply 
with caution" has been the message following previous failures (O'Neil et al. 
1983; Tietenberg 2006). This research therefore aims to investigate the feasibility 
of introducing such economic instruments in a regulatory system of river policy 
for the tidal Ouse, in order to avoid excessive costs in pollution abatement and to 
make the policy more effective both technically and economically. 
The economic model to be developed in this research will explore the static 
and dynamic equilibria in pollution abatement and capital investment undertaken 
by polluters, under different policy instruments and targets. The results from the 
economic model of river policy should indicate the optimal investment path or 
choice for the polluters in a dynamic system in which capital investment and 
depreciation of a plant determine the pollution abatement capacity and are 
therefore of relevance to regulatory compliance. The analysis of differences 
among policy instruments should provide a useful argument for assessing the EA's 
regulatory decisions with regard to pollution sources. 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis tackles the problems raised above in the following ways. The second 
chapter starts with reviewing the background situation of the tidal Ouse, 
hydrological, geological, climatic and social economic conditions along the river 
which affect the water quality to some extent. Then it goes on to discuss the 
regulative system of river policy in the tidal Ouse and in general, comparison of 
different choices for environmental policies. Since research in this study involves 
application of the hydrodynamic model QUESTS ID, it also reviewed applications 
of the hydrological models in different river systems and for different purposes, 
with particular focus on the QUESTS 1D model and another model used in the 
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tidal Ouse before, ECoS3. Finally, some of the previous studies that pioneered in 
the combination of hydrological and economic models are reviewed. 
The third chapter describes in detail the applications of QUESTS ID model in 
the tidal Ouse, with comparison to the results from ECoS3 model. The 
QUESTSID models are used to assess the effectiveness of various options that 
could potentially improve water quality. The effectiveness is envisaged by the 
manipulated simulations in the QUESTS ID model representing various water 
management options. Among them, several effective ones are chosen to carry on 
with economic analysis in later chapters, as one part of the designed integrated 
cost effective river policy. Another important outcome from this chapter is the 
transfer coefficient matrix (TCM), which provides useful and convenient tools to 
the river policy maker. 
Chapter 4 forms the theoretical backbone of this research, introducing the 
hydro-economic modelling framework in which water quality model is combined 
with an economic model, with the exogenous variables affecting them both at the 
same time. It represents the process of river policy determination in this research, 
balancing the different control variables, which are the various options of water 
quality management in this case, to achieve the water quality target, while 
offsetting the excessive costs in management. The theoretical analyses are carried 
out for both static and dynamic systems. The static analysis is a representation for 
short-term change with fixed abatement and abstraction capability, and the 
dynamic analysis tries to depict the long-term change with capability building up 
for abatement and abstraction. The purpose of the dynamic analysis is to advise 
the investment decisions to the pollution sources facing stringent water quality 
targets. The impacts of policy instruments on the pollution sources' behaviour of 
pollution are illustrated by comparative statics. 
In Chapter 5, I introduce the source and methods to obtain the data for this 
research, as well as the methods of analyses for the research. This is followed by 
two chapters of empirical analysis, when the theoretical framework is applied with 
the obtained data for the tidal Ouse. 
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Chapter 6 indicates the solution of integrated cost effective river policy, based 
on the options of water quality management that are proved effective in Chapter 3, 
by solving the constrained static optimisation problem to meet the particular water 
quality target at the least total cost of river water quality management. Due to the 
constraints of UWWTD on STWs' abatement levels, several scenarios are 
designed to test the differences in the outcome. Suggestions towards the integrated 
cost effective river policy in a static system are made based on the optimisation 
solutions. 
In Chapter 7, the dynamic model is used in the theoretical framework, fed with 
investment and capital stock data from the industries and STWs. The Chapter 
carries out similar scenario analyses to those in Chapter 6, but goes further to test 
the stability and convergence of the steady state equilibrium found by the dynamic 
analysis. The outcome of this Chapter is however constrained from implications to 
reality because of the insufficiency of data. 
Chapter 8 continues with the outcomes from the static and dynamic analyses, 
discussing the policy instrument choices to deliver the optimal solution under 
static and dynamic analyses, had they been accurate enough to indicate the policy 
making in the future. Different policy instruments are evaluated against the 
criteria of instrument choices for environmental policy to make the 
recommendations to the policy implications of the optimal solutions from the 
analyses in the previous chapters. 
The last chapter then reviews and concludes the outcome from this research, 
and discusses the successes and obstacles during the research and points out the 
future research needs. 
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2.1 The Humber River Basin and tidal Ouse 
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The Humber river basin is the largest river basin district (RBD) of the 11 
England's RBDs shown in the Figure 2.1, covers an area of 26,109 km2. from the 
north Yorkshire Moors to Birmingham, the Pennines to the North Sea and Stock 
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on Trent to Rutland (Defra 2005b). This accounts for one fifth of the land area of 
England, which has a wide diversity of natural environment and land use. The 
rainfall in the catchment varies from less than 600 mm per annum in the Trent 
Falls to over 1600 mm per annum in the Pennines. Most of the precipitation 
happens in the west catchment due to the prevailing wind. Nearly 11 million 
people were reported living in the Humber catchment (Edwards et al. 1997), 
which is likely to grow marginally (by 0.1% per annum) in the future (Defra 
2005b). The catchment drains through big cities such as Birmingham, Bradford, 
Derby, Hull, Leeds, Leicester, Nottingham, Sheffield and Stoke-on-Trent, but also 
drains the more natural areas of Pennines and north Yorkshire Moors. The major 
tributaries of the Humber RBD include the Trent, Ouse, Aire, Don, Derwent, 
Wharfe, Hull and Ancholme (Figure 2.2). The major industries in the Humber 
catchment include agriculture, food and drink, chemicals, iron and steel, 
non-ferrous metals, engineering, and electricity generation. Coal mining, which 
used to be one of the majors, has been greatly reduced in scale (Edwards et al. 
1997). The Humber also has one of the largest port complexes in England. 
The two largest tributaries are the Ouse and Trent. Although similar in the size 
of catchment that they drain, The Ouse and Trent catchments are distinctively 
different to each other (Edwards et al. 1997; Jarvie et al. 1997b). The river Trent 
mainly drains industrial area to the south and west of the district, and major 
populous cities within the district, Birmingham, Derby, Leicester, Nottingham, 
and Stoke-on-Trent. On the contrary, most tributaries bringing water to river Ouse 
have their sources in the Pennines, drains less populated agricultural areas (Jarvie 
et al. 1997b; Defra 2005b). The two large tributaries meet at the Trent Falls to 
form the Humber estuary. 
In this research, we focus on the tidal section of these two large tributaries, 
particularly from the section of tidal Ouse to the sea Spurn because of the severe 
water quality issue. The tidal Ouse and tidal Trent start from their tidal limits at 
the weirs at Naburn and Gainsborough respectively. However, the tidal Ouse and 
Trent are quite different in their drainage networks. All of the principle tributaries 
join the Trent upstream of its tidal limit, while the Ouse has all its major 
tributaries joining downstream of the Naburn Weir, with much less flow from the 
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non-tidal catchment (Edwards et al. 1997). The less flow from the beginning of 
the tidal Ouse makes it more vulnerable to water pollution. 
Figure 2.2 The Humber Catchment 
Source: Oguchi et aL (2000) 
The tidal Ouse is 61 km in length, and another 62 km from the Trent Falls to 
the Sea Spurn. The Sea Spurn of Humber has the largest fresh water source to the 
North Sea from the UK (250 m3s'') and the second largest tidal range in the UK 
(7.2 m). However, most the impacts of water pollution remain inland. National 
Rivers Authority (1993) argued that "This is several times greater than the 
seaward displacement due to the freshwater input during the tidal cycle. Thus 
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effluents which discharge to the estuary are held therefor a considerable length of 
time, being progressively diluted as they edge their way gradually to the North 
Sea. Thus residence period allows the full polluting effect of discharges to be 
exerted within the estuary ". 
The Humber RBD has experienced severe water pollution since the mid 
nineteenth century (Sheail 1997) but significant improvements can be seen. The 
pollutants enter the river system through effluents from point sources and runoffs 
from the diffuse sources in rural and urban areas. The major point sources in the 
Humber RDB are from industries and STWs. All the major point sources are 
authorised by effluent consents for their discharges at specific place, there may 
also be consideration for the accidental discharges of harmful substances. In the 
Humber RBD, around 46% of the rivers length are at risk of point source 
pollution (Defra 2005b). The diffuse source arises from a wider variety of 
activities, among which agricultural farming is the most important one in the 
Humber RBD, especially for the tidal Ouse catchment which drains large farming 
lands in the rural area. Diffuse source pollution usually causes eutrophication by 
increasing the concentration of compounds of phosphorus and nitrogen. This will 
then lead to excessive growth of algae and other plants, which adversely affect the 
biodiversity and water quality. In the Humber RDB, 73.4% of the rivers length are 
at risk of diffuse pollution while another 18.8% are probably at risk (Defra 
2005b). The impacts of diffuse and point sources pollution in the Humber RDB 
have drawn much attention of scientists, which has been intensively discussed 
from various aspects (Robson and Neal 1997; Tipping et al. 1997; House et al. 
1997a; Jarvie et al. 1997a; House et al. 1997b; Jarvie et al. 1997c). Nevertheless, 
it has yet to attract more attention of economist to bring economic considerations 
for the water quality impacts and regulations. As a macro tidal estuary, the 
Humber and tidal Ouse have one more factor that significantly influences water 
quality: sediment. When the tide moves in, the sediments at the bottom of the 
river will be resuspended and moved upstream along the river, causing extra 
consumption of DO. Some pollutant may also be absorbed onto the sediments 
surface. In the Humber RDB particular, there are intensive flood defences to 
protect the flat flood-prone Ouse valley from extraordinary winter floods seen in 
1982,1991 and 1995. However, the flood defences also have the effect of trapping 
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silts in the Ouse. This is then exaggerated by the long duration ebb that the Ouse 
relies on to keep open navigable channels. The Ouse is thought to be the river that 
has more sediments than any other river in Britain (Duckham 1967). Climate 
change may even exacerbate the problem (Cashman et al. 1999). Hence the 
behaviour and transport of resuspended sediments can be directly detrimental to 
the water quality of the tidal river system (Goodwin et al. 2003; Mitchell et al. 
2003). However, measures on the impacts of resuspended sediments on water 
quality are still inadequate. 
Water abstraction from both surface water and groundwater are common in the 
Humber RDB. The main purpose is to provide public water supplies and to serve 
industries and agriculture. The water company in this region, Yorkshire Water, is 
currently abstracting around 360 Mega Litre (Ml =I million Litre) of water from 
the tidal Ouse catchment every day, or 4.167 m3s-'. Most of the water abstracted is 
supplied for household use and ends in STWs. There is also abstraction at site of 
industries for production processes, among which some goes to the STWs as 
effluents. Through the drainage network in the Humber RDB, water resources are 
reallocated by abstraction and discharge from STWs. In the rivers Aire and Don, 
the effluents from STWs can consist as much as 50% of the flow in summer 
(Edwards et al. 1997). There is also significant abstraction at the Long Drax, 
around 20 km downstream of York, by the Drax power station, the UK's largest 
coal-fired power station. The water is abstracted as cooling water, returned at the 
same site, but with half of it lost in evaporation. 
The traditional manufacturing sectors in the Humber RDB is declining, 
especially in the sectors coal mining, and iron and steel, though the overall 
economic activity is predicted to increase. Selby, from where the water quality 
starts to decline in the tidal Ouse and is likely to be affected most by regulations 
to improve water quality, is strongly dependent on the manufacturing, mining and 
construction industries. It has higher unemployment rate than most of the Humber 
RDB. Overall the Yorkshire and Humber region has the second lowest GDP per 
head in the UK (Cashman et al. 1999). 
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2.2 Regulative system of river policies in the tidal 
Ouse 
The objective of water policy in England is to protect both public health and 
the environment by maintaining and improving the quality of water (Defra 
2000a). Therefore it is a legal duty to prevent or reduce water pollution in the 
river, as well as a social and environmental responsibility. This objective has been 
continuously reinforced by both domestic law and European Commission (EC) 
directives. In England and Wales, the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (Defra) and the Environmental Agency (EA) was formed under the 
Environmental Act (1995), combining the National Rivers Authority (NRA), Her 
Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP), the former Waste Regulation 
Authorities and several smaller sections from the Department of the Environment. 
The aim of the EA is to provide high quality environmental protection and 
improvement. The EA seeks to achieve this by an emphasis on prevention, 
education and vigorous enforcement wherever possible. 
The Environmental Protection Act 1990 established the statutory ground for a 
wide range of environmental protection purposes. It also introduced the concept of 
Integrated Pollution Control (IPC) to prevent pollutant emissions to the air, water 
and land. In 1991 the Water Act 1989 that controlled the pollution and supply of 
water was replaced by five separate Acts. The Water Resource Act 1991 replacing 
the corresponding section in the Water Act 1989, consolidated the previous 
legislation in respect of quality and quantity of water resources (Defra 2000a). It 
regulates the discharges to controlled waters, including rivers, groundwaters, 
lakes, estuaries and coast waters through a system of consents granted by the EA. 
The EA sets conditions of volume and concentration of particular substance enter 
in to the waters or imposes broader constraints to the nature of effluent. Each 
consent is made based on the water quality objectives set by the EA to the water 
the effluent is about to enter, as well as the relevant standards set out by the EC 
directives. The aim of this Act is to ensure the polluters pay the cost of the 
consequence of their discharge. The water abstraction from all sources is also 
prohibited by this legislation except under water abstraction licenses. The Water 
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Industry Act consolidated the regulations to the appointment of water and 
sewerage undertakers (the water service company), the conditions of appointment, 
water provision and sewerage services. No trade effluent could be disposed to 
sewerage undertaker unless trade effluent consent or permission from the 
sewerage undertaker is obtained. It is responsibility of the owner of effluent to 
ensure the effluent does not violate the permission and inform details of effluent 
to the sewerage undertaker. The sewerage undertaker is also able to set extra 
conditions to specific trade effluent depends on the nature of effluents. The 
Environment Act 1995 established the Environment Agency, and introduced 
measures to enhance protection of the environment, including further powers for 
the prevention and remediation of water pollution (Defra 2000a). Best Available 
Techniques Not Entailing Excessive Cost (BATNEEC) is required to be utilized in 
pollution prevention to minimize the pollution released to the environment. 
The EC directives have been transposed and implemented in UK to ensure the 
standards of water quality protected as well as elsewhere in the member states of 
European Union (EU). The EC Surface Water Abstraction Directives 
(75/440/EEC) set the quality requirement for the surface water that serves as 
drinking water sources. The EC Bathing Water Directive (76/160/EEC) aims to 
ensure the protection of the health of swimmer and maintain the aesthetic value of 
bathing waters. The EC Freshwater Fish (78/659/EEC) and Shellfish Waters 
Directives (79/923/EEC), on the other hand, aim at protecting the health of 
freshwater fish and shellfish, designating the water in need of protection and the 
quality standards of those waters (Defra 2000a). Input of dangerous substances 
into the water is controlled under the EC Dangerous Substances Directives 
(76/464/EEC), together with the Water Resources Act 1991 to protect the water 
bodies and aquatic creatures. In England, the potential dangerous processes and 
substances are subjected to IPC. This is a regulatory system enforced by the EA in 
England and Wales, under Part I of the Environmental Protection Act 1990, to 
offer an integrated protection of the environment from release of these substances 
into water, air or land, or to reduce the emission to a minimum or harmless level 
using the BATNEEC. Throughout the UK, the IPC approach is being 
progressively replaced by a new Pollution Prevention Control (PPC) system to 
implement the EU's Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 
17 
Chapter 2 Background and Literature 
Tao Wang 
(IPPC - Directive 96/61/EC). The aim of IPPC is to achieve a high level of 
protection of the environment taken as a whole by, in particular, preventing or, 
where that is not practicable, reducing emissions into the air, water and land 
(Defra 2002b). Both IPC and PPC require the operator of plant installations and 
mobile plants to obtain a permit from the EA and comply with the conditions of 
the permit. They are similar in the respect that they requires an integrated 
approach to prevent or reduce the emission to the water, air and land in order to 
achieve a high level of protection for the environment as a whole, using 
BATNEEC. But PPC applies to a much wider range of activities. The IPPC 
process is being carried out sector by sector in UK from 2000 to 2007. Early 
implementations in the UK's industries have convinced it as a general principle 
and primary means to reduce the level of pollutant emissions into air, water or 
land, and to protect the environment as a whole. 
River quality has been improved in many rivers through the improvements 
made to the outflows from Sewage Treatment Works (STWs) and industries under 
the EC Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive (91/271/EEC). UWWTD was 
agreed in 1991. It is one of a number of European Directives which protect both 
the water environment and use of water for drinking, recreation or industry (Defra 
2002a). This European directive imposes requirements on the collection of sewage 
and standards for the disposal of sewage effluents. The main objective of the 
directive is to protect the environment from adverse effects of sewage effluents. 
Standard requirements are set according to the size of the discharge and the 
condition of receiving waters. The STWs in the Ouse catchment are of different 
sizes and are imposed by UWWTD for improvements under different time 
schedules. 
The Water Framework Directive (WFD) (European Commission 2000) is the 
most substantial agreement on the water legislation of the EC so far. The directive 
is designed to integrate the way of water management in water bodies across 
Europe. The Directive takes account of all the different objectives for which the 
aquatic environment is protected (ecology, drinking water, health and particular 
habitats), and ensures that measures taken to achieve the objectives are 
co-ordinated properly (Defra 2002c). It requires all the water bodies in the 
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member states to reach at least the "good status" by 2015. Through establishment 
of a river basin district structure, it aims at achieving long-term benefit on the 
water ecological health and sustainable management of water across Europe. 
Unlike previous EU Directives regulating on particular water issue or substance, 
WFD considers all the key issues in the water to decide whether it is of a "good 
status". It is for the first time a directive deals with the water issues on a water 
basin basis as a whole, taking into account inland and coastal waters, surface and 
groundwaters, and both water quantity and water quality to meet the objectives. 
Water needed for wetlands and to protect aquatic habitat for wildlife is also 
considered under WFD. The "joined-up" feature of WFD does not only imply the 
integration of managing different water bodies and considering both quantity and 
quality of water, but also to integrate the water management with other regulation 
or policy that are relevant to water environment, and to integrate the 
environmental and economic information in river policy decision (Defra 2005b). 
This need has been highlighted in the Defra report of "Directing the flow" and is 
regarded as priority of Defra and EA' responsibilities (Defra 2002c). Diffuse 
pollution sources, including the agriculture and urban runoffs are now recognised 
as prominent cause of water quality deterioration as clear evidence has shown that 
phosphorous, nitrogen, silt and other materials from farms are causing significant 
long-teen degradation of rivers, lakes and groundwaters as well as harming the 
plants and animals that live in them. The WFD requires the member state to 
achieve the "good status" in a way balancing between economic, environment and 
social considerations. The benefit associated with the WFD was estimated to be 
around £560 million per annum (Defra and Welsh Assembly Government 2003). It 
required benefit to be delivered at the most cost effective without incurring 
disproportionate costs. Derogation of objective need to be applied subjected to 
approval by the Secretary of State if it entails disproportionate costs. The 
Directive therefore sets a framework that should provide substantial benefits for 
the long-term sustainable management of water. Public participation is called by 
WFD to ensure there is great public involvement to tailor the specific instruments 
of water management and sustainable water use in each member state. To pool the 
effort from each member state and ensure consistent understanding and 
implementation of WFD across Europe, a "Common Implementation Strategy" 
(CIS) has been established by member states and the European Commission to 
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facilitate the exchange of best practice and experiences. Within the UK, Defra and 
EA established a UK Technical Advisory Group (UKTAG) to provide guidance 
and facilitate the implementation of WFD. As a key piece of European legislation, 
the long-term program of WFD would offer a major opportunity to improve the 
whole water environment and promote the sustainable use of water for the benefit 
of people and wildlife alike. 
The Water Bill published on 20 February 2003 received Royal Assent on 20 
November 2003, becoming the Water Act 2003 and published on 28 November 
2003. As the latest legislation on water resources, the Water Act 2003 is in three 
parts, relating to water abstraction and impounding, regulation of water industries 
and other provisions. The first part reflects the need for changes in the system of 
water abstraction licenses. Three different types of water abstraction licenses are 
designated for various water use activities. The other two parts aim at improving 
the regulation system of water industries and boosting the opportunities for 
competition in water services. 
2.3 Current river policy and management in the 
Ouse catchment 
2.3.1 A Brief history of river policy and management in 
the Ouse catchment 
Sheail (1997) reviewed the relevant river-management bodies of Yorkshire, 
North England, illustrating how the pace and direction of watercourse and 
catchment management are influenced by the preoccupations, aspirations and 
knowledge of policy makers and engineers. Yorkshire engineer, Malcolm 
McCulloch Paterson, described to the Parliament in 1896 two ways of pollutions 
in river: Positive Pollution occurred when pollutant was added into the river while 
Negative Pollution referred to abstraction of natural clean water (Sheail 1997). In 
1894, a River Board replaced the previous joint committee, taking over power to 
mitigate pollution as an independent entity, although almost every regulation was 
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opposed by local authorities and the mill owners. The Board acted initially via 
prosecution and policing, and then expanded its role to offering guidance and 
approval to local councils and traders. A River Ouse (Yorkshire) Catchment Board 
was appointed in 1922 by West Riding County Council for the purpose of land 
drainage management. Under the River Board Act of 1949, the responsibilities of 
the West Riding of Yorkshire River Board, Catchment Board and Yorkshire 
Fishery Board were brought together under a Yorkshire Ouse River Board. The 
River Board was replaced by the Yorkshire Ouse and Hull River Authority in 
1965, and the Yorkshire Water Authority was appointed in 1974, which had the 
longest length of class 1 river (unpolluted water) and second longest length of 
class 4 river (heavily polluted) in England. Within the context of Yorkshire Rivers, 
the Environment Agency in Leeds acts as the environmental authority to design 
regulations and river policies aimed at achieving sustainable use of river and 
estuarine resources. 
2.3.2 Water target and effluent discharge consents 
Effluent discharge consents are authorized by the EA, which usually prescribe 
the maximum concentration of specific pollutants, effluent flow and other aspects 
such as pH and temperature. This is broadly utilized, not only in UK but also over 
the world, as the main instrument to control the point sources of pollution 
discharged into water bodies. The EA implements local regulations and European 
directives to set various water quality targets for inland streams, ground waters, 
lakes, estuaries and coast waters, and set up the corresponding effluent discharge 
consents of pollution sources in order to achieve the target. Water Quality 
Objectives (WQO) is one of the defined water targets in order to protect identified 
uses of surface water and there are associated water quality standards. In the tidal 
Ouse, different objectives are set by the EA for different sections of the river, 
according to the nature of river, pollution sources and their abatement abilities, 
and the designated function of river water. The current WQOs were classification 
regulated under the Surface Waters River Ecosystem (RE) Regulations 1994. 
Selby, Drax and Boothferry Bridge are currently designated to the objective of 
RE4, which specifies a target of 10 percentile (%ile) DO saturation to be higher 
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than 50%. Cawood and Naburn are subject to higher target of RE3 and RE2, with 
l0%ile DO saturation no less than 60% and 70% respectively (Boorman 2003b). 
The annual assessments of general river water quality are undertaken by the EA 
and reported as the General Quality Assessment (GQA). This is designed to 
provide a consistent assessment of the state of water quality and enable 
comparisons to be made between different years and places. The GQA addresses 
four aspects: chemical, biological, nutrient and aesthetic grading. In 2005,72% of 
the rivers were of good biological quality, compared with 69% in 2000. Between 
1990 and 2005,31 % of rivers improved in biological quality. As for chemical 
quality of the river, 68% of rivers were of good chemical quality in 2005, same as 
2000, but overall 41% of rivers improved between 1990 and 2005. This is largely 
due to the large investment into river water quality by the industries, e. g. water 
companies spent over £6 billion on improving inland waters. The EA declared 
more than 70% of the rivers in the Yorkshire and Humber in 1995, including the 
rivers Ouse, Aire, Calder and Humber have their chemical water quality classified 
as "very good", "good" or "fairly good". The percentage for biological water 
quality was 71 %. 
For each river system, the EA allocates the effluent discharge consents to the 
pollution sources, mostly point sources, according to the WQO of the particular 
river, the previous GQA records and the nature of effluent from each source. The 
effluent discharge consents are usually fixed value of concentration of pollutants 
and flow rate, in terms of either daily means or maxima, not allowing for 
variation. For most of the point sources, the outflow of effluent is a mixture rather 
than one particular pollutant. Therefore, an effluent consent is usually subject to a 
set of different pollutants, which is similar within an industry. The effluent 
consent also prescribed the location of discharge, receiving water, the monitoring 
process and other aspects of retaining the compliant effluent discharges. In order 
to recover the regulatory cost as well as motivate reduction of effluent discharge, a 
charge for effluent discharge is applied to everyone who holds discharge consent 
under the Water Resources Act or groundwater authorisation under the 
Groundwater Regulations 1998. Currently the standard application charge is £772 
and the annual charge financial factor is £596, which will be multiplied by other 
relevant factors to determine the total effluent charge for a particular consent 
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holder. The total effluent charges are expected to account for £64m in year 
2005/06 (Environment Agency 2005). 
2.3.3 The Tradable Water Abstraction License system 
In England and Wales, the EA is responsible for managing the water resources 
in rivers, wetlands, lakes, underground water and reservoirs. Any water 
abstraction more than 20 cubic meters per day from either surface or underground 
sources will need a license. The water abstraction license granted by the EA is 
supposed to control the level of water abstraction and protect the water resources. 
Same as effluent discharges, there is a water abstraction charge to each water 
abstraction license holder in order to recover the administrative cost of the EA. 
Currently, the water abstraction charge is £10.03/1000m3 in Yorkshire, which is 
the lowest in England and Wales. A Defra report (Defra 2000b) concluded that 
increasing the water abstraction charge is not able to provide strong enough 
incentives for reducing water abstraction, either to satisfy particular water 
management objective, or to reduce the cost of environment damage from water 
abstraction. 
The water abstraction license has been in place since the 1960s. After more 
than 30 years, the problem associated with the license system has become 
apparent, such as over-licensing, licences issued in perpetuity and the lack of 
flexibility. After a Water Summit held by the Government with water companies, 
the EA and key stakeholders, the license system is currently under review. The 
Government has proposed some changes in the water abstraction license system in 
1999, relevant to the time limit of the licenses. Many of the changes require new 
legislation, which has been incorporated into the Water Act 2003. The new 
time-limited tradable water abstraction licensing system is to be managed through 
the Catchment Abstraction Management Strategies (CAMS) process, which 
commenced in 2001. CAMS is constructed at a local level, to make more 
information publicly available and to determine the balance of need between 
water abstraction and aquatic environment through consultation within the locally 
interested parties (Environment Agency 2002). The Rivers Ouse and Humber 
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system has been divided into six CAMS areas to determine the water abstraction 
level in each of them. However, the issue of over-licensing and lack of flexibility 
still exist, although revocation or variation for the so-called "sleeper" licences", 
under which there has been little or no actual abstraction for several years, has 
been required by the Government report "Taking Water Responsibly" (Defra 
1999b). The new time-limited licenses under the CAMS have a long review cycle 
of 12 years, which is still slow to variation and uncertainties. 
The water abstraction licenses issued by the EA give water rights to the license 
holder. The trade of water rights from one party to another for profit is allowed by 
tradable abstraction licenses. This economic instrument is supposed to generate 
efficient cost savings in the water abstraction and provide greater flexibility to 
accommodate varying demands (Defra 2000b). It is also expected to realize the 
true economic value of water contained in the abstraction license. However, no 
significant water right transfer has ever taken place through the tradable licenses 
(Defra 1998a). The Water Act 2003 has incorporated some changes to provide 
more facilities to remove barriers to trading. The objective of tradable water 
abstraction licenses is, in principle, to establish effective means to achieving the 
optimal distribution of water resources within and between different sectors of use 
and thus contribute to a sustainable development. 
2.4 Review of other environmental policy instrument 
The choice of environmental instruments has been controversial for decades. 
The commonly used means of regulation through design and performance 
standards are mainly statutory instruments per se, taking forms such as prohibition 
of processes or products; technology specification; discharge standards and 
permits; emission caps and harvest limits. Most criticism of the statutory 
instruments is based upon the fact that the fixed standards and consents ignore the 
difference of marginal costs of pollution abatement among various pollution 
sources and the different marginal damage caused by pollution at various places, 
resulting in inefficiency in social welfare along with environmental degradation. 
On the other hand, Market-Based Instruments (MBIs), mostly referred to emission 
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charge and TPP system, are preferred by economists not only because they can 
provide considerable efficiency gains over arbitrary standards, but also because 
that they provide more flexibility in compliance to regulation and continuous 
dynamic incentive for pollution control (Oates and Strassmann 1984; Cowan 
1998; Hanley et al. 1998; Perman et al. 1999). 
2.4.1 Emission charge 
An emission charge is a fee, collected by the government, levied on each unit 
of pollutant emitted into the air or water (Tietenberg 2006). Emission charges 
induce the firms to reduce their pollution because there are substantial costs of the 
pollution emitted by firms. A firm assumed to be profit seeking, will then reduce 
their pollution to the point where its incremental cost of abatement equal to the 
emission charge they must otherwise pay (Hanley et al. 1997). An effective 
emission charge will be set such that it leads to the emission reduction at the 
desired level to the regulator. Emission charge can always ensure the cost 
effectiveness for the required pollution reduction target although the target may 
not be cost efficient. 
The emission charge has its advantages and limitations. 
1. An obvious barrier of emission charge application is that neither abatement 
cost nor private benefit of the firm are known to regulators. The information 
asymmetry then prevents the regulators from establishing appropriate charge 
rate at the first try. An iterate trial-and-error process to find the appropriate 
charge rate which initiated from an arbitrary charge is then inevitable. In 
addition, the uncertainty involved requires the "appropriate charge rate" to 
vary all the time. 
2. One important advantage of emission charge is that it will stimulate the 
development and acceptance of cheaper and cleaner pollution abatement 
technology (Turner et al. 1994; Hanley et al. 1997; Tietenberg 2006). 
3. As emission tax is a tax levied on a public bad rather than public good, there 
are little or no distortion impacts on the economy. Some economists have 
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suggested that the revenue from emission tax could be "recycled" to alleviate 
the distortion taxes in the economy. This may generate benefit more than that 
associated with environmental protection. Pearce (1991) suggested the use of 
environmental taxes to reduce distortion taxes in a revenue neutral way could 
result in two benefits, not only environmental protection but also release of 
distortion taxes. This is also called the double dividend of emission charge/tax. 
But Xepapadeas (1997) discussed that with the appealing claim for double 
dividend, theoretical and empirical research does not seem to support the 
strong double dividend hypothesis; and the environmental benefit of emission 
taxes still remain crucial in justifying their introduction. 
Hahn (1989) and Cowan (1998) investigated the charge systems in different 
countries, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States. In France, the 
system is primarily designed to raise revenue for investment in sewage treatment 
and other projects for water pollution control. This charge is based on the load 
estimated by regional water agency. They provide a significant source of revenue 
of water quality improvement. In Germany, the system is similar to the French 
one. The charge is used to cover administrative expenses for water quality 
management and to subsidize projects that improve water quality. Uniform 
charges system across the country is based on the expected value of concentration 
and varies with industry types and municipalities. Although lacking of data, water 
quality seems improved by the effluent charge system. There was a large increase 
in abatement investment after the introduction of the charges. The Netherlands has 
one of the oldest and best administered charge systems, with one of the highest 
charge rate levied on the effluent stream. The charges are set to finance sewage 
treatment costs and have steadily risen over time. Like those in France and 
Germany, water quality is managed by both permits and effluent charges. The 
large polluters are monitored for actual levels while households and small 
polluters pay flat-rate charges. As a result, effluent discharge declined by 90% 
over 15 years. The US has relatively moderate effluent charges compared to 
Europe. The primary purpose of the charges in the US is to raise revenue in order 
to help the treatment plants that are heavily subsidized by the federal government. 
The environmental and economic impacts of the effluent charge are apparently 
small due to their small size and limited application of the revenue. 
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The effluent charge practices in Europe and US appear convincing to the 
advantages announced before, especially in the Netherlands. The gradual and 
steady rise of effluent charges is regarded as one of the keys to the success. 
However, in all these cases the effluent taxes are cooperating with existing direct 
regulations. 
2.4.2 Tradable pollution permit system 
TPPs were first proposed by Crocker in 1966 and Dales in 1968. Rather than 
increasing prices through a tax to reduce demand, TPPs set a maximum level of 
pollution or resource depletion that will be allowed through certain amount of 
permits. These permits may be issued in two ways, grandfathering, or auctioning. 
The permits are freely transferable. Assuming all the firms are costs minimizing, 
and the permits market is competitive, the overall cost of achieving the 
environmental target will be minimized. This virtue allows government to meet its 
policy objective while allowing greater flexibility in how to achieve the target 
(Tietenberg 2006). Although Zylicz (2003) argued that this is not valid when fixed 
costs are large, or with non-convex cost function. An obvious advantage of TPP 
over effluent charge is that no information is needed for the abatement cost. 
The TPP instrument is more favoured in the United States, applied both to 
water and air pollution. The success of the emission trading scheme under the 
1970 Clean Air Act of US have been reviewed by Hahn (1989) and Tietenberg 
(1990), and they found a substantial cost saving of over $10 billion. However, 
TPP applications in water pollution control always have very small market and 
thus are not very successful. Several important conditions for TPP system are 
discussed below: 
1. In general, transaction costs are ubiquitous in economics thus it is 
impossible for the trade of pollution permits to avoid it. Therefore, the trade 
equilibrium does not equilibrate marginal abatement costs among pollution 
sources, but the sum of marginal control costs and marginal transaction 
costs (Stavins 1995). Application of TPP system in Fox River actually 
failed due to high transaction costs in the form of administrative 
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requirements which essentially eliminated potential gains from trade (Hahn 
and Hester 1989). 
2. TPP may also result in hot spots generated by trade. There is always a 
possibility that trade will concentrate discharges in some places where high 
control costs exist. Thus, the ambient standards in that area are very likely 
to be violated. In the case of water pollution control or for other 
non-uniformly mixed pollutants, the location of polluters matters in the 
trade process. It is therefore imperative for the environmental authority to 
differentiate among polluters by their locations to achieve cost 
effectiveness (Baumol and Oates 1988), and different transfer coefficients 
of polluters on various monitoring sites are helpful (Zylicz 2003). 
It is argued that agricultural pollution control is best accomplished using 
voluntary `Best Management Practices', and that quantitative discharge limits and 
economic incentives are impractical (Young and Karkoski 2000). But as a new 
direction of TPP scheme, experiments have been carried out for pollution permit 
trade between point and non-point pollution sources (Jarvie and Solomon 1998). 
2.4.3 Comparing emission charge scheme and TPP system 
The idea of using effluent charge for least-cost management of effluent was 
introduced decades ago (Johnson 1967), so was the TPP system (Montgomery 
1972). Generally, under ideal conditions, emission charge schemes and TPP 
system are symmetric to each other (Pezzy 1992). However, where the control 
cost is not known with certainty, the two instruments differ. Weitzman (1974) 
indicated that when information on costs and benefits is imperfect, which 
instrument is likely to lead to larger bias from optimal equilibrium depends on the 
statistical characteristics of these uncertainties. Nevertheless, Shrestha (1998) 
argues that the statistical characteristics of uncertainties only prefer the effluent 
charge scheme when the predetermined standard is excessively stringent; for all 
the other situations, a TPP system is superior to an effluent charge scheme. The 
choice between a TPP system and an emission charge scheme has been discussed 
for a long time. In general, the TPP system is more preferred in the US while the 
tax scheme is more popular in Europe. Baumol and Oates (1988) suggested some 
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of the possible reasons why one is more preferable to the other one under different 
circumstances. 
The first and the major advantage of a TPP system, is the TPP system can 
reduce the uncertainty and adjustment costs involved in attaining a required 
environmental quality standard. The permit amount issued by the environmental 
authority always guarantees the required pollution reduction, yet on the other hand 
the emission charge scheme cannot guarantee the desired response from the 
pollution sources, hence the authority have to alter the rate from time to time. The 
adjustment to achieve the optimal rate in emission charge scheme is very costly or 
even unavailable. Similarly, the emission charge scheme also needs alterations in 
the charge rate due to economic growth and inflation. Therefore, it is very difficult 
to determine the optimal charge rate. In both situations, the market forces will 
automatically adjust the price of permits, so there is no need for imposed 
adjustment and no increase in pollution. 
The second reason lies in the financial burden incurred because of the costs 
imposed by the emission charges. Although the emission charge scheme will 
reduce the total costs of pollution control, it imposes a financial burden to the 
plants. Therefore, it is unfavourable to the pollution sources. On the other hand, if 
the pollution permits in a TPP system could be distributed free, through so-called 
"grandfathering" determined by the current level of existing plants, it can 
effectively eliminate the adverse effects on the plants from the extra financial 
burden that the emission charge scheme would otherwise impose. Although the 
"Polluter Pays Principle" requests that no one else but the polluter should bear the 
costs of pollution abatement, the plants will lose their competitiveness if the other 
plants in the industry were not charged at the same rate or were not charged at all, 
particularly at an international scale. For this reason, TPP system is preferable to 
the emission charge scheme by the managers of plant and some government 
officials seek aiming at improving economic competitiveness. 
There are also some arguments favouring the emission charge scheme, one of 
which involves the saving in the transaction costs. If the pollution permits are not 
distributed optimally in the first place, a number of transfers of pollution permit 
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need to take place in order to achieve the least cost solution. There will be costs 
incurred during the search and bargain activities relevant to the trade, usually 
known as the transaction costs. When the transaction cost is too high, there would 
not be enough transfer occurrences even though it could reduce the costs of 
pollution control. Stavins (1995) argued that in the presence of transaction costs, 
the equilibrium of pollution permits trade is no longer independent from the initial 
allocation of permits, but dependent on it. In the water pollution problem, the 
common situation is that there are usually only few pollution sources along the 
river, as in the Forth Estuary (Hanley et al. 1998) and along the tidal Ouse in this 
research. Therefore, it is possible that a single plant could dominate trading for 
both buying and selling, which is also impeditive to the trading of permit. 
Furthermore, considering the fact that a plant usually discharges a mixture of 
effluent containing various pollutants, the uniqueness of the plant's effluent 
discharges makes it more likely to be dominant in the market and harder to find 
appropriate traders. Strategic behaviour by traders is evident in the Fox River 
example (O'Neil et al. 1983). 
Unlike the TPP system for air pollution control, such as carbon dioxide (C02) 
emission as prescribed in the Kyoto Protocol, the TPP system to control water 
pollution is dealing with non-uniformly fixed pollutants, which need to take into 
account the location of pollution when trade is undertaken. Pollution from the 
upstream sources will affect the water quality downstream while the pollution 
from the downstream sources usually only has small impacts on the upstream. 
Therefore, impact from one unit pollution emission on the river water and 
environment depends on the location of discharge and other natural factors, so 
should be the price of permitting the emission discharge. This will add more 
difficulties to the trade of permit to being efficient, without generating the 
"hot-spot" of pollution where the cost from pollution is undervalued. A pollutant 
dispersion model approved by the environment authority has to be obtained before 
the trade is undertaken. This kind of model is usually expensive and may raise 
critical questions, which ultimately lead to the transactions being denied. Even in 
the successful permit trading scheme controlling the air pollution in the US, few 
trades requiring this modelling for non-uniformly mixed pollutants have been 
actually consummated (Tietenberg 1990). 
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2.4.4 Command and Control and Market-based 
Instruments: empirical evidences in UK 
Despite the glorification from economists of the advantages of MBI over the 
CAC approach, most environmental regulators, and even many pollution 
dischargers retain their preference to the less cost-effective environmental 
standards in environmental management and pollution control. One of the most 
obvious reasons is that the CAC standards such as effluent consents or technology 
standards are more easily managed and implemented by the regulator, and more 
easily understood and provide clearer abatement targets for the regulated pollution 
sources than MBI. Other reasons have been argued by many researchers in an 
extensive set of literature (Stavins 1995; Hanley et al. 1997; Helm 1998; Russell 
2001; Bell 2003; Zylicz 2003). 
Most economists agree that MBIs are more efficient, both in cost saving and 
dynamic incentive over CAC approach (Oates and Strassmann 1984; Baumol and 
Oates 1988; Hanley et al. 1997; Cowan 1998; Perman et al. 1999). But the 
context of uncertainty over both pollution-related environmental damage and costs 
benefits estimates, the risks of significant environmental hazards, and the nature 
of some projects involving significant fixed costs and little marginal costs could 
all shift the favour to the direct regulatory standards as a "better" approach against 
MBI, which is consistent with the precautionary principle and environmental ethic 
(Turner et al. 1994; Zylicz 2003). 
The unsuccessful cases, for example the Fox river discussed by O'Neil et 
al. (1983), which neither achieved the desired level of pollution abatement nor 
provided incentive for pollution abatement, indicated that the application of MBI 
approaches needs to be implemented with great caution. In addition, 
like the cases 
of water pollution control through emission charges in Europe, the MBI schemes 
are quite frequently complementary with existing regulatory standards. 
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2.4.5 Policy instruments in the perspective of the UK 
Government 
The UK Defra has considered (Defra 1998b; Defra 2000b) the possible 
movement away from the localised CAC approach to a river policy system 
utilizing economic instruments such as emission charges and TPP system, in order 
to improve the cost effectiveness of control for both pollution emission and water 
abstraction. It has been agreed by the Government that applying an emission 
charge scheme and a TPP system could improve both water quality targets and the 
efficiency of abatement efforts. However, before the introduction of these 
economic instruments into river policy, the Government is still to commission 
consultancy work over a series of issues about the practicability of these 
instruments in the regulation system of UK, and to estimate the possible effects of 
them to the domestic, commercial and industrial water users. 
Emission charge schemes in water pollution control could be introduced into 
the current framework of price regulation of the water and sewage companies, but 
has to make sure the charge is not to be passed in full to the consumers. The 
appropriate level and the structure of the charge are also critical issues under 
consultation. The Government is also aware of the interaction of the emission 
charges with the regulation of abstractions in this report, but with no further 
details. Trading system of pollution permit would induce more difficulties in 
introduction, as there is no current provision in water or other legislation for the 
operation of tradable permit (Defra 1998b). New legislation may be needed in 
order to justify the trading process. As discussed before about the general issues 
for TPP system, the Government is fully concerned for the inherited difficulties of 
the TPP system even various degrees of success have been seen in the US. It is by 
no means easy to guarantee sufficient existing and prospective dischargers to 
trade, nor are there big enough differences among their marginal costs to make the 
trade profitable after transaction cost, and the flexibility of increasing or 
decreasing abatement capacity facing stepped cost functions or sunk cost of 
facility. Creation of "hot-spot" through trade is also acknowledged by the 
Government. As declared by Defra in this report, within the context of the 'no 
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deterioration' principle and a policy of localised quality objectives, there is little 
scope left for the manipulation of TPP system. Discussions are raised for the 
details of the possible introduction of emission trading scheme in pollution 
control, the possible roles the EA and the Government can play, and the structure 
of the scheme. 
Defra (2000b) has concluded that raising the current water abstraction charges 
in various regions for incentive purpose, either to achieve a certain reduction of 
water abstraction (by 15 or 30%) or to mitigate the social damage, is not able to 
change the behaviour of major water abstraction licence holders, i. e. the water 
supply companies. Therefore the small benefit from water abstraction reduction 
together with a significant level of revenue from charges, imply a significant 
distributional effects, which would obstruct the charge scheme unless distortion of 
the incentive can be avoided. The trading possibility of water abstraction license 
has been presented from the beginning, unlike the effluent discharge consents, so 
there is no legislative gap to the trading of water rights. Defra believes that with 
more facility provided to the water rights trading in the Water Act 2003, the 
creation of markets in abstraction authorisations should be feasible in a number of 
catchments, with efficiency and environmental gains in both short- and long-terms 
realised through trade of water abstraction licenses. 
2.4.6 Integrated river policy for static and dynamic 
efficiency 
So far, most of the policies of river management only focus on the effect on 
effluent discharges to the river, or just the impact of water abstraction, and most of 
the river policy researches were investigated using static analysis only. This 
research aims to investigating integrated river policy taking account of both 
effluent discharges and water abstraction, whose impact on river quality are 
interdependent on each other. The integration of the policy can only be derived 
from a comprehensive understanding of the influences from effluent discharges 
and water abstraction, and the nature of river quality dynamics. It will therefore 
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lead to more cost effective solution of river management. This research also 
initiates in exploring the dynamic equilibrium of water quality control within 
relevant activities. Although the TPP system is able to accommodate the effects on 
the permit prices of economic growth and inflation automatically through market 
forces, it is not applicable to the dynamic growth in individual plant. A dynamic 
analysis for the equilibrium of pollution control, and the associated capital and 
investment decision would shed a light into the river management over time rather 
than sticking at a stationary point. 
2.5 In-stream water quality models and their 
applications 
There has been a long history of using quantitative techniques to assess the 
impacts of pollutants on river water quality, in terms of DO particularly, in river 
systems (Cox 2003b). Up to now, most of the hydrological models used in this 
context are constructed based on the concept of mass balance of constituents 
first 
used by the Royal Commission of 1912. Streeter and Phelps derived the classic 
equations for simulating DO and BOD in rivers in 1925 (Cox 2003b), which 
have 
formed the basis of many present sophisticated computer-based water quality 
models. With the increased use of computer technology in hydrology 
in the last 
two decades, more advanced hydrological models have been 
developed and 
improved for better simulations of the dynamics in the in-steam water system 
(Bikangaga and Nassehi 1995; Lewis et al. 1997; Cox 2003b; Deflandre et al. 
2006). 
The large number of existing models is also partly because most studies of 
water quality and hydrology in rivers are more or less specific to a particular 
situation. Therefore, often the result is `local' water quality models suitable only 
for use where the models are derived. In a review of currently available water 
quality models by Cox (2003a; 2003b), several popular water quality models 
for 
in-stream and river processes are evaluated on the basis of availability for 
providing simulations of DO in lowland rivers. The conclusion shows all of them 
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contain assumptions and limitations on the interpretation of model simulation 
outputs. Because water quality models are widely used by environmental 
authorities to assist operations such as consents setting and evaluating potential 
effects of future planning, they are often driven by environmental legislations and 
water regulations in various countries. Therefore, it is not surprising that although 
few are widely used by institutions, water quality models are often specific to one 
country, one institution or even one river catchment. 
The water quality models used to predicting both static and dynamic change in 
water qualities in the rivers of UK include QUASAR (and the descendant 
QUESTOR) and MIKE-11. QUASAR and QUESTOR models were both 
developed by the Centre for Ecology & Hydrology (CEH) UK and have been 
extensively used by the EA as a planning tool and also during the LOIS project to 
simulate the dynamic change in river quality in the Yorkshire Ouse river system 
(Lewis et al. 1997; Whitehead et al. 1997; Eatherall et al. 1998). Both of the 
models represent a river system by a one-dimensional network of reaches. 
One-dimensional models assume complete mixture of the water in the river's 
cross-section area at any point along the river; hence, the concentrations of 
water-borne substances are distributed in one-dimension along the river length. 
QUESTOR is a software framework to support in-stream water quality modelling 
at CEH Wallingford. It was developed from QUASAR to support increasingly 
demanding model applications. An example of utilizing QUESTOR in water 
quality simulation, together with detailed data preparation, calibration and 
validation processes, can be found in the Defra report of Economic Instruments 
for Water Pollution Discharge (Defra 1999a). In this report, Defra examines 
advantages and disadvantages of a charge on water pollution if introduced in the 
UK. QUESTOR is utilised to simulate the influence of changes in emission rate 
on water quality. The models have relatively small data requirement, which 
simplify the calibration and reduce the run-time. However, the models cannot 
simulate a river system with back flows or loops, which is a common 
phenomenon in a tidal river system. Boorman (2003a; 2003b) carried out an 
extensive and consistent exercise in river modelling, through simulating several 
constituents including Dissolved Oxygen (DO), in the six catchments draining 
along the Ouse system to the Humber estuary. In most of the simulations, the 
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model provided very accurate quantitative assessment. However, as the author 
mentioned, the lack of data prescribing many of the point pollution sources and 
abstractions is regrettable especially in terms of assessing in-stream conditions 
during the summer months. The simulation results of the QUESTOR model were 
used as inputs to model the downstream estuary after the tidal limit with the 
ECoS3 HOT model (Tappin et al. 2002). 
MIKE-11 was developed by the Danish Hydraulic Institute and was marketed 
in a suite of software in the UK and Europe. MIKE-11 is an engineering software 
package for the simulation of flows, water quality and sediment transport in 
estuaries, rivers, irrigation systems, channels and other water bodies. It is a 
dynamic one-dimensional modelling tool for the detailed design, management and 
operation of both tidal and freshwater rivers. MIKE-11 is an advanced model of 
flow and water quality simulations (Cox 2003b). However, the large amount of 
data required limits running the model in many cases at a high enough level of 
complexity to generate accurate simulations. So is the problem for the process of 
calibration. Another issue of MIKE-11 is its lack of stochastic component, which 
makes it unfavourable to practices in relation to UK legislation, where the 
regulations are based on probabilities of water quality achievement. On the 
contrary, McIntyre and Wheater (2004) introduced a WaterRAT model based on 
Monte Carlo simulation to identify the significant uncertainties and to evaluate the 
degree to which the decision generates risks. But the model itself has much 
simpler form than MIKE-11 so it is not as accurate in water quality simulations. 
Hanley et al. (1998) utilized the MIKE-11 model as part of an 
environmental-economic modelling exercise aimed at quantifying the potential 
cost savings from a Tradable Pollution Permit (TPP) system in the Forth Estuary, 
Scotland. The MIKE-11 water quality model was combined with step-wise integer 
and linear programming models representing firms' abatement costs. They also 
mentioned the difficulty regarding data availability and introduced a term of 
certainty equivalency based on Chebychev's Inequality to include the stochastic 
property into the results. 
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Most of the models except MIKE-11 that Cox (2003b) evaluated are only 
suitable for the simulation of water quality, particularly of DO, in freshwater 
systems. In a river system such as the tidal Ouse that has diurnal tidal movement, 
the nature of water quality and flow is more complicated than can be satisfactorily 
simulated by a generalized model. Two models have been successfully utilized in 
simulating flow and water quality in the tidal Ouse: ECoS3 software and the 
QUESTS model. ECoS is acronym of Estuarine Contaminant Simulator, a quick, 
flexible framework that is utilized in many estuarine systems. Developed by the 
Plymouth Marine Laboratory, it aims to estimate the distribution of contaminants 
in a theoretical estuary (Pham et al. 1997). Tappin et al. (2003) constructed a 
Humber-Ouse-Trent (HOT) model with the ECoS3 software for extensive 
research on the fluxes and transformation of suspended particles, carbon and 
nitrogen in the Humber estuary system. The estuary quality model QUESTS was 
developed by WRc and widely used by the EA for consents setting and as a 
planning tool. The QUESTS model was used by Cashman et al. (1999) to evaluate 
the efficiency of the mechanism for the allocation of consents between pollution 
sources in the tidal Ouse. 
2.6.1 Previous research by ECoS3 Software and HOT 
model 
ECoS has been utilized by many researchers (Pharr et al. 1997; Liu et al. 1998; 
Harris and Gorley 2003; Punt et al. 2003; Tappin et al. 2003) aiming at simulating 
the distribution of turbidity, salinity, particles, carbon, nitrogen and metal 
contaminants in estuaries. Most of the researches have obtained satisfactory 
simulations, although in some instances it is hindered by lack of sufficient data 
(Tappin et al. 2002; Punt et al. 2003), suitable reaction coefficients (Liu et al. 
1998) or other constraints. 
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Applications of ECoS software or models built within ECoS range widely from 
the Tamar estuary in southwest England to the Tweed estuary in northeast England 
and as well as the Gironde estuary in France. Among them, the Humber estuary 
has been intensively investigated and simulated by utilizing ECoS software on 
suspended particles, carbon and nitrogen (Tappin et al. 2003). In order to do so, a 
site-specific model was built within the ECoS3 software to represent the 
complicated biological, chemical and physical transactions taking place in the 
estuary. The HOT model takes into account a wide range of processes linked with 
a dynamic mathematical model into a coherent system (Harris and Gorley 1998b). 
Although in theory ECoS3 can represent biogeochemical transformation 
systems of indefinite complexity in one and two dimensional advection-dispersion 
contexts which may be branched and layered (Gorley and Harris 1998), the 
models built within the software to simulate the constituents in river water are 
usually tidal averaged and are one-dimensional. The HOT model components treat 
the estuary in terms of concentrations, process- and transport- averaged across its 
cross-section, i. e. it is a one-dimensional model as it only represents the water 
flows and the advection and dispersion of substances along the axis of the estuary, 
assuming the river is instantaneously and completely mixed across its width and 
depth (Harris and Gorley 1998b). This is applicable when the estuary is well 
mixed, showing negligible variation across a section. Furthermore, the HOT 
model is a tide-averaged model, as the requirement to simulate the estuary over 
seasonal time scales precluded the explicit representation of the tide in the model. 
Any direct effect of the ebb and flow of the tide on constituents observed has been 
ignored. Variations directly due to the tidal oscillation are treated as error, and the 
indirect effects of the tides are modelled as dispersion (Tappin et al. 2003). The 
reason for using a tide-averaged model stems from the fact that the volume of 
water in many estuaries does not depend on the flow of river water into the 
estuaries from headwater sources, but largely on the ebb and the flow of tide 
(Harris and Gorley 1998a). Averaging over the tide would generate effectively 
constant volume of water in a particular estuary thus making it possible to 
calculate the water velocity in the estuary through cubature, in which the velocity 
at any point along the river is determined by the given volume and cross-sectional 
area at the point. 
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The ability of ECoS3 software is not restricted only to tide-averaged model as 
in HOT; it is also able to construct models with tidal variability. In a model 
constructed by ECoS3 of solute transport in the Tweed Estuary, the estuarine 
model consisted of a one-dimensional hydrodynamic scheme with tidally variable 
channel cross-sectional area (Punt et al. 2003). ECoS3 software is a general 
framework for modelling hierarchical spatial systems (Harris and Gorley 2003). 
Its modular structure and template models allow it to be rapidly adapted for new 
or highly specific modelling needs. Tappin (2002) has integrated the HOT model 
with the QUESTOR model by using the results from the latter to feed into the 
HOT model as input data for the tidal Ouse at its tidal limit at Naburn. This 
flexibility of the ECoS structure makes it ideal for modelling complex systems 
including the dynamics in an estuary, and spatial and temporal distributions of 
physical, chemical and biological processes. It has been suggested to be a suitable 
tool for environmental management, adaptable to the needs of industry and 
regulators (Punt et al. 2003). 
2.6.2 Previous research through the WRc QUESTSID 
Like the ECoS3 HOT model, the QUESTSID model is a one-dimensional 
representation of the tidal river system stretching from the tidal limits of the Ouse, 
Wharfe, Aire, Don and Trent to the sea spurn. The QUESTS 1D model has not 
been as widely applied to various estuaries as ECoS3 software. Nevertheless, this 
does not affect its reliability as most of the current water quality models are 
localized to specific rivers. In fact, the QUESTSID mode has been intensively 
utilized in the Humber system, by the EA for the consents setting and regulation 
planning purpose. 
The QUESTS 1D model has been available for simulating the river water 
quality in Humber system since 1994. Some recent previous works undertaken 
after the validation in 1999 are used as the predictive tool focusing on 
implications on river water quality of both water abstractions in tidal Ouse and 
reductions in Selby effluent discharges. 
39 
Chapter 2 Background and Literature 
Tao Wang 
Freestone (2001) used the QUESTID model to estimate the magnitude of the 
effects on DO concentration distribution of changes in water abstraction regime, 
i. e. abstracting the same amount of water from elsewhere rather than current 
locations. The effects of improving the inputs from rivers Aire and Don, the two 
biggest tributaries of the tidal Ouse, and effects from effluent discharges at Selby 
on the DO concentration distribution were also investigated. The simulation was 
based on the flow conditions of 1996 and 1997, a very dry year and an average 
rainfall year respectively. The simulated results illustrated significant changes in 
water abstraction locations and in effluent loads of Selby industries. The effluent 
loads had much bigger impact than the former factor, particularly in the drier year 
of 1996. Among these three possible changes, only elimination of effluent 
discharge could guarantee the DO target alone of no less than 30% saturation at 
5%ile, no matter dry or wet year. The input improvements in Aire and Don had 
very marginal effects on the DO sag between Selby and Long Drax, and caused 
relatively more noticeable improvements downstream of their confluences. This is 
a confirmed finding of previous researchers that the effluent discharges from 
Selby industries are a significant contributing factor in the DO depletion in the 
river Ouse between Selby and Long Drax. 
Similar research carried out later by Freestone (2003) to some extent quantified 
the effects of these three changes. Changing existing water abstraction location 
from the Ouse and Derwent to the Aire and Don, where the water would otherwise 
be transferred to through the water supply and sewage system, would have 
improved the value of minimal DO saturation between Selby and Drax from 5% 
to 13% in 1996 and from 20% to 28% in 1997. Elimination of discharges from 
Selby could have improved the minimal DO saturation in the same area from 5% 
to 39% in 1996 and from 20% to 40% in 1997. With existing water abstraction 
locations and the improved inputs from Aire and Don, elimination of discharge 
load from Selby resulted in an equally good water quality with a minimum of 41 % 
DO saturation between Selby and Drax. The oxygen demand of sediment, which 
is not available to be explicitly estimated in the QUESTS ID model, was related to 
the difference between minimal DO saturation at Naburn of 67%, and that 
between Selby and Drax under the best situation of 41 %, roughly 26% (Freestone 
2003). 
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Longer time series of simulations were made in 2002 for the river conditions 
between 1996 and 2000 (Freestone 2002). The simulated results were assessed 
upon the Rivers Ecosystem (RE) Objectives to investigate the effects of effluent 
discharge reductions in Selby's industries. The research concluded that even under 
very stringent discharge consents of no greater than 100 tonnes of BOD/year for 
all the four plants in Selby, it could just guarantee meeting the RE4 target at Selby 
and Drax. It also indicated that fresh water flows are an extremely important 
factor for the DO concentration in the tidal Ouse, which is unfortunately beyond 
our control. 
The most intensive simulations for the effects of alternative pollution control 
management on the DO concentrations in the Ouse were joint research by the EA 
and the Environment Department in the University of York. It considered the 
following alternative management actions (Cashman et al. 1999): 
"A change in the location of discharge of Selby industry effluents to the 
Ouse/Humber system. 
"A change in the timing of discharge of Selby industry effluents with 
respect to local high water. 
"A change in the timing of discharge of Selby industry effluents over the 
year. 
"A change in the net level of Yorkshire Water abstractions from the Ouse 
and Derwent. 
"A change in the level of discharges from the Selby industries to meet the 
Environment Agency's targets. 
The effects of these management actions were examined against compliance to 
RE Objectives, the General Quality Assessment (GQA) scheme, EA's DO 
standards, and the composite score of Estuarine Working Party Classification 
Scheme. The results concluded that, among all the actions, moving the location of 
effluent discharges from Selby to Boothferry, about 20 kin further downstream, 
would generate a remarkable benefit to the DO saturation in the tidal Ouse. Return 
of the abstracted water in either the Derwent or the Ouse has marginal effect on 
DO saturation. Return in the Derwent has better effects as the water in Derwent is 
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well-aerated and low in oxygen demand, while water return in the Ouse only 
slightly improves the situation due to the poorer input water quality. Storing 
effluent to discharge in winter instead of in summer has barely noticeable impacts, 
depending on the proportion stored and discharge location. Similarly, discharging 
on the ebb tide hardly makes any difference. Reduction of effluent discharges in 
Selby would significantly improve the water quality as expected, but at a much 
higher price. 
2.7 Previous research on hydrological and 
economic impacts of river policy 
There is little previous research trying to combine the water quality issues with 
economic analysis. O'Shea (2002) offered a general discussion of the difficulties 
and possible approaches to combine these two aspects in reducing water pollution. 
One of the conclusions reached at the end is "Each case must be decided on its 
own merit". She also pointed out that the water pollution issues "call for close 
cooperation between scientists and economists". Same as a later research by 
Zylicz (2003), cost effective management in the river to reducing water pollution 
are perused, followed by discussions regarding the proper policy instruments, 
particularly market-based instruments to deliver the management. 
There is also little research trying to add dynamic features in water quality and 
river policy analyses, despite the fact that the pollution issue in river water usually 
has dynamic features related to changes in effluent discharge, abatement 
measures, and runoff from land use or interactions within the water body. When 
water pollution reduction is combined with economic analysis as suggested above, 
the dynamic feature widely associated with economic activities calls for more 
consideration of not just one-off solutions under the current situations, but for 
solutions that can evolve with time and can accommodate changes within the 
system. 
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Combining water resources management with economic analysis has attracted 
more attention than water quality management, partly because the uses of water 
resource as public and industrial water supply or irrigation in agriculture are more 
closely related to and easier to quantify their economic cost and benefit than water 
quality. Rosegrant et al. (2000) introduced an integrated economic-hydrologic 
water modelling at the Maipo river basin in Chile. A holistic hydrological model 
at river basin scale was combined with economic analysis for farmers' agricultural 
activities and water use efficiency. Water rights trading were introduced to allow 
water resource to go to higher valued agriculture. Economic profits were found by 
the optimisation. However, water quality was not concerned in this research. 
Brouwer et al. (2005) and Dellink (2000) discussed the prospects of evaluating 
total cost of economy for pollution abatement through general equilibrium model. 
The work of Brouwer et al. (2005) was based on scenario analysis in a top-down 
approach within which various abatement levels were assumed. This approach 
depicts well the direct and indirect costs of pollution abatement targets, but the 
options of pollution abatement were inflexible, ignored the significant local 
differences among river systems, which is not in a "case by case" style. Dellink's 
research (2000) is similar but using optimisation analysis rather than scenarios. He 
also focused on the dynamic interaction between economy and environment and 
found that the dynamic specification is highly relevant to the results. As a 
top-down approach, these studies concentrated on the GDP impacts of 
implementing pollution reduction requirements such as that required by the WFD. 
On the contrary, this research is taking a bottom-up approach, looking for 
specific abatement options and focus on the impacts within the catchment, 
especially those along the river. Indirect costs are not considered in this research 
due to data limitation. A well-calibrated water quality model, which simulates the 
changes of water quality instead of just focusing on abatement levels, is combined 
with specific case-based economic analysis in this research. This offers more 
flexibility and more realistic optimisation to the water quality management. 
Although it is rare, there are some studies in the UK taking a similar bottom-up 
approach to achieve the cost effectiveness in water quality management, back 
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from 1979 by Rowley et al. at the Tees Estuary (Rowley et al. 1979). The Tees 
Estuary was "grossly polluted" in 1970 so that it was not able to support fishing 
livelihoods from Stockton to the mouth of the estuary. Rowley et al. (1979) 
investigated the possibility of utilizing an emission charge instrument rather than 
regulatory consents to control the pollution and achieve satisfactory water quality. 
Nine major industrial pollution sources were included in an economic model in 
which a least-cost solution in the pollution control can be found combined with 
transfer coefficients from a water quality model. An appropriate charge rate can 
also be determined for a particular water quality target. 
Another one is at the Forth Estuary in Scotland (Hanley and Moffatt 1993; 
Hanley et al. 1998). The most significant problem in the Forth Estuary, similar to 
the tidal Ouse, is the seasonal DO sag associated with low flow and high 
temperature conditions, which prevents the salmon from returning after migration. 
The industrial sources account for 87% of the total BOD loading. Economic 
model was developed for the estuary to minimize the control costs subject to the 
environmental constraints, alongside a model of water quality. The research also 
tried to explore the potential of using a tradable permits system to improve the 
water quality at a lower cost than that under a CAC approach. In the paper in 
1993, Hanley and Moffatt (1993) showed that the flexible regulation was closest 
to the least cost solution although it could not provide the continuing incentive of 
reducing pollution in the efficient manner as TPP and emission charges. Hanley 
(1998) conducted the analysis for both the Emission Permits System (EPS) and 
the Ambient Permits System (APS). The research emphasized the importance of 
heterogeneity among the WQM sites in the estuary. The author also pointed out 
that significant impact of resuspended bottom sediment on the DO distribution 
can be expected in estuary, from both past and current anthropogenic activities. 
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Chapter 3 River Water Quality Model 
3.1 Introduction 
Tao Wang 
Using quantitative techniques to assess the impacts of pollution on river water 
quality has a long history, but only recently it has been enormously improved with 
the assistance of computer technologies such as Geographic Information System 
(GIS) and much stronger calculation capability. But the underlying concept of 
most current water quality models is still the same as before, based on the concept 
of mass balance of constituents first used by the Royal Commission of 1912. 
Depending on various processes to simulate the river system and different levels 
of detail information, there are many different water quality models. Most of the 
current water quality models are constructed with different forms of computer 
programs. However, the river system is always complicated and difficult to 
predict. After years of continuous development, assessing the impacts on water 
quality of diffusing pollution remains one of the major difficulties. As pointed out 
by Cox (2003b), the simulating abilities of many of the water quality models are 
still sensitive to the river system they are applied to. 
For the reason above, I selected two water quality models in this research that 
were applied to the tidal Ouse before. The ECoS3 HOT model is good at 
simulating the fluxes and transformation of pollutants in the river (Tappin et al. 
2003), while QUESTSID model is used by EA to assist the design of effluent 
discharges, which is therefore more focused on the DO issue in the tidal Ouse. 
Both of them have been successfully applied to various simulations in the tidal 
Ouse before, but the research later found the ECoS3 HOT model is not well 
equipped to simulate the location of DO sag in the tidal Ouse despite its success in 
simulating other major pollutants. The simulation results from QUESTS ID model 
fit better to the observations. It has also been continuously improved with 
calibrations and validations because of its special role in EA's decision making in 
discharge consents. 
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This chapter comprises 4 sections. Section 1 is the overview of the simulation 
results from the hydrodynamic models and describes how this chapter is 
structured. Section 2 describes the development of the ECoS3 HOT model and its 
previous applications in the estuaries of the UK and Europe. The results of 
previous applications are introduced and evaluated to determine the possibility of 
utilising it to model water quality of the Ouse/Humber estuaries. The discrepancy 
between observed data and simulation results is described in this section, and 
potential reasons for the model's inadaptability to this research are discussed. 
Section 3 introduces the QUESTSID river water model, which is applied to the 
Ouse and Humber estuaries by the EA for setting consents and as predictive tool 
for the implementation of potential pollution control options. The QUESTSID 
model treats DO saturation and concentration as one of the key determinants in 
the river water as well as in the model processing. Several studies on the Ouse and 
Humber estuaries have utilised the QUESTS ID model. The details of these 
research and their results are introduced. Section 4 analyses the simulation results 
from the QUESTS 1D river water model. Diverse management options are 
designed to improve the water quality in the tidal Ouse and to tackle the DO sag 
between Selby and Drax during the summer months. The effectiveness of each 
control option for improving water quality and tackling the DO sag is evaluated 
based on the DO profile and the composite score. As these management options 
are not exclusive, a combination of some of them might be the best practice. The 
analyses of simulation results also lead to the construction of a transfer 
coefficients matrix, which would be a critical parameter of the economic model 
constructed in the next chapter. 
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3.2 ECoS3 HOT Model 
3.2.1 Description of the HOT model 
Figure 3.1 The tidal section of Humber, Trent and Ouse system and main tributaries 
Source: Tappin et al. (2003) redrawn from (National Rivers Authority 1993) 
Tao l1'ctng 
Figure 3.1 shows the structure of the tidal section in Ouse, Trent and Humber 
system and their main tributaries. The estuaries of the Ouse, Trent and Humber are 
divided as follows: The Humber estuary extends from the confluence of the Ouse 
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and the Trent, at Trent Falls, to Spurn Point (a distance of 63 km); the Ouse and 
Trent estuary extend from their tidal reaches, Naburn Weir and Cromwell Weir 
respectively, to their confluence, distances of 61 and 85 km respectively. Inputs 
from the Wharfe, Derwent, Aire and Don are located at their confluence as point 
inputs, while regressions are used to reduce the problem of missing data to an 
acceptable extent (Tappin et al. 2003). All the estuaries are divided into 500-meter 
segments along their longitudinal axes, and the simulated values of determinants 
in each segment represent the averages over the cross-section. 
Dynamic representations given by this model include water, salt, suspended 
particulate matter (SPM), suspended phytoplankton, detrital particulate organic 
carbon (POC), nitrate, nitrite, ammonium, dissolved inorganic phosphate (DIP), 
particulate inorganic phosphate (PIP), temperature, dissolved oxygen (DO) and 
other determinants. The model also simulates the dynamics of POC, ammonium 
and DO in the bed sediments in a simple way. More details of the structure of the 
HOT model and its rationale have been intensively introduced (Harris and Gorley 
1998a; Harris and Gorley 1998b; Harris and Gorley 2003). The HOT model 
calculates the velocity of the water and solutes by cubature, with aggregate inputs 
of river, tributaries and discharge sources and constructed mid-tide mean 
cross-sectional area at any point. Water abstraction currently is not taken into 
account in the model but could be included as an output of water. For the three 
reaches, the river Ouse, river Trent and river Humber, any effects of evaporation, 
precipitation, abstraction or diffuse inputs (from drainage, groundwater) on the 
volume of water are ignored (Tappin et at 2003). 
A description of the transfers and cycling of the constituents simulated by HOT 
model is given as Figure 3.2. Detailed description and mathematical 
representations of the transfers between theses constituents can be found in Tappin 
et al. (2003). Data on water flow and constituents concentrations from the 
estuaries and their tributaries are provided by the Natural Environment Research 
Council (NERC) Land-Ocean Interaction Study (LOIS) rivers programme. River 
inputs from the Ouse and the Trent are located at their tidal limits while the inputs 
from the main tributaries are located at their confluence with the Tidal Ouse, 
although, except for Derwent they all have long distance of tidal reach beyond the 
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confluence with the tidal Ouse (National Rivers Authority 1993). For unavailable 
data, the model uses regression to reduce the difficulties of missing of earlier data 
to an operable extent, based on assumption of flow-concentration relationships 
(Tappin et al. 2003). The HOT model includes sixteen point sources of industrial 
discharges and sewage effluents in the Humber, five in the Ouse and four in the 
Trent. Two out of four industries in Selby are included in the model, Harmann & 
Reimer (now Tate & Lyle Citric Acid) and Hazelwood (now Greencore). These 
inputs are regarded as minor relative to river inputs, with the exception of 
ammonium discharge in the Humber and the Ouse (Tappin et al. 2003). 
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Figure 3.2 Reservoir and transfers of carbon, nitrogen and phosphorus in the model 
Source: Tappin et al. (2003). 
The HOT model was calibrated on the Rivers Atmosphere, Estuaries and 
Coasts Study (Coasts) (RACS(C)) database for the Ouse and Humber, for carbon, 
nitrogen and suspended particles utilising a Marquardt minimisation procedure. 
The part of model for the Trent is not calibrated due to lack of data, but the model 
incorporates calibrated parameters generated from the Ouse and the Humber to the 
49 
Chapter 3: River Water Quality Model 
Tao Wang 
Trent model. Harris (2003) provides a detailed process for calibration illustrated 
by the simulation of the surface salinity profile of Humber estuary. 
The axial concentration along the river of SPM, POC, nitrate, nitrite and 
ammonium in the tidal Ouse and the Humber estuaries are simulated with the 
HOT model and are compared with the measured concentrations used for model 
calibration. The simulated concentrations and distributions have also been tested 
against independent data from the 27 surveys of the Yorkshire Ouse and Humber 
estuaries during 1994-1996, the LOIS database and the EA measurements. The fits 
between model results and these data are reasonably good, but with some 
exceptions. 
3.2.2 Simulation of DO distribution 
Because of the previous successful experience in the Humber estuaries, ECoS3 
HOT model was first applied in this research to analyse the DO saturation (DO%) 
distribution over the tidal Ouse-Humber estuaries, especially in an attempt to 
represent the DO sag during the summer months in the Tidal Ouse around Selby 
and Long Drax. The flexibility of model structure in ECoS3 makes it feasible to 
change the timing and locations of discharge effluents and include water 
abstraction as an output. Therefore it should be capable to analyse the 
effectiveness of alternative pollution abatement options in this research. 
However, the simulated DO distribution in the summer along the Tidal Ouse 
does not fit the DO sag observed in the river. Instead of having significant DO sag 
around the river length between Selby and Long Drax and having gradually 
improved DO% as approaching to the Trent Falls, the simulated result in most of 
the time indicates a smooth DO curve monotonically declining along the river, 
having the minimal DO concentration around the Trent Falls. Figure 3.3(a) and 
3.3(b) indicates the significant discrepancy between model simulation result and 
observed DO concentration data in two different years. 
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Figure 3.3 (a) The ECos3 simulation and observed DO distribution along the river from 
Naburn to Sea Spurn in summer in 1994 and (b) in 1996. The X-axis is the distance from 
Naburn Weir, tidal limit of Ouse till the sea Spurn. The dots are observations from LOIS 
dataset. 
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The HOT model was not calibrated against DO data when constructed. This is 
due to the time pressure on the project within which the HOT model was 
constructed to analyse the transformation and transport of suspended particles, 
carbon and nitrogen. After looking into the model in detail, I concluded several 
reasons might be responsible for the discrepancy between simulated results and 
observed results: 
The first is that the biology/chemistry of DO dynamics is not well described in 
the model. The relationship between the POC mineralisation and ammonium 
nitrification was not included in the model, There might be competition for the 
DO in the river water between these two transactions according to their respective 
kinetics. On the other hand, the rate of nitrification has been found dependent on 
the concentration of suspended sediment in the water, and this relationship was 
included in the ECoS3 modelling based on a linear representation derived by 
Owens (1986). Xia et al. (2004) argued that the nitrification rate would increase 
non-linearly with the increment of suspended solid rather than following the linear 
relationship applied in the model. But both studies agreed that the nitrification rate 
would increase with suspended particles in the river water. In the HOT model, 
POC concentration was assumed to be a constant percentage of SPM in the river 
water. Therefore the maximum SPM concentration, usually in the turbidity 
maximum (TM) zone, always accompanies the DO sag or is just slightly 
upstream. This was also confirmed by the changes in the locations of DO sags 
when shifting the TM zone. From the simulations, the model suggested the DO 
consumption from nitrification and POC mineralisation to be the most significant 
sources of DO consumption in the river, particularly the POC from resuspended 
bed-exchanged sediment. The DO consumption from the transactions in the 
sediment was also suggested to be as significant (Hanley et al. 1998; Parr and 
Mason 2004), but it cannot be successfully separated from other sources. 
However, no matter where the TM zone is located, the DO sag in the simulation 
always persists until the confluence with the river Trent, without showing a 
recovery stage which is observed in the lower river Ouse. So the problem seems to 
lie in the simulation of DO recovery in the river water, which will be discussed 
later. 
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There are also some transformations that are not included in the modelling, 
such as denitrification. Denitrification is the process through which nitrate is 
reduced to nitrogen or nitrous oxide when the DO concentration in the water is 
very low. However this process is treated as an insignificant process in the river 
Humber in HOT model and would have less significant impacts on the DO 
distribution. Likewise, nitrification is also DO concentration dependent. The 
minimum DO concentration for nitrification ranges from 0.6-0.7 mg/l (Forster 
1974) to 2 mg/l (Clabaugh 2001; Ho et al. 2002) under different pH and 
temperature conditions. The simulation from HOT model was to some extent 
improved after a threshold concentration of 2 mg/1 DO was introduced into the 
nitrification process. 
As for the issue of DO recovery in the river, the major sources of DO in the 
polluted river include the following, (a) oxygen in incoming or tributary flow, (b) 
oxygen generated by photosynthesis and (c) oxygen from the reaeration process 
(Cox 2003a). Because of the muddy nature in the tidal Ouse, photosynthesis from 
the plankton plants is negligible compared to the other sources. The oxygen 
reaeration process in the model is represented by the exchange rate between water 
surface and atmosphere. This process was defined as exchange in the HOT model 
in order to allow both directions of oxygen dispersion. The direction of exchange 
is determined by the oxygen concentration between the surfaces while the 
dynamics of this process were related to the variable of clearance time, which is 
determined by the river depth and piston velocity of oxygen. The air exchange 
rate also depends on wind speed (Kremer et al. 2003), but it is not represented in 
the model. Contrast to 2 to 5 m/d with normal water temperature (Broecker and 
Peng 1983), the piston velocity in the model has to be lowered by several orders 
of magnitude in order to have realistic simulation in the river. However, 
modification of exchange rate across the air-water surface would affect simulation 
of DO% along the whole tidal Ouse, but not be able to correct the wrong location 
of DO sag predicted by the model. The oxygen from the incoming tributaries 
maybe an important source in the river Ouse, especially considering the fact that 
the recovery of DO sag observed in the river Ouse starts around its confluence 
with the river Aire. The river Don, which is another relatively clean river with 
large volume, joins the river Ouse 10 km further downstream. But, considering the 
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fact that data of the HOT model is provided through the comprehensive surveys in 
LOIS programme, there is little possibility that the lack of improvements 
contributed by inputs the rivers Aire and Don is inherited from false data. 
As stated above, these tributaries are not treated as rivers in the HOT model but 
as point sources. This characteristic implies another important reason for the 
discrepancy between simulation and observation. Not being treated as tributaries 
means all the bio-chemical transformation and sediment transport that would 
otherwise happen in the tributary rivers are ignored, so are the consequences for 
the flux to the river Ouse. These processes then would be assumed to happen in 
the river Ouse rather than in the tributaries themselves. Because the tributaries' 
inputs are data from gauge stations along them, the longer the distance from the 
gauge station to their confluences with river Ouse, the larger the error introduced 
in the simulation results. There would be more effects in the summer when the salt 
wedge extends far up the river Ouse and into these tributaries. Restoring the 
tributaries in the model to what they were in reality is feasible, but demands 
sufficient hydrological data to construct the river reach in the model and to 
represent the transformations within the new river reaches. 
This section has discussed several potential reasons why the HOT modelling 
generates discrepancy between simulations and observed results, but they are by 
no means all the potential reasons, nor are they as significant to the discrepancy 
observed. But to quantify their relative contributions in the discrepancy would be 
a time consuming job, especially when all the parameters in the HOT model have 
already been calibrated against observations for some other constituents relevant 
to the DO% through various physical, chemical and biological transformations of 
species. 
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3.3 QUESTSID model 
3.3.1 Structure of QUESTSID model 
Tao Wang 
The original objective of WRc QUESTSID water quality model was to provide 
calibrated, time dependent, one-dimensional water quality model of the Humber 
estuary to National Rivers Authority (NRA) in the Anglian, Seven Trent and 
Yorkshire Regions (Slade and Morgan 1993a). It was to aid the establishment of 
discharge consents in the river system comprising the Humber, Ouse, Trent, Aire, 
Don and Wharfe estuaries. This model is still used by the EA for this purpose. In 
addition, the model also provides a predictive tool for the impact of pollution 
loads and scope for evaluating potential pollution control options. 
The current QUESTS ID model is a one-dimensional representation of the tidal 
river system stretching from tidal limits of the Ouse, Wharfe, Aire, Don and Trent 
to the sea spurn. The QUESTS ID modelling system is made up of several linked 
programs. The rough data from routine survey and monitoring need to be 
processed in the data preparation stage to generate the daily data file through 
statistical programs, SHARE, SYNTH and COLLATE. SHARE is to run under 
the Test Data Facility (Ellis et al. 1992; Clark and Ellis 1993; Slade and Morgan 
1993a) to generate description of input data and the latter two are to generate an 
auxiliary file containing time series of daily input loads (Slade and Morgan 
1993a). 
The total length of the tidal river system represented by the QUESTS 1D model 
is around 313 km, divided into 282 cells in total. Each cell represents about 1 km 
length along the river from the tidal limits of the Ouse and Trent at Naburn and 
Dunham respectively, to some 4.5 km offshore from the sea spurn , with distances 
of 62.5 km in the Ouse, 84.8 km in the Trent and 62.2 km from their confluence at 
Trent Falls downstream towards the sea. The tributaries of the Ouse, except river 
Derwent, are treated as river rather than point sources as they are in ECoS3 HOT 
model. The rivers Wharfe, Aire and Don in QUESTS 1D model stretch from their 
confluences with Ouse to their tidal limits at Tadcaster, Beal and North Bridge, 
55 
Chapter 3: River Water Quality Model 
Tao Wang 
distances of 69.9,48.9 and 45.7 km respectively. The river Derwent for the Ouse 
and river Hull for the Humber are treated as point source due to their low volume 
and short tidal sections. 
For a prototype of the model, the hydrodynamic component and water quality 
component were simulated by two separate models, which are combined into the 
QUESTS ID system. The hydrodynamic model is to simulate the tidal movements 
for a range of tidal conditions and the effect of density gradients on tidal flow, to 
predict variables such as river level and water velocity. The water quality model, 
based on the conservation of mass, is compatible to the hydrodynamic model, 
using the results from hydrodynamic model to incorporate the processes of 
advection, diffusion, decay and interactions between the determinants in the river 
water. Concentrations of DO, BODS, suspended solids, ammonia, phosphate and 
metals in each cell are simulated in the water quality model as well as temperature 
and salinity. As with the ECoS3 HOT model, sediments are also modelled in the 
QUESTS ID model, with a three interactive layered system. It is made up from a 
water layer, in which solids are suspended (SS), an upper sediments layer (SED) 
and a more compact lower bed layer (BED) (Slade and Morgan 1993a). Finally, a 
statistical shell enveloping these two models was developed to generate statistical 
output on the modelled water quality results. 
At the time of construction, there were approximately 216 discharges to the 
system, with 52 major inputs, and six additional sites were included in the model 
in 1993 (Slade and Morgan 1993a). The QUESTSID model utilized in this 
research has 56 inputs excluding the returned abstraction from Drax station. 
3.3.2 Calibrations and validation of QUESTSID 
The Hydrodynamic model was calibrated against information from a neap tide 
between 15th and 19th May 1978 and from a spring tide between 19th and 23rd 
June 1978. Calibration for the Don and Wharfe was using data from October 1967 
and March 1968 respectively due to insufficient data in the previous stated period 
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(Slade and Morgan 1993b). By adjusting the bed friction coefficients along the 
estuary, satisfactory fit was achieved against the observed levels. 
Secondly, the water quality model, which is developed building upon the 
results of hydrodynamic model, was calibrated against data from a previous water 
modelling study (Humber Estuary Committee 1982). This dataset comes from two 
intensive surveys during May and June 1978 for the pollution loads inputs and 
water quality within the estuary. 
The calibration of both models resulted in satisfactory simulation of DO 
against the observed data. However, as result of the calibration procedure, some 
questions concerning the modelled processes are raised for further investigation, 
including: 
" The interaction of chlorophyll and suspended solids and its effects on DO. 
" The low levels of suspended solids predicted in the upper Ouse. 
" The high levels of BOD5 predicted on the estuary. 
" The over-prediction of temperature in the lower Humber. 
A further modification was carried out in 1994 after the model was checked 
against continuous monitoring data from 1992, which aimed to improve the 
prediction of DO in the lower Ouse. It was found that good agreement of DO in 
the lower Ouse could be achieved as long as the simulated bed sediment is 
sufficient to provide a realistic level of suspended solid throughout the run-time. 
This modification, therefore envisaged the significant impact of suspended solids 
on the DO concentration, which is also illustrated in the ECoS3 HOT model and 
other research (Hanley et al. 1998; Parr and Mason 2004). Several conclusions 
were drawn about the relationships between suspended solids, DO, and oxygen 
demand in the river (Cashman et al. 1999), as summarised below: 
" Suspended sediment (organic) contributes significantly to total oxygen 
demand. 
"A mobile `pool' of sediment moves upstream under low freshwater flows 
and high tidal range conditions which the model did not predict. 
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" Net upstream transport of sediment under low flow high tidal range 
condition is not predicted because sediment which is transported upstream 
during a flood tide is immediately transported downstream on the ebb tide. 
" It should be possible to improve the predictive capability of the model by 
improving understanding of sediment composition and transport and by 
adjusting model parameters which control sediment transport (critical 
erosion and deposition shear stress, settling velocity). 
These conclusions are also implicitly supported by the HOT model, especially 
the first one. As for the second conclusion, this attribute of sediment `pool' was 
enabled by an upstream-moving TM zone in the HOT model. This is because the 
frictional dissipation of tidal energy tends to produce a shorter, more rapid flood 
and a slower ebb, exacerbated by the effects of density-driven vertical circulation, 
resulting in the upstream movement of fine sediment and the TM zone (Harris and 
Gorley 1998a). But towards to the limit of salt-water intrusion, this trend would 
be balanced by steady fresh water outflow towards the sea (Harris and Gorley 
1998b), which is the basis of the third conclusion. The fourth conclusion suggests 
a required improvement for the HOT model as well. 
Although further works on the QUESTSID model is required to improve the 
way it handles sediment dynamics and oxygen demand, validation against 
continuous monitoring data for spring and summer in 1995 and 1996 produced 
satisfactory result. The pattern of DO sag was reasonably predicted in the model, 
being only slightly optimistic. The most recent validation of the model predictions 
of DO and salinity against continuous monitoring data was undertaken using the 
data of 1999. The results of this validation displayed good agreement between the 
predicted and observed data (Freestone 2001). Thus the QUESTS ID model was 
considered suitable for river water quality simulation in the Humber system, and 
consequently for the purpose of evaluating potential pollution controls relating to 
effluent discharge consents. 
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3.4 Modelling Results of the QUESTS model 
3.4.1 Measures of water quality 
Tao Wang 
In previous research, several water quality measurements were utilized to 
evaluate the simulated results. During the utilizations, only the pertinent 
constituents were assessed, despite some of the measurements requiring a set of 
major constituents to meet the compliance to environmental regulation. DO 
saturation is a key indicator of water quality and of the health of aqueous habitats 
and the environment (Freestone 2002). In addition, DO is also the key constraint 
on many transformations of constituents in the water and thus significantly 
influences the concentrations of other constituents in the river. Since the DO sag 
during the summer between Selby and Drax is the most serious issue, DO 
saturation, BOD5 and NH3 in the Ouse were taken as the key indicators of any 
effects from alternative management actions. 
RE Objectives and the GQA are both based on the last three years routine 
sampling data, comparing with the 95%ile value of the summary statistics from 
either observations or simulated results against the designated class limits. The RE 
classes range from RE1 (good quality) to RE5 (bad) and GQA grades range from 
A (very good) to F (bad). Both of the measurements have a wider range of 
assessed determinants than just three key ones mentioned above. They are not 
considered in previous research, nor are they in this one. Further details of these 
RE and GQA measurements are available from the EA. 
The EA adopted a DO minimum standard of 30% saturation in the tidal Ouse, 
mainly to allow the return of Salmon during the summer, specifically for the 
juvenile salmonids. This standard only applies to saline reaches in the Ouse and 
Humber system, which is basically from the confluence of the rivers Ouse and 
Trent. However, it is also used to assess the compliance at each cell in the model, 
including both saline and fresh water reaches for Mile or 2%ile values. The 
number of cells, which fail to comply with this standard of no less than 30% DO 
saturation, is reported for each simulation run. 
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The composite score of the Estuarine Working Party Classification Scheme 
(EWPCS) provides a convenient way to quantify the effects on DO saturation 
from various controlling options. It is calculated as below: Only the DO saturation 
as a water quality indicator is considered in the classification; a value range from 
0 to 10 will be assigned to each cell depending on its 5%ile DO saturation level. 
Specifically, the composite score calculated as follows in this research: 10 for the 
cell with above 60% DO saturation at 5%ile, 6 for above 40%, 5 for above 30%, 4 
for above 20%, 3 for above 10% and 0 for below 10% (Environment Agency 
1998). The composite score of each river reach is represented by the summation 
of the values in each cell within the river, therefore it reflects dissolved oxygen 
levels throughout the estuary over the twelve months period of a model run 
(Cashman et al. 1999). The changes in the composite scores among simulation 
runs illustrate the difference of their impacts on the DO saturation throughout the 
estuary, particularly in the area suffering from DO sag. 
3.4.2 Scenario design and data processing 
Similar scenarios of alternative pollution control options have been evaluated 
under QUESTID model as in previous research, but more intensive experiments 
were carried out for those options of high sensitivity to the distribution of DO 
saturation in the tidal Ouse. The evaluated alternative options include: 
" Changes in the locations of effluent discharge from the four major plants 
in Selby 
" Changes in the timing of effluent discharge over the year, for example no 
discharge in summer or only discharge in high-flowed winter. 
" Return of water abstracted by Yorkshire Water beyond the tidal limit of 
River Ouse and Derwent. 
" Change in the timing of effluent discharges during the day with respect to 
local high water, i. e. from continuous discharges to discharges in six hours 
during the ebb only. 
" Change in the load of effluent discharges from the Selby industries. 
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The research also simulated the water abstraction at the Drax station, in order 
to quantify its impact on the DO saturation in tidal Ouse. 
Seven alternative locations of effluent discharges were arbitrarily chosen for 
the analysis, located along the tidal Ouse at 61km, 51km, 35km, 25km, 22km, 
13km, and lkm upstream of the confluence of the river Ouse and Trent at the 
Trent Falls. The original effluent discharge locations for the four plants at Selby 
are around 41 km upstream of confluence. Discharge point other than the original 
location is reached by building pipes to transfer the effluents. This scenario is to 
evaluate the location effects of effluent discharges on the DO saturation along the 
tidal Ouse and to provide information on the optimal discharge location. 
The alternative discharging scenarios over the year are without discharge in 
summer and only discharge in winter. In the former scenario, there is no effluent 
discharge from the four plants in Selby in the tidal Ouse during June, July and 
August while the effluent discharges in December, January and February doubled. 
In the "only discharge in winter" scenario, all the effluent discharges from the 
Selby plants are discharged during December, January and February and there is 
no discharge in the rest of the year. Since the DO sag usually happens in the 
low-flowed summer, this scenario is expected to see to what extent the problem 
could be avoided by shifting the discharge patterns over the year. However, to 
undertake this option, the plants need to build vast waste storage facility to store 
the effluents. 
The impact of returning the significant water abstraction from 
Ouse and 
Derwent are examined, either return abstracted water in any one of them or both. 
Since the abstracted water is to supply potable water to the population in the tidal 
Ouse catchment, the water would be otherwise abstracted from elsewhere in the 
Ouse system or from other systems if it was not abstracted from Derwent and 
Ouse. The abstracted water will be returned to the river system through the STWs. 
Therefore returning abstracted water is not a feasible option unless the potable 
water could be attained from elsewhere. 
61 
Chapter 3: River Water Quality Model 
Tao Wang 
The alternative to discharge continuously during each day was to store the 
effluent and to discharge only for six hours in the day during the local high water. 
The local high water at Selby was considered four hours later than that at the sea 
spurn. This scenario is to evaluate how much the local high water during the ebb 
could alleviate the DO sag issue. The changes in the level of effluent discharges 
try to evaluate the consequent impacts on DO profile under different proportion of 
effluent discharge from Selby, in order to evaluate their marginal effects on DO 
distribution along the tidal Ouse and Humber. 
Since the dataset for effluent discharge was not fully complete, in order to 
evaluate the DO saturation with the improved discharge consents in Selby after 
2000, two separate datasets were constructed for 2001 and 2002. One is at the 
same level of effluent discharges as previous years; another is updated according 
to the "future" effluent discharge consents, which is supposed to be implemented 
by the EA since 2000. 
The data for simulation ranges from 1995 to 2004. However, 1998,2003 and 
2004 are not simulated in the QUESTS ID model due to insufficient or incomplete 
dataset. Some other data are also missing in the dataset from the EA as follows: 
1. The data of salinity for all years are missing. Salinity was defined as the 
weight of dissolved inorganic compounds in grams in 1 kg of seawater, 
after all the bromide and iodide is converted to chloride, and all carbonates 
converted to oxides. This could be calculated from chlorinity of the flow 
following the Knudsen equation: S%o = 0.030 +1.8050 x Cl (g Cl/1) x 1/P, 
where P is the density of seawater at that chlorinity. Since the river and 
tributaries upstream of the confluence of River Ouse and Trent are 
regarded as fresh water, P is the same as the fresh water density I000g/l. 
2. Data for total phosphorus is not available for all the years. It is suggested 
that orthophosphorus, which is available, is about 80% of total phosphorus 
for all the inputs including riverhead water along the river Ouse. Therefore, 
in this research total phosphorus data is calculated according to 
orthophosphorus. 
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3. Detailed data of effluent discharges from BOCM and Tate & Lyle Citric 
Acid (TLCA) are missing. This data adequacy is solved as follows. For 
TLCA, effluent discharge before 2000 were assumed at the same level as 
that in 1996 and 1997, which was described in the report of Cashman et al. 
(1999); effluent discharges since 2000 were assumed same as the 
Environmental Agency's "future" consents described in their report. This 
is reasonable because since 2000 TLCA has managed to reduce its effluent 
just below the "future" consents although the consents were not brought 
into force at that time. For BOCM the effluent discharge in the simulation 
were assumed to be the same level as that in1996 and 1997 described by 
Cashman et al. (1999), the possible improvement after 2000 were 
incorporated in the simulation with "future" consents for all the four 
plants. 
Through the analyses, the research was able to estimate the Transfer 
Coefficient Matrix (TCM) for the Ouse system from different discharge locations 
to the EA's water quality WQM sites, by comparing the reduction in pollutants 
between discharge points and the WQM sites. The TCM can provide a quick 
reference for the distribution of assimilative capacity of the river water, indicating 
how much pollution in the river could be degraded through the assimilation 
process. More details of the applications of TCM in the regulative system of river 
policy will be found in later chapters. 
3.4.3 Results of Analysis 
All the simulations are based on simulation for one calendar year. As RE and 
GQA classifications published by the EA are based on three successive years, 
therefore RE and GQA are not used as main indicators in the analyses of 
simulation results. The results are evaluated and ranked upon the composite score 
of EWPCS, and illustrated by the DO saturation profile along the tidal Ouse. 
Figure 3.4 displays the flow in the river system from 1995 to 2003 and Figure 
3.5 shows the simulated base-run DO saturation for each year based on existing 
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situation without scenario manipulations. The effluent and boundary dataset for 
the simulation has been discussed before. 
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Figure 3.4 Time series of river flows in the Ouse, Trent, Humber and their tributaries 
The vertical axis of Figure 3.4 is m3/s and all the flow from tributaries and 
rivers are added together so the height of each column means the average of total 
flow of river system in that year. In Figure 3.5, the DO saturation are depicted at 
the 5%ile value, this is because the RE and GQA are classified on 95% of 
compliance and the composite score of EWPCS are also calculated based on 5% 
DO saturation profile over the estuaries. The value of the x-axis is the cell number 
along the tidal Ouse from Naburn downstream to sea spurn, from cell 158 at the 
Naburn Weir to cell 282 at the end of river Humber, one kilometre for each cell. 
The vertical lines in between represent the locations of EA's WQM sites for water 
quality, named Naburn, Cawood, Selby, Long Drax, Boothferry Bridge and 
Blacktoft. The DO saturation profile for 2001 and 2002 were simulated twice, first 
is based on the previous effluent discharge consents for the plants in Selby and the 
second is based on the EA's "future" effluent discharge consents. It shows that the 
river flows are of particular importance to the DO saturation profile in the river 
system. The worst DO sag appeared in 1995 and 1996, while 1996 is a very dry 
year with drought in summer. The DO profiles of other years are increasing as the 
total flow of river system increases. 1995 and 1997 has similar averaged water 
flows and tributary inputs, but the DO% of these two years are significantly 
different. This is because 1995 has very high flow in winter and much less water 
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during the summer months (Tappin et al. 2003) while the flow are more evenly 
distributed during 1997, therefore the river system suffered from DO sag in the 
1995 although the averaged flow did not indicate the insufficient flow in summer. 
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Figure 3.5 The Base-run DO saturation for different years 
3.4.3. a Location Effects 
The direct expression of the location effects of the effluent discharge can be 
seen from Figure 3.6, which indicates the distribution of DO saturation in the tidal 
Ouse when the effluents from the four major plants in Selby are discharged at 
various locations along the river. 
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Figure 3.6 5%ile DO profile at various effluent discharge locations in 1995,1997 and 2001 
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It is obvious to see the trend of water quality improvement as the location of 
effluent discharges moves downstream towards the confluence of Ouse and Trent. 
In 1995, there was a significant DO sag between Selby and Drax when effluents 
were discharged anywhere beyond Selby. However, the minimum of 30% DO 
saturation that is required by the EA could be marginally achieved when the 
effluents were discharged from somewhere 25 km upstream from the confluence, 
with a leap from the poor water quality. If the effluent discharges were moved 
even furtherer downstream, the significant DO sag appeared in 1995 could be 
effectively dispelled from tidal Ouse. In 1997 and 2001, there is no obvious leap 
as the discharge location moves downstream, partly because of the better water 
quality in these two years. As expected, the location effects are greater in the year 
of poor water quality than those with better water quality, and are decreasing as 
water quality improves. Generally, their effects depend on location within the 
same year. The improvement in DO saturation is always increasing fast in the 
region from 41 to 22 km upstream of the Trent Falls. After this region, the 
improvement is getting slower towards the seaward direction, and negligible after 
the Boothferry Bridge. 
Table 3.1: The EWPCS scores and rate of improvements at various discharge location 
Overall Estuaries EWPCS Score of different discharge locations in three years 
Point Distance 199 199 2001 Improvement per km 
A -61 2061 221 235 199 199 2001 
B -51 213 2261 237 6.9 4.2 1.8 
C -41 216 229 239 3.2 3.7 2.4 
D -35 2171 2321 241 1.5 3.8 2.6 
E -25 224 233 247 7.4 1.7 6.0 
F -22 225 2351 2481 4.0 4.3 2.6 
G -13 2281 2364 249 2.6 1.44 1.3 
H -1 228 23681 2501 0.3 0.3 0.6 
Ouse/Humber EWPCS Score of different discharge locations in three years 
Point Distance 199 199 2001 
Improvement of moving 
downstream 
A -61 69 82 86 199 199 2001 
B -51 75 86 88 5.9 4.1 1.8 
C -41 791 90 89 3.8 3.7 1.6 
D -35 801 92 91 1.6 3.8 2.6 
E -25 86 94 97 6.8 1.4 6.00 
F -22 87 94 98 2.3 3.0 2.6 
G -13 89 95 991 2.0 1.0 0.8 
H -1 894 95 99,1 0.0 0.0 0.3 
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The EWPCS scores for the overall estuaries and Ouse/Humber estuary under 
each discharge location were indicated in the Table 3.1. The negative sign in the 
second column simply means the effluent is discharged upstream of the Trent 
Falls. The monotonic water quality improvements as effluent discharges moves 
downstream from point A to H are represented by the increasing composite scores, 
both for the Ouse/Humber estuaries alone and for all the estuaries including Ouse, 
Trent, Humber and their tributaries. The last three columns to the right indicate 
how fast the DO saturation is improving along the river length, displayed by the 
increase of composite score for each kilometre the location of effluent discharge 
moves downstream. 
For 1995, the high rates of improving take place when discharge location 
moves from D to E. The improvement rate between point A and B is also high, but 
discharging in both of the points would lead to even worse pollution in the tidal 
Ouse than current, so they are not considered as an acceptable option. This applies 
to 1997 and 2001 as well. The highest rate of improvement in 1997 is at different 
region to 1995, from point C to D and E to F, whereas for 2001 the area with most 
improvement for every kilometre is same as in 1995. Therefore, indicated as the 
highlighted area, the discharge locations between point C and F have the highest 
rate of improvement in DO saturation for each kilometre moving downstream. 
Point C is the existing discharge location in Selby area, and point F is at 
Boothferry, which is one of the six EA's WQM sites along the tidal Ouse. The 
difference of improvement rates is attributed to various factors, including 
geographical structure, hydrological dynamics, phytoplankton composition, 
ambient water quality and tributary inputs. They are as a whole considered as the 
assimilative ability of the river water in degrading the pollutants inside the water. 
For the location where the assimilative ability is low, the same amount of effluent 
discharge leads to larger impact on DO saturation than the location with high 
assimilative ability. The diminishing rate of improvement along the river therefore 
indicates an increasing assimilative ability in the river water. Hence, the highest 
rate of change in water quality actually indicates the location least resistant to the 
effluent discharges. 
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3.4.3. b Changes in the Timing of Effluent Discharges 
Tao Wang 
Two different scenarios are designed to evaluate the effects of changes in the 
timing of discharges on the DO saturation in tidal Ouse. Since the significant DO 
sag happens most during the summer when water flow is low, shifting the effluent 
discharges from summer to winter is expected to alleviate the DO sag issue in 
summer. The first scenario is to store the effluents in June, July and August and 
double the effluent discharges during December, January and February, which 
requires the plants to store at least 25% of their annual effluents. The second one 
evaluated the effects when effluent discharges are only allowed in winter, i. e. 
December, January and February and to store up to 75% of the plants' annual 
effluents. Some of the simulated results are illustrated by Figure 3.7 (a)-(d). 
Figure 3.7 (a)-(d) illustrate the effects on the DO saturation profile of shifting 
discharge timing over the year in 1995,1996,1997 and 2002. Significant 
improvement could be found in 1995 and 1996 when severe DO sag were present 
during the summer. Year 1997 has moderate improvement by shifting the effluent 
discharges into winter while the improvement in 2002 is almost negligible. As 
stated above, due to the exceptional water flows distribution over 1995, shifting 
discharge into winter has greater impacts on DO saturation than in 1996. Storage 
of 25% annual effluents would be able to elevate the DO sag barely above the 
30% minimum prescribed by the EA in 1995, but this scenario does not lead to the 
same improvement in 1996. As for 1997,25% storage still led to a significant 
improvement, which eliminated the DO sag between Selby and Drax and elevated 
the DO saturation above 40%, even with original water quality that was much 
better than 1995 and 1996. The shifting of effluent discharges could hardly make 
any change in the DO saturation profile in 2002 when the future effluent discharge 
consents were implemented, because of the high summer flow in 2002 and the 
stricter effluent discharge consents. For all these four years, another 50% annual 
effluent storage in the scenario of "discharge only in the winter" could only result 
in small proportion of DO 
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saturation improvement compared with the first scenario. Therefore, it is probably 
unnecessary to build a much larger storage facility for storing three times the 
effluents in the first scenario while only generating little improvement. Table 3.2 
indicates the changes in EWPCS composite score due to the shifting of effluent 
discharges timing over the year. 
Table 3.2: EWPCS scores of effluent discharge shifting over the year 
Overall Estuaries 
Scenario 199 199 199 199 200 2001 2001 200 2002- 
ontinuous 216 217 229 235 240 237 239 243 248 
5% Stora e 228 228 2360 2402 255 2458 2470 251 2540 
75% Stora e 229 230 237 246 256 250 250 254 2544 
SC 1 12 11 6 5 14 82 7 7 5 
C2 1 2 1 61 51 3 2 
Ouse/Humber NWC Score of different discharge locations in three years 
Scenario 199 199 199 199 200 2001 2001 200 2002- 
ontinuous 791 80 90 92 95 89 89 97 1010 
5% Storage 89 89 95 94 104 95 96 102 103 
5% Stora e 90 90 96 99 105 100 100 103 1038 
C1 101 8 4 2 8 5 6 5 2 
C2 1 1 1 4 51 3 1 0 
There are two simulations for 2001 and 2002, within which 2001-F and 2002-F 
are simulations of 2001 and 2002 based on the EA's `future' effluent discharge 
consents. SCI is the composite score changes for the first 25% effluent storage, 
and SC2 is the composite score changes due to the other 50% effluent storage. 
Because of the predetermined designation in the calculation of composite score (4 
points difference between 60% DO% and 40% DO% and I point for every 10% 
change in DO% below 40%), the effect of the extra 50% effluent storage was to 
some extent exaggerated by the higher weight. On the other hand, there are also 
some changes without being taken into account as the score of EWPCS remains 
unchanged between 40% and below 60%, which is the range within which most of 
the improvement in years 1997,1999 and 2001 take place. Nonetheless, the 
quantification of water quality still proved that the increasing of water quality 
from the 50% extra effluent storage was much less than that from the first 25% 
effluent storage, and the improvement from effluent discharge shifting is more 
apparent with less summer flow in tidal Ouse. 
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3.4.3. c Return of Water Abstraction 
Tao Wang 
Due to insufficiency of abstraction data in Ouse and Derwent, this scenario was 
only evaluated for the simulations of 1996 and 1997. The water abstraction in 
river Ouse and Derwent are both taking place beyond their tidal limits, therefore 
the return of water are represented by the changes in the headwater of river Ouse 
and Derwent. 
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Figure 3.8 (a) Effects of abstraction return in 1996 
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Figure 3.8 (a) and (b) indicate the effects of returning abstracted water on the 
DO saturation profile. Three difference return scenarios are examined in each 
year: returning the abstraction in either Ouse or Derwent only or returning 
abstraction in both rivers. As expected, the return of abstracted water under 1996 
flow conditions leads to slight improvements in all the scenarios. The return of 
water abstraction in Derwent results in more improvement than water abstraction 
in Ouse because of its better water quality and higher volume abstracted. The 
improvement of water abstraction return becomes significant from confluence of 
Derwent towards to the confluence of Trent. Similar simulation result was also 
discussed in Cashman et al. (1999). 
However, the return of abstraction water resulted in some unexpected result for 
1997. Unlike the improvement in water quality from the return of abstracted water 
in river Derwent, the return in river Ouse knocked down the water quality by a 
remarkable extent. Therefore, the return of abstraction in both rivers has less 
improvement than returning in river Derwent alone. A possible reason for this 
phenomenon is that because of the poor water quality of Ouse, the returned water 
abstraction adds pollutants back into the system as well, whose effects on the 
water quality overshadows the impacts on water quality from increased flow. 
More analyses are needed when abstraction data of other years is available. 
The returned water would generally improve the water quality over the whole 
river length, depending on the fresh flows and effluent discharge conditions at the 
time. Comparing with returning water abstraction in river Ouse, abstraction return 
in river Derwent has more improvement on the water quality downstream of its 
confluence than upstream, from some 30 km upstream of Trent fall. It also has 
more effects than return in Ouse due to its better water quality. However, the DO 
saturation improvement from the option of water abstraction return is still limited 
comparing with the two options above, therefore it cannot be considered as an 
effective option alone. 
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3.4.3. d Discharge Effluents with the Ebb 
The first attempt of discharge during the local high water is to take advantage 
of the ebb tide so that it can bring the effluent discharge downstream quicker than 
other time of the day. There is a four-hour lag between the local high water and 
the high water at the sea spurn. In this scenario, the daily effluent is discharged 
within six hours during the ebb tide instead of continuously discharged over the 
whole day. However, the simulation results show no difference from the daily 
discharge shifting. The reason could be that, due to the tidal nature of Ouse and 
Humber, the river flow is held up in the river system for a long time before it 
passes through tidal Ouse. Therefore, the effluents from the plant would be 
completely mixed with river water and stay long enough to have their impacts on 
DO saturation regardless the timing of discharge during the day. 
3.4.3. e Changes in Effluent Loads from Sources 
Three years are chosen to evaluate the effects of the effluent discharges from 
the four major plants in Selby. Year 1995 is regarded as one of the years with most 
severe DO sag, mainly due to its exceptional flows distribution over the year and 
drought in summer. Year 1997 has similar average of water flow as 1995 but more 
evenly distributed over the year, which is regarded as a year with moderate flow. 
Year 2001 has the second highest flow from 1993 to 2003, with the more stringent 
effluent discharge consents, resulting in much better water quality in tidal Ouse 
above 50% DO saturation at 5%ile during the summer months. The three different 
years were expected to represent the effects of effluent discharge on DO saturation 
under the worst, moderate and very good water quality conditions. Their 
respective effects on the DO saturation profile are illustrated by Figure 3.9 (a) to 
(c). 
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Figure 3.9 (b) Effects of effluent discharges in 1997 
Dissolved Oxygen at 5%ile in 2001 (Future consents assumption) 
90.00 
80.00 
70.00 
60.00 
aR 50.00 
8 40.00 
30.00 
20.00 
10.00 
0.00 
150 
II 
*awood 
Ne6um ý 'S%-S41by 
i 
I 
i 
ii 
r-i 
IiI 
200 
i 
I 
Cell 
250 
L_ 0103 Full Future Dis X50% Futre Dis -No Discharge 
Figure 3.9 (c) Effects of effluent discharges in 2001 
ii 
niar 
iii 
Tao Wang 
300 
300 
300 
75 
Chapter 3: River Water Quality Model 
Tao Wang 
The DO saturation profiles generated indicate significant improvement in 1995 
and 1997, and only slight improvement in 2001. However, up to 50% of effluent 
reduction from Selby only resulted in small proportion of improvement in 1995, 
as 50% effluents from Selby were already strong enough to suppress the DO 
saturation down to just above 10% saturation during the exceptional dry summer. 
When there is no effluent discharge from Selby plants, it would allow the DO 
saturation to be elevated to just below 40% around Selby and Blacktoft. The first 
decline of DO saturation might be due to the effluent from STWs whereas the 
latter one was probably dominated by the inputs from river Trent. The large 
difference between the 50% and 100% effluent reductions reveals a rapidly 
declining curve of the DO saturation with increase in effluent discharges. On the 
other hand, the result also illustrated that in a year like 1995, the reduction of 
effluent discharge should not be used as an effective option to tackle the DO sag 
problem. The situation in 1997 was slightly different due to the higher flow in 
summer. The improvements from the first and second of 50% reduction are 
similar. The first 50% reduction of effluent discharge could lead to more than 10% 
increase in DO saturation towards 40% at some particular positions, therefore 
gives more credibility to effluent reduction as an option to increase DO saturation 
in 1997. For the situation in 2001, the improvement in DO saturation from 
reduction of effluent is very limited. With above 50% DO saturation along most of 
the length of river Ouse, even 100% of effluents reduction could not bring much 
difference in the DO saturation. This reflects the other sources of DO% 
consumptions, such as suspended solids with tide. 
More scenarios have been examined by QUEST ID model to evaluate impacts 
on river water quality from various effluent discharge levels. Effluent discharge 
levels that were simulated within these three years range from 0% to 150% of 
original levels. Their effects on the water quality, in forms of EWPSC composite 
score, are listed in Table 3.3 as below. The first three columns are the composite 
scores of the estuaries under various effluent discharge levels. The next three 
columns are the corresponding changes in composite score compared with the 
score of original effluent load. The largest increase of composite score by effluent 
reduction was found in 1995, followed by 1997 and 2001 because there are larger 
impacts on the DO% in the years like 1995 with less assimilative ability. 
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Increasing the effluents of 2001 by 50% only results in 4 points decrease in the 
composite score, reflects a very promising assimilative capacity of the river water 
in rainfall-rich years as 2001. 
Table 3.3: Effects on river water quality of various effluent levels 
Overall Estuaries NWC Score of different discharge loads in three years 
Load 199 1997 2001 199 1997 2001 
0% 2288 2368 2463 126 70 66 
50% 2248 2340 2434 86 42 37 
90% 2176 2310 2405 14 12 8 
100% 2162 2298 2397 0 0 0 
110% 2154 2295 2389 -8 -3 -8 
150% 2116 2263 2380 -46 -35 -17 
Ouse/Humber NWC Score of different discharge loads in three years 
Load 199 199 2001 199 199 2001 
0% 903 970 962 112 67 63 
50% 856 931 932 65 28 33 
90% 800 915 907 9 12 8 
100% 791 903 899 0 0 0 
110% 784 901 899 -7 -2 0 
150% 754 1 777074 895 -37 -29 -4 
3.4.3. f Transfer Coefficients Matrix (TCM) 
Combination of the analyses of location effects and effluent discharge levels 
sheds a light into the transfer coefficients matrix, which gives parameters to the 
following chapters of this research. TCM is a matrix of transfer coefficients within 
which each transfer coefficient indicates how much the concentration of pollutant 
has changed between two points along the river. Since the reduction in the 
pollutant concentration is mainly the result of assimilation processes in the river 
water, the TCM depicts the assimilative ability of the river water between any two 
points along the river. The TCM calculated in this research is based on BOD5 
concentration in effluent discharges from Selby industries. Therefore, it is a TCM 
of BOD5 concentration. The details of the calculation are as follows. Various 
effluent discharge levels from the four plants in Selby are simulated, range from 
no effluent discharge to 150% of existing effluent discharge load, discharged at 
the eight discharge locations A to H discussed above for the fresh flow conditions 
of 1995,1997 and 2001. The changes of effluent load and location result in 
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different concentration of BOD5 at the WQM sites along the river. Comparing the 
BOD5 concentration at the location of discharge and change in BOD5 
concentration at any other location along the river would tell how much BOD5 is 
degraded through the assimilation processes between these two points. Tables 3.4 
to 3.6 indicate the resulteing TCM of BOD5 in the three different years. 
Table 3.4: Transfer Coefficients Matrix for BOD5 discharge in 1995 
Transfer Coefficient Matrix of 1995 (dry year with high discharqe) 
Point Distance Naburn Cawood Selby Long Drax Boothferry Blacktoft 
A 61 0.17 0.57 0.39 0.11 0.07 0.02 
B 51 0.00 0.53 0.83 0.32 0.21 0.05 
C 41 0.00 0.01 0.97 0.53 0.35 0.07 
D 35 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.82 0.63 0.08 
E 25 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.74 0.89 0.22 
F 22 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.46 0.73 0.32 
G 13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.26 0.62 
H 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.78 
Table 3.5: Transfer Coefficients Matrix for BODS discharge in 1997 
Transfer Coefficient Matrix of 1997 (wet year with high discharge) 
Point Distance Naburn Cawood Selby Lon Drax Boothfer Blacktoft 
A 61 0.12 0.59 0.40 0.19 0.13 0.03 
B 51 0.00 0.45 0.93 0.45 0.30 0.07 
C 41 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.66 0.44 0.11 
D 35 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.84 0.59 0.14 
E 25 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.72 0.89 0.27 
F 22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.72 0.37 
G 13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.67 
H 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.80 
Table 3.6: Transfer Coefficients Matrix for BOD5 discharge in 2001 
Transfer Coefficient Matrix of 2001 (wet year with EA's 'future' discharge) 
Point Distance Naburn Cawood Selby Lon Drax Boothfer Blacktoft 
A 61 0.12 0.60 0.42 0.18 0.09 0.04 
B 51 0.00 0.43 0.84 0.35 0.21 0.07 
C 41 0.00 0.01 0.97 0.52 0.31 0.10 
D 35 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.77 0.42 0.12 
E 25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.79 0.25 
F 22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.53 0.50 
G 13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.62 
H 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.81 
The column of distance indicated the distance of discharge locations upstream 
from the Trent Falls. The tables are constructed based on changes in the mean of 
BOD5 concentration rather than 5%ile value as for DO. This is because the TCM 
is expected to provide reference under most of the circumstances, telling the most 
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possible impacts of effluent discharges at one location on the water qualities at the 
WQM sites, rather than that in extreme conditions. 
In the tables above, each value in the cell indicates how much the BOD5 
concentration would change at the water quality WQM sites if there were one unit 
increase in BOD5 concentration at the effluent discharge locations. Because of the 
definition, the value of transfer coefficient ranges from zero to one, where one 
means the variation of BOD5 concentration is the same between these two points 
and zero means the BOD5 contribution from effluent discharge has no effects on 
the other point. Tables 3.4 to 3.6 give examples of three different flow and effluent 
load conditions as stated: 1995 has low flower (in summer) and higher effluent 
discharges; 1997 has high flow and high effluent discharges while 2001 has high 
flow and lower effluent discharges. The water quality WQM site at Selby is just I 
km downstream of the discharge location C at Selby therefore it has very high 
transfer coefficient to the discharge from point C. Point F is also very close to 
WQM site at Boothferry, only 1 km upstream of the discharge location. The 
flow-inverse dispersion may not be very strong and the dilution effects from river 
Aire which joins the tidal Ouse less than 2 km upstream, so the transfer coefficient 
from point F to Boothferry is only about 0.72 and 0.73 in 1995 and 1997, and as 
low as 0.53 in the year of 2001. When the transfer coefficient is zero, as some of 
cells show, means the changes in the BOD5 concentration at the discharge location 
has no effect on the concentration at the WQM site. This usually applies to the 
WQM sites that are further upstream of the discharge locations. 
Despite the three years with different combination of flow and effluent 
discharge, the value of transfer coefficient does not vary very much. Although the 
assimilative capacity of river water would fluctuate over the years depending on 
many factors, the relatively stable value of TCM suggests that it is probably 
dominated by the kinetic of assimilative processes, geographical structure, water 
surface area, tributary positions and other factors that are generally consistent over 
time. It is also possible reason that because that the 5%ile data used to derive the 
TCM are mostly happened in summer therefore the seasonal variation was 
minimized. Because of the relatively stable values, an averaged TCM of these 
three matrixes would be more convenient for the EA or other river management 
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authority, or they can also choose the TCM of particular flow and effluent 
combination depending on the situation at the time. 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
The analyses of the simulation results from QUESTSID river water model 
provided a useful tool to assess the effectiveness of several alternative water 
management options aiming at improving the water quality, particularly to tackle 
the DO sag issue during the summer months between Selby and Long Drax in the 
tidal Ouse. The industrial plants at Selby discharge substantial effluent loads into 
the river Ouse, which are thought to be primarily responsible to the deterioration 
of water quality and appearance of DO sag. The results of simulation proved that 
the effluent discharge at Selby does relate to the DO sag downstream of its 
disposal, especially during the year with less flow in summer such as 1995 and 
1996. However, as a tidal river system with the largest catchment in England, 
there are also remarkable contributions to the water quality issue from 
resuspended sediments and its landward transport with tide, as well as the inputs 
from STWs and diffuse pollution draining from agricultural farms and highly 
populous areas. The effluent discharges from the industries does not account for 
all the pollution in the tidal Ouse. The sediments move up the river system during 
the low flow period and remain around Selby long enough to cause the observed 
DO sag in summer (Cashman et al. 1999), the effluent discharge from Selby 
exacerbates the situation when the flow is low but should not be regarded as the 
only reason. Therefore, reduction of the effluent discharges in the Selby plants 
may not always be an effective option to tackle the DO sag problem, though it is 
regarded as the only option by the EA under most circumstances. 
The choice of locations for effluent discharges from the Selby industries could 
dramatically change its effects on the DO saturation in tidal Ouse. Moving the 
discharge location downstream along the river would monotonically increase the 
water quality over the whole length of tidal Ouse because the water quality 
downstream of Trent fall is dominated by the water from the river Trent. Its 
effectiveness applies in both dry and wet years. Shifting the effluent discharges 
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from summer into winter also leads to significant improvement on the DO sag 
issue, since the worst DO saturation usually happens in warm and less-flowed 
summer. In most situations, 25% annual effluent storage would be enough to meet 
the EA's target of 30% minimum DO saturation at 5%ile, except for the very dry 
year of 1996. The water abstraction return at river Ouse and Derwent has only 
, marginal effects on the DO saturation, too little to tackle the issue of severe DO 
sag in the summer months alone, particularly during the low flow years. 
Discharge on the ebb only is not able to improve the water quality in either dry 
or wet years, due to the long clearance time for river flow in the tidal Ouse and the 
landward invasion of tide. There is also water abstraction and effluent input from 
Drax Station. It abstracts the river water at the rate 2 m3/s for cooling process and 
returns half of the volume back to the river at the same position, with 0.75°C 
elevated. Cashman et al. (1999) revealed that the temperature difference between 
effluent and river water has negligible impact on the water quality. The results of 
simulation from QUESTSID in this research show no impact due to the loss of 
water, only marginal influence to the water qualities in the dry summers in 1995 
and 1996. 
Therefore, the changes in effluent discharge loads, discharge locations and 
discharge timing over the year deserve more consideration as effective 
management options to improve the water quality and tackle the DO sag issue. 
They are not, however, exclusive to each other, therefore the best option of river 
water management could be a combination of them all or variations on them. The 
combination of the analyses for two of them also produces TCM as important 
reference to the river management. The TCM would be a quite useful tool to the 
river policy design that will be discussed in the later chapters. 
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Chapter 4 Economics of River Policy 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Review of regulative system of river policy in the 
tidal Ouse 
Although the river quality has been improved significantly in the Ouse system 
over these years, it still suffers from the DO sag in the summer months, especially 
downstream of Selby industrial effluent discharges. As a result DO levels in some 
parts of the river and at some times of the year are too low to support salmon, 
which is regarded as a key indicator of the river's ecological health. The decline 
of salmon stock in the Ouse system is due to a number of sources, which may 
include over-fishing around Greenland, commercial netting in estuaries, habitat 
loss, increasing sediment load and river morphology changes, etc. But among 
those, pollution discharge and water abstractions have significant influences on 
dissolved oxygen. In the Ouse system, the most serious oxygen sag happens 
downstream of Selby, usually between the water sampling points at Selby and 
Long Drax. The EA is considering to improve the river water quality by 
tightening the discharge consents in Selby. A new regulation system of pollution 
control is being implemented in order to restore water quality in the Ouse system, 
which is driven by the EU Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control (IPPC). 
"The basic purpose of the IPPC regime is to introduce a more integrated 
approach to controlling pollution from industrial sources. It aims to achieve a high 
level of protection of the environment taken as a whole by, in particular, 
preventing or, where that is not practicable, reducing emissions into the air, water 
and land. The main way of doing that is by determining and enforcing permit 
conditions based on Best Available Techniques (BAT). " (Defra 2002b). The 
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essence of IPPC is that operators should choose the best option available to 
achieve an agreed level of protection of the environment taken as a whole. The 
BAT approach is typically modified by the qualification that the cost of applying 
techniques should not be excessive in relation to the environmental protection 
they provide. The environmental benefits of the IPPC target stem from the 
reduction in effluent emissions of BOD into River Ouse. The Environment 
Agency aims to improve the DO levels in River Ouse through the IPPC, not only 
for the return of salmon but also for assuring river water quality for various 
purposes including recreation, angling, agriculture, industrial abstraction and 
amenity value etc. It tries to achieve this purpose by tightening the consents on 
discharge from industrial sources in Selby area and employing the IPPC Scheme. 
However, the IPPC Scheme requires BAT to be applied in the abatement of 
pollution while there is no one specific definition of BAT provided. The BAT is 
varying among each plant depending on its cost and benefit conditions. As the 
prerequisite of BAT is that the application of abatement technique without 
incurring excessive cost, an alternative way of addressing the issue of cost is to 
identify the most cost effective method for achieving a given target of water 
quality, which is applicable to both pollution abatement techniques and pollution 
control policies. 
The current regulation system controlling effluent discharge and water 
abstraction in Tidal Ouse and Humber estuaries consist of two different policies 
implemented by the EA, the discharge consents for effluent discharges and the 
system of tradable Water Abstraction Licenses for water abstractions respectively. 
The consents for effluent discharges are usually fixed amounts over the year, 
although some of them allow certain extent of violation over the year such as the 
BOD discharge consent for Tate & Lyle Citric Acid (TLCA) in Selby and big 
Sewage Treatment Works (STW). An abstraction licence generally states how 
much water could be taken, from where, the way to be used and where to return 
water to river. Since a recent amendment, the Tradable Water Abstraction License 
became time limited and can only be renewed upon new application. However, 
the amount of water abstraction granted by license is given on the annual base that 
allows the abstractor to take water from river any time of the year, no matter what 
the river condition is. 
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4.1.2 The Structure of the Chapter 
This chapter consists of four sections as follows. The second section discusses 
the static analysis of environment policy to control pollution in the tidal Ouse. A 
tax-subsidy scheme (TSS) and tradable pollution permits (TPP) system are 
compared with a direct command approach using a static equilibrium analysis to 
evaluate the ability of each policy instrument in achieving the least cost solution. 
The difficulties might be encountered in design and practice are also discussed. 
The third section introduces a dynamic analysis of the same policy instruments. 
Here we discuss differences between the three policy instruments in their ability 
to achieve the dynamic equilibrium in a dynamic system. The differences are 
illustrated. The convergence and stability properties of the steady state 
equilibrium, determined by the capital stocks and investment choices of the firm 
are analysed. Analysis shows that the steady state equilibrium is a saddle point, 
and thus only one trajectory of the system will eventually converge to the steady 
state. Comparative statics was carried out in the fourth section to identify the 
impacts of environmental policy instruments in the dynamic system. Policy 
adjustments are necessary to achieve the prescribed environmental target. The last 
section provides a summary of the results from the preceding analyses and 
discusses the potential implications of the research for environmental policy and 
river water management. 
4.2 Static Analysis of Environmental Policy 
According to economic theory, environmental policy makers can correct for 
market failure in environmental issues, in a full information competitive context, 
by using various environmental policy instruments which internalise external 
social damages. Environmental policy instruments can be divided into two 
categories: economic instruments, which are also known as market-based 
instruments, and direct regulation, also known as "Command and Control" 
(Xepapadeas 1997). However, the prerequisites for the efficient environmental 
policy are not easily achieved. Information on production and emissions is usually 
incomplete, while industrial managers are generally not willing to share this 
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information with regulatory authorities. The prerequisite for fully competitive 
markets presents another difficulty in reality. 
As stated above, water policies in England and Wales dealing with effluent 
discharge and water abstraction can be categorized into the two instrument types. 
Discharge consents involve direct regulation only, whilst Water Abstraction 
Licenses combine regulative instruments with at least some potential for license 
trading. Water abstraction carries similar consequences on river water quality as 
emissions due to the impact of water volume on the quality and assimilative 
capacity of river water. Currently, neither abstraction licenses nor discharge 
consents take the timing of river flow into account. Since the river flow has an 
impact on assimilative capacity and consequently on river water quality, it might 
be necessary to consider the effect of time-varying consents and licenses to cope 
with changes in the volumes, and velocities of river flows, water temperatures, 
tidal influences, geographic factors and so on. 
4.2.1 The general model of cost efficiency of pollution 
abatement 
Consider a typical pollution externality produced by several plants in a market. 
The plants are competitive with each other. The plants produce a homogenous 
output qj and during production generate emissions e, to the whole market. 
With exogenously determined prices for the industry's output and for the inputs to 
pollution abatement, the firm's profit and emission functions can be defined as 
below: 
P(g1, a; )=pq, -Ci(q,, a, )-T(e, ) ... 
e; =Z, (g1, a, ) ... (4.2), 
where P. and C; are the net benefit (profit) and production cost of the firm, 
q; is product output from site i facing an exogenous price p, a, denotes the 
level of abatement activity at site i and T(e1) reflects private emission-related 
costs incurred at site i. Emission e, is a function represented by Z; of output 
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production and the level of abatement. The emission-related costs are usually 
attributed to the existence of environmental policy (Xepapadeas 1997). The 
environmental policy instruments implemented by an economically rational 
environmental authority, either regulatory approaches or economic instruments, 
would seek to achieve the level of environmental quality where the marginal cost 
of damage from pollution equalled to the marginal cost of pollution abatement. At 
this point, social welfare would be maximized. Private plants however, would 
minimize their costs of pollution abatement, because they seek to maximize profit, 
by equating the private marginal cost of abatement and the marginal benefit of 
abatement. Thus, in order to achieve the social optimum, full information about 
the cost and emission functions of plants is essential. 
4.2.2 Cost effectiveness analysis with water abstraction 
4.2.2. a Ambient water quality with effects of water 
abstraction 
Although regulation of effluent discharges can reduce the pollution in a 
receiving water body, ambient water quality in the river is the subject of 
regulatory concern here. So the effects of effluent on ambient water quality should 
be evaluated in order to achieve the desired water quality level at specific WQM 
sites. For the tidal Ouse estuary, there are five WQM sites downstream from 
Naburn Weir to Boothferry Bridge before its confluence with the tidal Trent at 
Trent Falls. 
Since discharges from industry and abstraction by water companies both have 
adverse impacts on river water quality, an integrated river management strategy 
for both consents and water abstraction would appear to be more appropriate than 
dealing with these two issues separately. Water quality in a river such as the tidal 
Ouse is influenced by several factors including the tributaries water qualities, 
industrial emissions, water abstractions by water companies and also the 
indigenous river properties such as volume, velocity and micro plankton activities. 
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Suppose that water quality at any WQM site s in the tidal estuary can be 
described by a function which takes the form QS = f., (A,, Es , H,, es) + ys , and 
the ambient water quality target at site s is a,, then the water quality at the WQM 
sites must satisfy Q5 >_QS, Vs. The variables in the water quality function are 
given below. 
A, is ambient water quality including the inputs from other tributaries at 
WQM site s; 
ES is aggregate impacts of industrial emissions to WQM site s; 
HS is aggregate impacts of water abstractions to WQM site s; 
e is a vector of other environmental factors that will influence the water 
quality, including velocity, volume, river flow and tide etc. There might be 
various influencing variables in different water quality models; 
and ys are the variations which are not captured explicitly by this function. 
When the locations of polluters and abstractors matter, it is not appropriate to 
simply sum up emissions and abstractions from all the sources. Instead, transfer 
coefficients are applied to evaluate and aggregate their impacts on the water 
quality at various water quality sites from various sources. For simplicity, it is 
common to assume that the sources contribute linearly to the aggregate emissions 
or abstractions on the water quality at WQM site s (Zylicz 2003). Thus we have 
kk 
Es = b, se, +bzse2 +...... +bsek = 
Leis = 2]büei ... 
(4.3), 
where bs is the transfer coefficient of impact of one unit pollution discharge (in 
the case of this research is BODS) from the pollution at site i on the water 
quality at WQM site s, and e; is the pollution discharged at site i. Similarly 
for water abstraction, there is 
kk 
HS = dtsQi +dzslßz +...... +dk,, 8k = E/j,, =Ed; si3r 
; _ý ; =i 
... (4.4), 
where d; = 
is the transfer coefficient of impact of one unit water abstraction from 
the abstraction site i on the river water quality at WQM site s, and ß; is the 
amount of water abstracted at site i. 
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Suppose the cost function of each firm at site i, either an industrial plant or a 
water company, takes the form of C, (q; , a; , ß) where q, and a, are the 
industrial output and abatement level at site i respectively, and ß; is the amount 
of water abstraction at site i. It is assumed that given any combination of q, and 
a; , the industrial effluent discharged to the river from site i, e; can be 
determined. Currently there is no plant in the tidal Ouse catchment discharging 
effluent to river and abstracting substantial amount of water at the same time, 
while some are using ground water for their production process. But in order to 
provide a perspective on future development, this economic model allows a firm 
at site i to have e, and ß; at the same time. For a pure effluent discharger, 
ß; =0 and e, =0 for a pure water abstractor. 
The river quality management objective of the regulator will be achieved by a 
cost allocation of effluent abatement and water abstraction among the different 
plants in the catchment, which is given by the solution of the following 
constrained optimisation problem: 
Minimize 2]C, (q; , a; , /3; ) 
Subject to: Q, = fS(As, E,, Hs, es)+7, >_Qs, forallthe s=1,2... r ... 
(4.5) 
The aggregate cost burden on the plants is minimised, subject to achieving the 
water quality target at each WQM sites. The Lagrange Equation is: 
L =ýC; (q,, a,, Q, )+ý. i., '(QS - fs(AS, ES, H5, es)-YS) ... 
(4.6) 
rs 
AS here is the shadow price (Lagrange Multiplier) for water quality. It forms 
an essential part of the optimal solution and reports the marginal impact of water 
quality constraint at binding point. Under the assumption of convexity of the cost 
functions, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to this optimisation problem imply (Simon 
and Blume 1994): 
aC'(")-Z 
b 
afs('), öe' 
>p; ... (4.7) aq SS ,ý aE, a9; 
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afs() öe, 
q=0, di; aqi 
s s, s 
aEs aqi 
aC; (") 
_ýý b`5 
öfs (") ae; 
>0. aa; 
s aEs aa, 
, 
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(4.8) 
(4.9) 
[C1(. ) 
Ab 
ars(') öe, 
a =O, Vi; ... (4.10) öa; 
s 
s" aES öa; , 
8GA 
s 
d" 
afs(')>0; 
... (4.11) aQ, 
s aHs 
äi () 
-2] Asdis 
aH) 
-Qr = 0, Vi; ... (4.12) 
QS -3(As, 
E5, Hs, e )-YS 50; ... (4.13) 
(QS 
-fs(AS, Es, HS, es)-YS). A, =0, Vs; ... (4.14) 
q;, a1, ß1, A, > 0, Vi, Vs. 
From equations (4.8), (4.10), (4.12) and (4.14), at least one of the two factors 
in each of the products has to be zero. Recalling the economic meaning of 
q, , a; ,, ß, , A,, they are all positive unless the plant is shut 
down or water qualities 
at some WQM sites are of no interest to the regulator. Thus, assuming the water 
quality constraint is binding at each WQM site and no plant shut down, 
q; , a; , f3,, 2., > 0, these first order conditions (FOCs) 
for the optimal solution 
become: 
öC; 
As bis 9f (') ae; ». öq; 
, 
öEs ag; 
aC; (") 
=I Ab 
afs (') ae; 
aa; ` s rs aEs aa; 
Ad afs() aQ` s 
rs 
aH rss 
fs(AS, E, H, Es)+YS =Qs ... (4.1 8). 
The function C; (q ;, a; ,, 
ß, ) thus represents the minimised total abatement 
costs under the optimal combination of output level, effluent abatement and water 
abstraction from each plant and the optimal allocation of those factors among the 
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plants. Equation (4.18) indicates a binding condition regarding the water quality 
target. 
The economic implications of above equations could be explained as, for 
example of equation (4.17), the cost effective allocation of water abstractions is 
where the marginal abstraction cost 
aC` 
*from a particular source 
is equal to 
a)6, 
the sum of "impacts" of that abstraction on all WQM sites, which is measured by 
a linear combination of the products of the Lagrange multipliers A, and marginal 
effect of abstraction from site i on water quality at each WQM site, weighted by 
transfer coefficient d, s . 
In a large catchment, when cost effectiveness could be achieved and the water 
quality target is binding at each WQM site simultaneously, it could be shown that 
the following condition would be satisfied, '; =Aj=".. = A, =A for all the 
WQM sites in the catchment, if the water quality constraint at each WQM site is 
independent of each other. The reason for this equation is that: at the cost effective 
allocation, if there were any two WQM sites whose water quality targets were 
achieved at different marginal cost, unless the basic requirements of river water 
quality are violated, the total abatement costs E C, (q; , a*,, 
6i*) could always be 
reduced further by increasing water quality at the cheaper site and decreasing it at 
the more expensive site. However, in a river system, the water qualities at each 
WQM site are usually closely related, as will be shown in the detailed case study 
of the tidal Ouse in the later chapters. 
Thus the equations (4.15)-(4.17) imply that 
aC; (")lagr 
= 
ac; (")laa, 
- 
aC; (")laA' ^Z afs O ae; afs O ae; afs (") (ýýJ ;3 
OH, 
bi, 
OE, ag; S 
b" 
M, aa; 
ý" 
... 
(4.19). 
Equation (4.19) has clear economic meaning: the optimal cost efficient 
allocation of effluent abatement and water abstraction across the whole catchment 
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requires the ratio between the marginal private cost of output level, effluent 
abatement and water abstraction at site i 
(aC; (")/aq` 
, aC; (")/7a, ' and aC, (")/aß , and the marginal impacts of each activity 
at site i on the river water qualities at all the WQM sites (the three denominators 
of Eq. 4.19) , is the same for each choice variable. The ratio is equal to the 
marginal abatement cost, or shadow price, of the ambient water quality at the level 
Q3 at WQM site s. 
However, in order to determine the allocation of effluent emissions and water 
abstraction among the plants, the marginal cost of ambient water quality, or 
shadow price of ambient water quality, must be appropriately determined in order 
to link the marginal damage cost of pollution on the community (which is 
equivalent to the marginal benefit to the community from pollution abatement), 
and the marginal effect from either effluent emissions and water abstractions on 
water quality at the WQM sites. Because of the controversies surrounding the 
accuracy and eligibility of environmental benefit valuation, it is very difficult to 
establish a shadow price to equate the marginal cost of pollution abatement to the 
marginal damage cause by pollution, or to the marginal benefit for the community 
derived from pollution abatement. 
Apart from this, it is also easy to prove that economic analysis is usually not 
the main driver behind current environment policy in reality. Economic 
considerations do contribute to the environmental policy making process. But 
other influential factors such as political acceptability, legitimatisation process, 
equity, social preference and international obligations also have their say in the 
process. These factors will be discussed in later chapters. 
As a second best position in the absence of the elusive shadow price of water 
quality, for any prescribed environmental target, cost effectiveness is achieved if 
the environmental target is met at least cost to society. By switching the focus 
from cost efficiency to cost effectiveness, value of shadow price is no longer 
required for the optimal allocation of emissions and abstractions. However, 
equation (4.15), (4.16), (4.17) and (4.18) will still apply for cost effectiveness. In 
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fact, any constant value of A will be sufficient to achieve cost effectiveness in 
the allocation of emission and abstraction among the plants. This is represented by 
the equation below, where yr could be any constant value without violating the 
environmental standards. 
aG (")Iöq; 
_ 
aC; (")Iaa; 
_ 
aC; a/jr 
_ 
Yb afs (-) ae ý b`Safs (") ae; ýd afs ()-ý S aEs aq; M, aa; ' 
S, 
S aHS 
4.2.3 Policy instruments 
(4.20) 
According to the analysis above, the cost efficient or cost effective I 
equilibrium allocation of effluent abatement and water abstraction under a 
regulation scheme for river water quality will satisfy the constraints below: 
aC; (") 
_A, b 
afs (") ae; 
aq, Gý aEs aq,. ' 
aC; () 
_ 2. V1, 
afs (") ae, 
; -, L Lu is äa öEs öa; 
(4.21) 
(4.22) 
aC; (") 
=ý 1] bi, 
afs (') 
. ..... .. (4.23) na* n.. vM 
f, (A 
ag; S 
ý -, s ax, s 
. 
fs (AS ý ES , 
H., cs )+ Ys = QS (4.18) 
for all the i and all the site s that is water quality is binding. 
Several policy instruments are available to regulators in order to achieve the 
optimum level of pollution reduction. Discharge consents directly regulated by the 
EA as a Command and Control (CAC) approach, whilst market-based instruments 
(MBIs) include the pollution tax scheme and the tradable pollution permit (TPP) 
system. The MBI options are usually thought superior to the CAC approach 
because they are cost effective per se, and could achieve cost effectiveness for any 
level of pollution reduction, even not at the cost efficient level. However, the 
choice among policy instruments is not straight forward between the tax scheme 
and TPP system, nor is it between CAC and MBI approaches. Details of 
instrument choices will be discussed in a later section. 
` When A takes the value of the shadow price of ambient water quality, this becomes a cost 
efficient allocation. 
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The CAC takes the form of statutory standards or consents that pollution 
dischargers must not violate, otherwise heavy penalties, fines and other forms will 
be applied. There are several forms of this instrument. Two different consents 
focusing on different targets are discussed below: 
1. Discharge Consents 
Discharge consents for industrial effluent, such as the effluent discharges from 
Selby sources into the Ouse, specify the emission limit for the plant. This is 
similar to water abstraction as the regulator specifies the amount of water that can 
be abstracted by each water company. Supposing e, and ß; are the maximum 
emission and water abstraction allowed at site i respectively, the problem faced 
by a cost minimising plant is then to: 
Minimize C; (e; 
, 
ß) 
, 
subject to e; 5 e; ,, ß; :5 
Ai where e; = Z; (q,, a). 
The Lagrange function is L=C, (ei, a; ) + 27e (e; - e; ) + 2; Q 
(ß; - X13, ) , where 
/(.; e and 
2 can be interpreted as the shadow price of the emission and 
abstraction limits respectively. These shadow prices indicate the impacts on the 
abatement cost of changes in the stringency of the emission and abstraction 
standard. 
Solving the maximization problem by finding the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, it is 
not difficult to show that the optimal solution for the firm is to discharge and 
abstract up to the allowed limits in a wide range of cases. So the limits chosen by 
the policy regulator, the Environment Agency in the case of the River Ouse, are 
particularly influential over the river quality. 
In general, effluent consents set by regulators are not cost effective because 
they tend to be applied uniformly across polluters. Cost effectiveness in pollution 
control requires the polluter with lower costs of pollution control to abate more, 
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and those with higher costs to abate less. Therefore, uniform effluent consents 
across polluters and over time are unlikely to be cost effective unless they are set 
at the exact level where the marginal cost of pollution abatement is equal to the 
marginal benefit of pollution control. 
If the effluent consents are set higher than the optimal level, i. e. when the 
polluters have to abate more than the socially optimal level, the polluters with 
higher costs of abatement have to reduce their pollution more, to the level where 
marginal cost of abatement exceeds the marginal benefit from pollution control. 
This situation is not cost effective because social welfare is decreased by the extra 
cost of pollution abatement. If the effluent consents are set too low, however, the 
polluters with lower abatement costs will have no incentive to abate further to the 
optimal level as that would incur extra costs of pollution abatement. 
In this thesis, giving the consideration to changes in both location and timing of 
discharge will lead to the conclusion that cost effectiveness requires polluters to 
abate more where and when assimilative capacity of the river is lower, and to 
abate less where and when assimilative capacity is higher. Since the marginal 
benefits from emission reduction are actually the marginal damages avoided by 
pollution elimination, they vary with changes in the assimilative capacity in the 
river. If consents are insensitive to variations in assimilative capacity in the river, 
the marginal social benefits of emission reductions could not be equalised. 
However, to have the discharge consents varying with assimilative capacity are 
simply impractical in reality. 
2. Ambient Quality Consents 
As alternative, the environmental authority could design the direct control 
regulations within an ambient water quality system which aims to achieve water 
quality that matches the required target, rather than focusing directly on the 
effluent emissions and water abstractions of polluters. In an ambient water quality 
system, E, and Hs, as discussed before, are the aggregate effects of emissions 
and abstractions on the water quality at the WQM site s from all the plants 
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along the river, which are defined by equation (4.3) and (4.4). Therefore the 
problem of cost minimisation is: 
Minimize C; (e, 
, 
ß; ) , 
subject to Qs = 
f., (AS , ES , HS , es) + YS >_ QS for all the s =1,2 ... r. 
QS is the regulated ambient water quality level required by the EA. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions defining the minimum cost are: 
äC. O- 
A` bs 
afs O>0, 
with equality if e, ' >0... (4.24); ae; S aEs 
-C-'(-) 
- A* "Z di, aH) > 
0, with equality if ß* >0... (4.25); 
ss 
Qs -fs(A,, Es, H5, E5)-Ys >0, with equality if A* >0 ... (4.26) 
for all the i and s. 
Since e;, ß; ` and K are positive values in most situations, if K is assigned 
the value of shadow price, at which the value of A` " 
2] bis and 
A' b,, 
aaHf) 
are equal to the marginal damage to the community from 
pollution, this environmental consents of effluent emissions and water 
abstractions would be cost efficient. However, as we discussed before, it is very 
difficult to determine the proper value of A', so is to estimate the marginal 
damage from pollution deterioration. 
Without knowing the value of A', cost effectiveness could still be achieved as 
long as öC; a()Iöe; = 
8C; ()iä, ß,. ' =w When this is the case, regulation in the ls() als() bis 
ÖES 
dis 
oHs 
effluent emissions and water abstractions would be cost effective, provided that 
the desired environment quality was not violated. Only when the constant value is 
equal to the true shadow price of environment quality, regulations will be cost 
efficient. 
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If the marginal effect of aggregate effluents and abstractions on water quality, 
), 
could be assumed fixed at each WQM site, the environment 
as 0 
and äßiyý 
s 
agency would then be able to determine the cost-effective consents for effluent 
emission and water abstraction for each plant at any site i when the plant's cost 
function and their transfer coefficients were known. However, the marginal effect 
of aggregate effluents and abstractions on water quality at the WQM sites is 
subject to seasonal variation associated with changes in assimilative ability in the 
river water. Also the information asymmetry between the plants and 
environmental authority presents problem for the design of cost effective consents. 
The cost function of polluters is usually unknown to the regulator and the 
polluters are reluctant to share this information. When there are many polluters 
involved, finding out the individual cost function of each polluter and designing 
individual consents for each of them would require an impractical level of effort 
by the environmental authority. Therefore direct controls which aim to achieve 
cost effectiveness in the river management are not usually feasible in practice. The 
onerous calculation involved and the requirement of iterative amendment due to 
seasonal change, new technology and new entry are unacceptable the 
unacceptability both to environmental authority and political process. 
4.2.3. b Pollution tax-subsidy scheme (TSS) 
An emission charge or pollution tax is a fee, collected by the government, 
levied on each unit of pollutant emitted into the air or water (Tietenberg 2006). 
Pollution taxes induce plants to reduce their pollution because of the substantial 
costs of the pollution emission. Assuming they are profit seeking, they will reduce 
their pollution to the point where the incremental cost of control is equal to the 
emission charge that they must otherwise pay (Hanley et al. 1997). An effective 
pollution tax will be set such that the emission reduction is what is desired by the 
regulator. When the emission charge is set at the level of marginal social damage 
of pollution emissions, emissions will be reduced to the level where the marginal 
damage of pollution to society is equal to the marginal abatement cost, provided 
there is a convex abatement cost function. Such a pollution tax scheme would 
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induce the optimal level of pollution abatement with cost efficiency, and is usually 
called a "Pigouvian Tax" (Mankiw 2001; Tietenberg 2006). 
A successful pollution tax on the effluent discharges and water abstractions 
should motivate industries to mitigate the impacts of their emission and 
abstraction on the river water quality. However, here I will analyse a bit different 
pollution TSS. Pezzy (1992) suggested a combination system of charges and 
subsidies could be applied as an integrated scheme, mentioned that pure pollution 
taxes usually encounter objections because of their political unacceptability and 
the financial burden imposed on industry. In this scheme, polluters pay the 
amount of TQ = to " (e; - e, °) , where to 
is the tax rate set by regulator; e, ° is a 
targeted emission right which is initially granted as a property right to each 
existing firm for discharge at site i. The value of e, ° may vary from firm to firm, 
but not over time. 
Similarly, when considering water abstraction, each water company would be 
required to pay the amount TQ = to " (/. 3; - ß, °) , where tQ and 
ß, ° are the 
counterparts of the TSS for water abstractions. 
If the firm has less than its targeted level effluent or abstraction (e, < e° or 
, Q, <, 8i'), it will receive corresponding subsidy from the authority. 
When e° and 
, ß, 
° are set to zero, this scheme reduces to a pure Pigouvian pollution charges 
system. Since the TSS is a form of MBIs it is inherently cost effective. As usual, 
different tax rates will produce different cost-effective allocations of effluent 
discharge and water abstraction, although only one will truly be cost efficient. 
However, e, ° , to and 
/ß, ° 
, tQ are not necessarily set 
by the regulator at 
efficient levels, and this can be influenced by many factors representing their own 
interests. Therefore this scheme may not be revenue-neutral for the regulator 
(Pezzy 1992). 
The regulator's problem is now to set an appropriate tax system through which 
the plant will bear same marginal cost of effluent and abstraction control, which is 
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equal to the marginal damage cost of pollution. However, in contrast to what 
discussed above, a set of tax and subsidy rates different at each WQM sites are set, 
because of the different transfer coefficients for emission and abstractions from 
various sources. 
Let Ti, and Ti,, be the sum of tax and subsidy for effluent emission and 
water abstraction at all the WQM sites. Therefore the cost function at each cost 
minimising plant is to: 
Minimizing C. (e; ,, ß; ) + T,, e + 
Tr, , 
where Ti. = 
(e; 
- e° 
)" bi, " te5 and Ti0 , =O-, 
ß; °) d; 
s t0 55 
The FOCs are 
aä 
i!. / + bia . teS =0 
,5 
(4.27), 
aC, () 
+Zd, stas =0... 
(4.28). 
Comparing Eqs (4.27) and (4.28) with Eqs (4.24) and (4.25), it can be seen that 
teS = -ý 
afs () 
and tas = -A 
afs () 
, where the negative sign means 
that the 
aEs aHs 
direction of tax and subsidy revenue is opposite to the effect of emissions and 
abstractions on the water quality. Under the TSS scheme, the resulting river water 
quality at all the WQM sites will be same as the river water quality achieved with 
cost efficiency in section 4.2.3. a, therefore the tax and subsidy scheme would be 
cost efficient. This is categorized by Pezzy (1992) as short-run efficiency. Taking 
opportunity cost into account, long-run efficiency could also be achieved under 
proper entry-exit rules for the industry (Pezzy 1992). It should be noted that this 
TSS takes into account not only the effects of discharge and abstraction locations, 
but also the effects of discharge and abstraction timings. The effects of timing 
changes can be manifested through the factors of 
afs O 
and 
afs O. 
The charge 
öEs öH, 
rates should also be allowed to vary over time accordingly. 
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However, the difficulty in estimating the value of A also applies to the tax 
and subsidy scheme. Without knowing the value of A, it is not possible to 
achieve the cost efficiency though the tax and subsidy scheme. But assume that 
A takes the same value at all the WQM sites, and the environment quality is not 
violated, the tax and subsidy scheme would retain its cost effectiveness. The tax 
and subsidy rates, as discussed previously, will be influenced by many other 
factors to reflect different preferences or interests. At the equilibrium, the tax and 
subsidy rate will equate the marginal cost of emission abatement and abstraction 
reduction among all the polluters at each WQM site, but these costs are not 
necessarily equal to the marginal damage from pollution deterioration to the 
community. 
4.2.3. c Tradable Water Abstraction Licenses and TPP 
Scheme 
Tradable emission permits represent a system of tradable property rights for the 
management of environmental pollution. Originated by Crocker (1966) and Dales 
(1968), they have gained much popularity recently in environmental economics. 
An ideal tradable emission permits system involves: 
"A decision regarding the total quantity of pollution is to be allowed. If an 
efficient system is to be attained, the total quantity of emission permits 
issued (measured in units of pollution) should be equal to the efficient 
level of pollution. 
"A rule that ensures that any firm is only allowed to produce pollution up to 
the quantity of emission permits it possesses. Any emission beyond that 
level is subjected to a prohibitively expensive fine or other penalty. 
"A choice by the control authority over how the total quantity of emission 
permits is to be initially allocated. 
"A guarantee that emission permits can be freely traded between plants at 
whichever prices are agreed for that trade. 
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Different versions of tradable pollution permit systems have been proposed and 
established worldwide. Three of them are described here: the ambient permit 
system (APS), the emission permit system (EPS) and the pollution offset (PO). 
1. Ambient Permit system (APS) 
In an APS, the environmental authority determines the amount of permits 
issued to the polluters based on the effects of their emission on ambient water 
quality at the WQM sites. In order to take into account the differences of spatial 
characteristics among polluters, transfer coefficients are utilized to facilitate 
permit trading at each WQM site. The trade of permits at a WQM site is not to be 
carried out on a one-for-one basis, but a rate relevant to the ratio of the polluters' 
transfer coefficients at the WQM site. Thus a separate permit market needs to be 
established at each WQM site, and the polluters are required to produce a 
"portfolio" of pollution permits for all the WQM sites they affect, depending on 
the transfer coefficients between sources and the WQM sites. In an APS, the 
environmental authority is responsible for specifying the transfer coefficients 
matrix for all the plants at each of the WQM sites through which the trading ratio 
among any plants at any WQM site is established and adhered to during the trade. 
Supposing e° is the total quantity of emission permits issued by the 
{5 
environmental authority and e° is the initial permits initially allocated to site i 
through either auction or "grandfathering" at WQM site s. No TTP system is in 
place for the tidal Ouse and Humber catchment. However, tradable license of 
abstraction are implemented in water abstraction management. Following the 
notation for pollution permits, let j j, ß, ° and ß; ° denote the initial total 
quantity of abstraction permits and the permits for water abstraction for company 
i at site s in the catchment, then net demands for emission and abstraction 
permits at site i are (e, 3 - e°) and 
(, 8;, - 8; ° 
S 
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Since plants are allowed to trade their permits in markets, equilibrium permit 
prices for effluent discharge and water abstraction will be established at each 
WQM sites. The cost minimizing plant will then face the problem: 
Minimize C; (e; ,, ß; ) + [PeS " (ei, - ejo, ) + Pps (Qrs - ý3; 
° )J 
, where 
Pes and Pas 
S 
are the equilibrium permit prices for effluent discharge and water abstraction 
respectively in the permit market established at each WQM site s. These prices 
may vary from site to site and over time. 
Knowing that ej., = b; e; and ßu = d; ß, and assuming that neither of them is 
zero or negative, the FOCs of the cost minimising solution for effluent discharges 
and water abstractions are: 
ac, (-) 
bi, =0... (4.29); ae; 
aC; (") 
+ d; ý Pas =0... (4.30). aß; s 
Thus the optimal equilibrium prices for effluents and abstractions that clear the 
permit market at site s are 
P' = _A 
af, (") 
eý aEs 
Al (. l ! s\/ Pg"s = -ý aHs 
(4.31); 
(4.32). 
As we discussed previously, the value of A reflects the preference of the 
environment authority. If the total quantity of permits is chosen optimally, i. e. at 
the level where the marginal damage function intersects the demand for permits, 
then the social optimum is achieved. Or, putting this another way, when the 
environment authority makes A equal to the value of the shadow price of water 
quality, then the TPP system will be cost efficient in the delivery of social welfare. 
If the total amount of pollution permits is determined by the influence of some 
other factors, A might be chosen at other value rather than the shadow cost of 
water quality. In this case, then permits trading will ensure that the target will be 
met at least social cost (Xepapadeas 1997), thus the cost-effectiveness of the TPP 
system will remain in achieving the prescribed water quality target. 
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APS is a TPP system in which separate permits regulate the impact of emission 
and abstraction form various individuals on water qualities at separate WQM site, 
where the permits are exchanged at rates governed by the transfer coefficients. 
Each WQM site s is called an ambient permit system. The APS appears to offer 
a very simple regulatory process to the environmental authority. Only the proper 
amount of pollution permits at each WQM site need to be determined and 
distributed, either through auction or a "grandfathering" process in which the 
permits are granted to the current existing polluters in proportion to their current 
emission levels. However, this system would be extremely cumbersome from the 
viewpoint of polluters. Each polluter will have to hold a "portfolio" of permits at 
each WQM site that it might affect, for both effluent emission and water 
abstraction if necessary. There will be one market at each WQM site. When there 
are many markets involved in the trading process if a polluter who affects these 
WQM sites wishes to increase his pollution through purchasing corresponding 
pollution permits, the transaction cost will be so high that it might actually prevent 
the trade from occurring. The second deficiency of APS would be the possibility 
of generating "hot spot" of pollution through the trading of pollution permits, 
since locations which tend to generate more pollution by purchasing more permits 
are usually the locations which are more difficult to abate pollution and more 
sensitive to damage of pollution. In the case of this research, although the 
assimilative capacity of river water would change seasonally, it is not very 
feasible to set the effluent emission permits and water abstraction licences specific 
to different time periods during the trade process. 
2. Emission Permit system (EPS) 
Some of the difficulties and complexities associated with the APS could be 
reduced to some extent by using an emission permit system (EPS), However, an 
EPS does not have the least cost property that APS can offer, so it is not a cost 
effective TPP system. In an EPS the environmental authority will divide the 
whole region into several zones, within each zone the pollution sources are 
allowed to trade the pollution permits on a one-for-one basis and ignore the spatial 
differences among their locations. This system could facilitate trading among the 
polluters and avoid the "hot spot" problems (Xepapadeas 1997). Unlike APS, EPS 
could greatly simplify life for polluters (Baumol and Oates 1988), because of the 
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simple exchange rate between polluters within the zone. But when the dispersion 
characteristics of the pollutions from different polluters, i. e. the transfer 
coefficients in our case, are very different, the EPS could deviate far from the 
least cost allocation of pollution abatement. As a result of the simpler trade 
process for potential traders, the environment authority then have to bear the 
burden of calculating the amount of pollution permits at each WQM site, and then 
readjusts it iteratively as times goes by in order to achieve the solution nearest to 
the least-cost allocation. 
3. The pollution-offset (PO) system 
A system which combines APS and EPS is the pollution offset (PO) system. A 
PO system is able to circumvent the problems associated with APS and EPS 
systems (Baumol and Oates 1988). In a PO system, the pollution permits are 
defined in terms of emissions, as in the EPS, while the trade of the permits is not 
on a one-for one basis, but instead are undertaken at ratios that depend on the 
contribution of their pollution to the ambient water quality at the WQM sites. 
The PO system inherits the least-cost property from the APS system, because 
the ratio of permits trade will eventually lead to a cost effectiveness allocation of 
permits. This property does not depend on the initial allocation of permits as in 
APS, any initial allocation will be led to the cost effective equilibrium by the 
market force (Baumol and Oates 1988; Xepapadeas 1997). There is also no heavy 
burden to the environmental authority to solve the minimization problem of the 
polluters in each zone as it would be required under the EPS. Under a PO system, 
the environment authority needs to establish the transfer coefficients matrix of all 
the polluters, [b;, ], [d;, ], and the effects of effluent discharges and water 
abstractions on the ambient water quality, 
af` ý) 
and 
af, (') 
DE, H. 
Unlike the APS, the polluters could trade their emission directly with other 
polluters in a PO system, therefore there is no need to trade the pollution permits 
in a multitude of separate permits markets at each WQM site, thus the high 
transaction costs associated with the APS could be avoided. The only constraint 
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on the operation of a PO system is that the trade process must not generate a 
violation of the prescribed water quality at any WQM site. Therefore, the PO 
system offers a promising approach to the design of a TPP system, although there 
may be cases in which an EPS is preferred because of its simplicity in trade. A 
"non-degradable offset" PO system, requires that the total emissions in the zone 
must not increase after any trade. This "non-degradable offset" PO system has 
been argued to be relatively more cost effective than a range of other TPP systems 
(Atkinson and Tietenberg 1984). 
4. The link between APS and PO system 
In a PO system, the trade ratio of pollution permits is based on their effects on 
the water quality at the WQM site, which determined by the aggregated pollution 
level at each WQM site. The value of the trade ratio between any two effluent 
emission at sites i, j, rp; ej , should 
be determined based on the effects of 
emissions from the two sources on water quality at the binding monitoring site, or 
based on the permits prices at each site and their transfer coefficients to the WQM 
sites. 
afs() Pes b P. " "b, s eS ae, M, ae; (4.33), 
.i- örs (') afs () aEs Pes Pes ' bis .. b 'S öei 
S öEs ae; s -A 
where e; and ej* here denote the optimal level of emission form each site and Pes 
denotes the market clear permit price at each WQM site. 
Because the equilibrium price of pollution permits at each WQM site is known 
to all the potential traders once the market clears, and also the transfer coefficient 
matrix for all the potential traders is authorized and published by the 
environmental authority, then the trade ratio (peg between any two polluters can 
easily be found and used in the trading process. In this way, the pollution level at 
each WQM site remains unchanged after the trade of pollution emissions whilst 
the total cost of pollution abatement is reduced. Thus the desired ambient water 
quality is achieved at the least cost through the TPP system. In the same way, the 
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trade ratio between water abstraction at site i, j, Vi' ., could be found out, which 
is equal to 
ýafsi) aHs Pas d. Pa, 
s , d. 
ý-' 
ýs s 
r aHs aQ,. ý 
Q_S aQ, * ýP; 
"; -a fs (. ) 2: Pa -d;, 2] afs aHS Pas d; 
s aQ; s aHs a, ßý s -. 2 
s 
(4.34). 
More importantly, the trading ratio could also be expanded to cover the trade 
between permits for effluent emission and permits for water abstractions, an 
opportunity which has not been realized so far. According to the criteria that the 
trading ratio should be based on the effects on the aggregated pollution level at the 
WQM site2, the value of the ratio for trading between emissions and abstractions 
at any two different sites is3 
afs (") afs (') aEs pes , 
e, a s 2e,. 
' 
_, 
aEs ae; 
ý bra ý pes ' bi, 
ýP, -afs() af() aHs . pas 
d 
pas ' d; s 
Js s a, aJ ýs aH s a, ß' 
2: 
A 
4.3 Dynamic Analysis of Environmental Policy 
(4.35). 
In a dynamic analysis, product output, effluent abatement and water abstraction 
from a plant are considered to be dynamic functions of capital stock. This assumes 
that the costs of labour are negligible compared with capital costs, or that they 
could be taken into account as the operational costs. The capital stock of firm 
depends on its investment through time, which is an exogenous choice variable in 
the model, and depends on the depreciation of the current stock. The dynamic 
analysis aims to find out the optimal investment path for a given plant under 
different environmental policy instruments, and to evaluate the feasibility of 
optimal investment schemes under different policies. 
2 As discussed before, water abstraction is regarded as another type of pollution besides the 
effluent emissions in this research. More detailed discussion could be found in Sheail (1997). 
' This also the opportunity of trade in the same plant between effluent emission permits and water 
abstraction permits, which is the case of emission trade within one plant, described by Tietenberg 
(1990). 
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4.3.1 Dynamic problem with discrete time 
The production output, effluent abatement and water abstraction of a firm in 
discrete time are functions of the firm's capital stock at time t, i. e. qi,, = qi (k, ", ) , 
ai, 
l _ ai it) and 6i, t i=/ (k') respectively. ki° ki, °t and ki,! ý here denote the 0 
capital stock which firm i has available for be used in these activities. 
In the economic problems, the time horizon of dynamic problems is usually 
allowed to approach infinity. This is not because the firm or environmental 
authority has to consider to adopt a policy of sustainable development for 
indefinite time, but that even the time horizon of planning is to stop at some point 
of time, the remaining stocks still have to be valued along the horizon by 
discounting what they could produce in the future (Aronsson et al. 2004), unless 
they will have no value after the planning period, which is not usually the case. 
Therefore, the environmental authority will only plan for a period but take into 
account the present-value of remaining stock after the management, such as a 
T 
optimisation problem to maximise I p' " F(t) +V (T) , where F(t) is the 
r=o 
production function at time t, p is discounting factor, and V(T) is the 
present-value of remaining stock after the management period. Since V (T) is 
equal to the value produced in the future after the management, 
a, 
V(T)=1: p' - F(t). 
r=T 
Therefore the problem becomes, 
T 
F(t)+V(T)=1: p`"F(t)+ýp`"F(t)=Zp`"F(t), 
r=o r=o r=r r=o 
same as an optimisation problem over a finite horizon will end up the same as the 
problem with an infinite horizon. 
In our case, the optimisation seeks to minimize the aggregate costs of 
achieving the desired level of water quality. The environmental authority is 
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unlikely to adopt a perspective with infinite time horizon for its policy making; 
nonetheless, the water quality is still to be kept at least on the required level after 
the finite time horizon. Therefore the aggregate costs of keeping the water quality 
after the finite regulation time horizon, is still to be taken account in the dynamic 
optimisation, so the minimization of total abatement cost is also using an infinite 
time horizon. 
For the dynamic optimisation in this research, the capital stocks in the firm are 
the state variables; investment levels to the capital stocks are the control variables 
which determine the level of state variables to achieve the optimisation. The 
capital is constrained to the three elements, output production, effluent abatement 
and water abstraction, independent of each other. The water quality target is to be 
met at each WQM site at each time period. The water quality target is the 
constraint to the dynamic optimisation, represented by Eq (4.38). The dynamic of 
capital is represented by Eq (4.37) where the capital stock in the next period for 
each element is determined by the current capital stock for each element, on-going 
investment in the element and the depreciation of current capital stock. 
The objective of the environmental authority, which wants to achieve the 
desired environmental target at the least abatement cost, is therefore 
w 
Min t p "C, (9,, t, a;,,, Q,,,, Ij) 
t=o , 
s. t. kir+ý -kit =Ii, .I -15, 'k, 't, J =9, a, Q 
Q, 
{ 
=. %(As, Es, 
t, 
Hs, 
t, Es)+Ys' 
Qsý 
J, is given. 
(4.36), 
(4.37); 
(4.38); 
p =(I+ r)-` is the discount factor, with r equals to the 
interest rate. 8; 
represents the depreciation rates for each element of capital stock. 
The current-value Hamiltonian of this dynamic problem is 
II =j 
[ci(itait, 
Qi. r ,Iii)+ 
ZPfui', 
t+, 
(I; 
l- 9i' ' ki') 
(4.39); 
i1 
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The water quality target is to be satisfied at each WQM site and at any time. 
The constraint is then captured by the Lagrange Equation below: 
L =H+ A,., -(a, -. f,, (A,,, E,,,, H,,,, s, )-YS) ... (4.40). 
is called co-state variable or dynamic Lagrange multiplier. This could be 
interpreted as shadow price or value of one unit extra capital stock at time t to the 
firm's costs. The A,,,, this indicate the consequences which a marginal change in 
the water quality constraints at site s in time t would carry for the minimised cost 
of water quality compliance. The Lagrange multipliers A,,,, which were static 
variables before, are now dynamic variables, i. e. their values can change through 
time. This feature is necessary because the environmental quality constraint must 
be satisfied at every time slot tin the planning period. 
The FOCs of the minimum cost solution to this dynamic problem are (Barro 
and Sala-i-martin 1999) as below, where variables with asterisk represent their 
values at the dynamic equilibrium: 
I; ý 
ac; (')+pp; 
t+. 0, I;; >_o ý al;, ý 
0 , ýS, f ' [Q, S - 
. 
fs (A, Es.  Hs,  cs )- Ys 1=0, 
Za, 
r 22 
Pfj; t+l -P r'l =- 
aL' 
aki ;, l 
aL` 
=0=> k' k' I' 
jk! 
j kill,, - e, r -- rr -8r ý, r 
aý,, t 
and the transversality condition 
liýmp`"fU1r'k; ', =0 
From Eq (4.40), we have: 
_ 
ac; afs" (1- 9i') = ak' ak 
,, r : 
At the steady-state equilibrium, theses is 
... (4.41); 
... (4.42); 
(4.43); 
(4.44); 
(4.45). 
(4.46). 
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k' = k' = k' + i, t 
Pi - Pi, t = 
jt+I 
Therefore Eq (4.44) implies that at the steady state equilibrium I; ' = 8i' ki' 
which says that at the steady state equilibrium, the investment undertaken by the 
firm in every year should equal the depreciation incurred in the already deployed 
capital stock. At the steady state equilibrium Eq (4.46) reduces to the function 
below after substituting p= (1 + 
p. r /u' -p . S; ... (4.47). Oki' Oki j 
This equation implies some fundamental economic interpretation. The left hand 
side is the product of the interest rate and the discount factor. The interest rate 
could be regarded as the average rate of return from other areas of economy for 
one unit capital investment. So the left hand side equals to the discounted average 
rate of return from investing capital in other areas of the economy. The right hand 
side consists of two parts. The first one, similar to the static analysis, gives the 
average rate of return to net cost of water quality management, which is equal to 
the marginal effect of an extra unit of capital stock, either in output production, 
effluent abatement or water abstraction, on the firm's current-value individual cost, 
net of the marginal effects generated by that extra capital expenditure on the 
ambient environmental quality, then weighted by the shadow prices of the extra 
capital. The shadow price of capital is the amount by which the current-value cost 
at dynamic optimum C ,. 
' (q, 
t, a. t, 
ß; 
,, 
I 
,) will 
increase if the capital k were 
to increase by a small amount (Hoy et al. 2001). The second part is the discounted 
depreciation rate of the capital stock that is invested in the plant. The right hand 
side is then the overall average rate of return on the capital investment in the plant, 
taking account of environmental costs in water quality. Therefore, at the steady 
state equilibrium, the capital investment should deliver the same average rate of 
return in both internal (i. e. in the firm) and external (i. e. in other area of economy) 
investment decisions. 
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In a continuous time setting, the product output, effluent abatement and water 
abstraction are assumed as functions of current capital stock, which are 
themselves dynamic functions of time dependent on previous investment 
decisions and on-going depreciation. 
9. (t) = 9. (kq (t)) 
a. (t) = a. 
(kia (t)) 
F, (t) = Q; (klP (t)) 
The objective of the environmental authority to achieve the environmental 
target at the minimal cost becomes: 
Min Je-ri . C, (q,, a,, ß,, I; ) ... 
(4.48) 
o o 
s. t. k. ' =I. (t)-S'k (t), j=q, a, Q, ... 
(4.49); 
QS = . 
fs (A, 
, Es (t), HS 
(t), ES) + YS >_ QS , ... 
(4.50); 
k/ (0) is given. 
The current-value Hamiltonian for this continuous time dynamic problem is 
H=ýI Ci (4; (t), a; (t), A (t), I' (t)) +, fý' (t) (I' (t) - ý, ' k' (t)) 
I (4.51) 
The corresponding augmented Lagrange Function is 
L= IH +E As (t) " (Qr -% (AS , Es (t), Hs (t), Es )- Ys )... (4.52). 
S 
The co-state variables u (t) and static Lagrange multiplier As (t) have 
similar economic meaning to those described in the discrete time setting, only 
now they are functions of the continuous variable t rather than discrete time 
variables. 
The FOCs for the minimum cost solution are 
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I, ' ac` (. ) +' = 0, r, > >- 0 aj, i 
,i 'LQS -fs (Ag, Eg(t), Hg(t), F's)-YS1 = 0, As >_ 0 
rflij - , Ü; = 
aL; 
=: Ü; _ (r + ý; ' ) f. t; - 
aC,. ' (") 
+, 
afs. (') 
ak; ak; ak; 
aL' =0=: > k' =I; ''-S; 'k; '` apl! 
and the transversality condition 
lime-" ft' (t) " k, ' (t) =0 
... (4.53); 
(4.54); 
(4.55); 
(4.56); 
(4.5 7). 
From Eq (4.53) 
j* acio 
al' ... 
(4.58). 
For simplicity in writing, from now on, I use C, '(. ) to represent the first order 
partial derivative of cost function against investment I, C; " (") to represent the 
second order partial derivative against Iii, and so on. Variables with asterisk 
indicate that they are at the level of steady state equilibrium value. From Eq. 
(4.58), we have 
al; 1 =. =-C"(. )-'. `di. 
a'ui 19, u; / 
therefore, 
ý` - 
ak; 
_ 
aC; (") ac; ý") ar; 
at at ar' at 
(4.59), 
= -ac; " (") " 
I; ' 
... (4.60). 
Substituting Eqs (4.60) into Eq (4.55) gives 
i ac* (") al' () I' [(r+8, ')ý; ' +ýý, 5 "s c; '(") Oki' s Oki' 
> . (4.61). 
Eq (4.61) and Eq (4.56) could form another pair of Hamiltonian dynamic 
equations regarding the control variable of investment I j', and state variable, 
capital stocks k' , which 
have more practical meaning than ii and k' 
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described by Eq (4.55) and Eq (4.56), because in reality I' is much easier to be 
seen , ur' . 
In the new system, the steady state long-run equilibrium is defined as the point 
at (I/, k*), V i, dj , where there is 
Then from Eq (4.56) and (4.61), 
Ir'' - b' 
ki'' 
1 aC; ` (") 
-I ý; .( aki s 
I; =k; =0, di, bj. 
afs* 0)-S, ' =r ökr' 
(4.62) 
(4.63) 
Eqs (4.62) and (4.63) have similar economic interpretations to their 
counterparts in the discrete-time dynamic problem. Eq (4.62) says that at the 
long-run steady state equilibrium, the investment rate of the firm, in all the three 
elements of capital stocks, should be equal to the depreciation rate of each 
element of capital stock so that the capital stock remains constant at levels which 
comply with the environmental regulations. Eq (4.63) expresses the same meaning 
as Eq (4.47) but in a continuous time setting, stating that under optimal 
investment management, the internal rate of return of increasing capital stock on 
the current-value cost at dynamic optimum should equate the external rate of 
return on capital invested elsewhere in the economy. 
4.3.3 The Convergence and Stability Properties of the 
Steady State Equilibrium 
According to the analysis above, the solution to the dynamic cost minimisation 
problem could be found using the FOCs of Hamiltonian equilibrium. The steady 
state equilibrium could be found out by setting the motion of the co-state, state 
and control variables of the dynamic system to zero. In our case these are the 
variables u, , k/ and If respectively. However, knowing the steady sate 
equilibrium alone is of little use without discussing the convergence and stability 
properties of the dynamic system. An equilibrium point which only exists in 
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principle, but which cannot be approached or which is such that the slightest 
disturbance could produce divergence away from it - an unstable equilibrium 
point - is obviously not very relevant from an economic point of view (Gandolfo 
1997). 
The following analysis, investigates the convergence and stability properties of 
the dynamic system of water pollution control under investment decisions based 
on the continuous time series. Analysis for the solution of the dynamic problem in 
discrete time could be illustrated similarly. In the following analyses of 
convergence and stability, the capital stock and investment are assumed having 
independent impacts on the total cost, i. e. 
alci () 
= 0. ak al; l. 
Stability and convergence are typically investigated using a phase plane 
approach in which two relevant variables form the two axes of the phase plane. 
Depending on the variables and the steady state equilibrium we would like to 
investigate, there are two Hamiltonian dynamic system formed by the co-state, 
state and control variables, namely k; ,u and 
k, Ii', j=q, a,, 8 . The 
quantitative analyses are carried out in each system as follows. 
4.3.3. a Dynamic System in terms of k, h 
From discussion above, there are 
(r + ), u -+ 2S , afs 
(') 
= F(, u; , k; 
) ... (4.55), ak' s ak' 
=I'' -ö'k' ... 
(4.56). 
From E 4.58 
, u; 
' =-- = C; ' I'') where 
' represents 
ai! 
the reverse function of function g, so we have I, '' = g(, uj*). Therefore, Eq(4.56) 
could be rewritten as a function of ft' ,k, 
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k,. ' =Ir' -S, 'k'* =S(fu; *)-8, 'k'' =G(p; , 
k,. ') 
... (4.64). 
Due to the nonlinearity of the dynamic system defined by k' , ,ff, the global 
stability of this system cannot be investigated. Here we use the linearization 
method4 to analyse the local stability of the steady state equilibrium. As this 
system is autonomous, the following linearised system in the neighbourhood of 
the steady state is a good approximation to the original non-linear system formed 
by Eq (4.55) and (4.64) around the steady state equilibrium (Gandolfo 1997). 
The linearization method states that for .i 
(t) =f (x(t)), f: R" -> R", if x` is 
an equilibrium, then i(t) = A(x(t) - x*), A= 
af' (x') 
öxi 
jjj =1,2,... n , where A 
is 
the Jacobian matrix of the system evaluated at the equilibrium point. If the 
equilibrium point in the linear approximation is globally stable, then it is also 
locally stable at the original non-linear system. The converse is not necessarily 
true (Xepapadeas 1997). 
For the original non-linear system formed by Eqs (4.55) and (4.64), 
A= 
aF(") aF(. ) 
a, u; ak; 
ac(. ) ac(-) 
a, u; ak, ' \"l 
Pi 1") 
k; ' = k'' 
a 
azi 
a12 
, where it can be proved that a22 
all = r+, 5/ 
a> 
0, 
yz 
{'Ja` (") aZCl*(") 
a, z = 
ýýS " 2 ak; 2- ak' 
a21 = 
aiii 
=1 =-C;. (I,. '')-' 
ap ; ap ; /ail! 
a22 = -S' < 0, 
I q, a,, 8. 
° For the details of linearization method, see Appendix I 
aiz 
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If the determinant of Jacobian matrix A, denoted as det A= aa22 - a12a2, , 
is 
nonzero, the qualitative behaviour of the trajectories of the non-linear system in 
the neighbourhood of its steady state point (k/ ' u; 
'') is the same as that of the 
trajectories of the homogeneous system before, which is linearised from the 
non-linear system (Xepapadeas 1997). The sign of det A implies the stability 
properties of the dynamic system, which depends on signs of 
"f*(') a2C* (") 
2 
ak; ' , ak' 
2 
and C, (I; *)-' . 
Recall the economic meaning of k and I, the signs of the partial 
derivatives of costs and water quality with respect to these variables determine the 
sign of det A. Since it is more expensive to accelerate the increase in capital 
stock, C, (I) > 0, C; ' (I) >_ 0. From the relationship stated in Eq (4.56), it is also 
z 
reasonable to assume that 
aC' ()>0, a C, " (. ) >05 (i. e. cost increases at an 
ak' ak 2 
increasing rate as capital is accumulated for output production, effluent abatement 
and water abstraction). For the partial derivatives of water quality with respect to 
the different elements of capital stock, it is obvious to see that 
afs () 
< 0, 
afs () 
<0 and 
of (') > 0(i. e. water quality reduces as production and 
ak9 akP aki 
abstraction increase, and increases as abatement increases). Due to the widely 
existing increasing marginal damage of water pollution, we can assume 
that 
af2 () 
< 0, 
afs2 () 
<_ 0. On the other hand, the effect of abatement on pollution 
ak, Q 2 ak; f 2 
z effluent is either constant or diminishing in most of the situations, so 8k; ° 
5 This may not always be true in reality. An exceptional case in reality could be 
found in Hanley et 
al. (1998), in which the abatement of pollution in a particularly large firm 
has decreasing marginal 
cost, i. e. 
özC, (') 
<" 
öki aZ 
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From the discussion and assumptions above, we now have enough information 
to determine the sign of det A. For each element of capital stock and its 
corresponding investment element j we have: 
a a2fs*()-a2C'*()<0 12 z ak' z ak, ' 
a21 = -c; (I; *)-1 >- 0. 
Therefore det A= a a22 - a12 a2, < 0, Vi . Thus, 
det A must be negative. 
Because of the negative sign of the det A, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix 
A are of opposite sign. Therefore the steady state equilibrium (k'*, p,. '*) of the 
non-linear dynamic system constructed by k' and it is a saddle point, and the 
trajectories in the (k , fir; ) phase plane 
display the property of a saddle point, at 
least locally around the equilibrium. 
We can also utilize the phase plane analysis to help us analyse the stability and 
consequence properties of the non-linear dynamic system, defined in terms of 
k and l'. 
4.3.3. b Dynamic System in terms of k; ', 1' 
Because the co-state variable u, which was considered in section 4.3.3. a is 
not easy to evaluate and control in reality, a more practical dynamic system is 
constructed by the state variable k and control variable I,. 
' as below: 
J) 
} (4.61) I; 
Ci1 
[(r + S' ), u; - 
aak/ 
+ý ýS " aki 
k/ =I`-S; k'' = F(k; , I; ) ... 
(4.56). 
From Eq (4.58), u/ _ -C; ("), so Eq (4.61) becomes 
i_-l" [-(r + S/) " C; (") - ack +A ökýý)) _ G(k/, I; ) ... (4.65). C"r(') 
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After linearization, the non-linear dynamic system constructed by Eqs (4.65) 
and (4.56), yields the Jacobian matrix 
A= 
r0F(. ) aF(") 
ak; ' aI' a,,, a12 
aG(") aG(") _, where 
k' = k'" 
az1 ý az2 Oki' ' al; ' ' (I' 
=1;, 
) 
<0, 
a12 =1, 
a21 = -C (")-' 
' (I 2 a2f' () _ aZýr 2 ")) , J ak' ak,. ' 
a22 = r+6, ' > 06, 
j=9, a, ß" 
As the signs of the partial derivatives in a21 are determined before, it is not 
difficult to see that det A= a a22 - a12a2, < 0, b'j. Therefore the steady state 
equilibrium (k; '', I; '') of the new non-linear dynamic system is also a saddle 
point equilibrium for each element of capital stock and investment. This is the 
same conclusion as in terms of (k; '' u; 
'') 
, as these two 
dynamic equilibria are 
actually same in both systems, only the viewpoint differs. 
4.3.3. c Qualitative analysis: phase plane 
Since many dynamic systems of non-linear differential equations cannot be 
solved analytically, the qualitative properties of their solutions can sometimes be 
described and examined by using a graphic device, the phase plane (Leonard and 
Long 1992). 
Taking the non-linear dynamic system in k, 1 as an example, the 
intersection of the lines k=0 and 1=0, if it exists, would be the saddle 
point steady state equilibrium (k; '', I ') . These two 
lines are called isoclines, 
e For the detailed derivation of a22, see Appendix 2 
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which are the loci of the points satisfying k/ =0 and i/ =0 respectively. The 
coordinate system of (k' , I) 
is called the phase plane of the system. In the 
phase plane (also sometimes called the plane of the states) (k/ , I/) , the slope of 
the isoclines are - (Fk / F, ) and - (Gk / G, ) respectively (Gandolfo 1997), 
defined by Eqs (4.65) and (4.56), where subscript represents partial derivatives. 
Therefore the slopes for the isoclines are 
l 
k; ' 0ý al =-(Fk IF, )=ö, ' >0; ak 
__ 
ýas a2s'()_a^c;, () 
I' _ýý ' --(r- /r_1_- i-. ak' , vk , v -c; (')-' "lY+sý) 
When 
a2fg*(") 
< 0, 
alci (") 
>0 and C"(") ?0 have continuous values, and 
ak 2 ak,. ' 2 
a2c; - (. ) 
ak'2 
increases faster than does C; ' (") with k,. ' , the 
function describing the 
slope of I=0 implies that 
lim 
k; -i0 
lim 
k; ýk/m. 
I/ azJs`(ý) azC! (. ) 
s 
ýs 
Oki j2 ak. 'Z 
-C; (")-' - (r+Y, ') 
\I 
/ 
- Aký` Ak' ý .... ý ... _' t !1, _.. .. R 
=o; 
aZfs'(. ) aZc; ý ýS ak' 2 ak; 
2 
-C; " (")-' "(r+, 5, J ) 
= -co , where 
k, 'fax is the maximum 
value k could take. Considering the increasing marginal damage to the water 
quality resulting from effluent discharge and water abstraction, and the 
diminishing marginal effects of pollution abatement, the existence of the 
maximized k; is expectable, even though we cannot have the accurate value of 
k without knowing the exact functions. The above properties of I=0 
guarantee an interior solution for the steady state equilibrium. 
Z: V7 - ['qUqfJ . 
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The next step in constructing the phase plane is to determine the sign of k' , 
I' in the regions separated by their isoclines. Since 
'= 
r+8; ' > 0, this öl 
means that holding k' constant, an increase (decrease) in I; ' will result in an 
increase (decrease) in is thus positive above the isocline I; ' =0 and 
J 
negative below it (Hoy et al. 2001). Similarly, Oý = -6, 
' < 0, meaning that 
is negative for points in the phase plane to the right of isocline k. ' =0 and 
positive for the points to the left. 
Now we have sufficient information to construct phase plane for the non-linear 
system of non-linear equations defined by k and Ii'. The result is shown in 
Figure 4.1. 
The two isoclines divide the phase plane into four different regions and the 
directions of the trajectories in each region are indicated by the arrows. Since the 
phase plane is the set containing all the possible trajectories in the system, for any 
combination of (k , I') , the system would move 
along trajectories in the 
directions specified as time increases. Therefore, knowing the directions of the 
trajectories, the convergence properties for any initial combination of (k ,I) 
can be found out. Since we have proved that the Jacobian matrix A has a 
negative determinant, the dynamic system above is unstable with a saddle point 
equilibrium, (k; ', I *) .A unique property of saddle 
point equilibrium is that 
there is only one trajectory in the phase plane which would converge to the steady 
state equilibrium, while all others only diverge away from it (Hoy et al. 2001). 
The two lines, s and r, determined by the eigenvectors of the Jacobian matrix A 
respectively, are the asymptotes to all the remaining trajectories (Gandolfo 1997). 
From the phase plane it can be seen that only point in the line s will eventually 
converge to the steady state equilibrium (k/* ,I 
') while the all points elsewhere 
on the phase plane will ultimately diverge away. Therefore line s is the only 
trajectory which converges to the equilibrium, which is called the stable arm while 
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line r the unstable arm. Because functions of cost and water quality are not 
specified in this model, trajectories will not necessarily be exactly the same as that 
indicated in the phase plane above. Accurate estimation of the dynamic movement 
of (k, ' J. ' ), and the location of the stable arm of saddle equilibrium relies on the 
accurate specification of the cost and water quality functions. Analytical and 
numerical methods for identifying the stable arm of a saddle-point equilibrium 
with specified functions are discussed by Shone (Shone 2002). In the economic 
theory however, the form of a cost function is often not specified, only with its 
qualitative properties given. Therefore the phase plane provides a useful tool for 
qualitative analysis of stability and convergence properties, but is not very helpful 
for finding equilibrium solutions, or stable approaches to them, unless the 
constituent functions of the dynamic system are known in considerable details. 
I' 
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4.3.4 TSS and TPP system for Dynamic Solutions 
4.3.4. a Pollution TSS 
As demonstrated in the static analysis of TSS, a firm needs to pay (receive) an 
aggregate emission and water abstraction tax (subsidy) at all the sites along the 
river for its effluent discharge and water abstraction activities. The level of 
payments (subsidies) depends on whether they discharge or abstract more than the 
right initially allowed to them by the environment authority. 
The amount of tax (subsidy) for firm i which discharges effluent and 
abstracts water at site i are Ti, +Tia =E 
(ei 
- ei° 
)" bis t+ (ß3i -, ßi °) " dr. s "t : es as 
ss 
where t, s and tas are the tax rates 
for the unit effect of pollution at all the sites 
s influenced by the effluent and abstraction. Thus the objective of a cost 
minimising firm under the TSS in a dynamic setting of continuous time is to 
Mill 
Je -rt "rC'i(qisQi, ýi, jij)i-ý(ei -e°)"171s "tes -f-Zýi -/-'io)"Ciis . tasJ 
0Lss 
s. t. Eq (4.49), e(t) > 0,, 3(t) ?0 and k/ (0) is given. Different value of j 
represents the three elements of capital stock, production, effluent abatement and 
water abstraction. 
The current-value Hamiltonian for this problem is 
H= C; (4;, a1, ßr, I; )+Z(e; -e°)'bs'tes+Z(a, -f3, °)'dis'tas +2: uf'(I; -8''k') 
Ss% 
The following FOCs are then implied for the cost minimising solution: 
aH ac; ' (") ; +, ý =o al; - al, i 
(4.66), 
, ic; = (r + 5/ )fu ' 
ac, ' () 
tes 
bts ae 
+ tQS " dis " 
aý`y 
.. . (4.67); ak; ' ak; Oki 
k, ' = I'' - 8; ' k; '' (4.56); 
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and the transversality condition is: 
liým e-rr ., u, ' (t) - k; (t) =0 (4.57), 
I=9, a,, ß. 
The time path of investment in each element of capital stock is derived as 
before in section 4.3.2: 
I' _ -C, (")-' (r + s, ' 
)fý' 
_ 
öC,. ' (") 
_ý tes 
b;, 
" 
öe" 
+ ta5 dis 
ýr,, 
akr s ak, 
' ak i 
(4.68). 
Comparing the FOCs of the cost minimising solution for a firm under the TSS 
and those for optimal pollution control under direct command in section 4.3.2, i. e. 
comparing Eq (4.68) with (4.61), the equilibrium achieved through the TSS would 
be the same as the optimal pollution control the environmental authority wishes to 
achieve through direct consents, if the following tax rates are set for effluent 
discharge and water abstraction: 
tes = -A, . 
afý 0 
and tas = -As 
K* (') j=q, a, Q aEs W, 
When these tax rates are used, not only will the equilibria under the two 
different policy instruments be the same point, but also this would ensure that the 
dynamic systems under the two policy instruments have the same properties of 
convergence and stability, i. e. the dynamic system under TSS has a saddle point 
equilibrium with only one trajectory that converges to the steady state equilibrium. 
Due to the difficulty in evaluating the appropriate value of the shadow price of 
water quality A. at each WQM site, tax rates in practice might not always have 
the correct value to induce the optimal equilibrium, thus the two equilibria are not 
coincident and the TSS is not cost efficient. However, recalling the Jacobian 
matrix A, it can be proved that the stability and convergence properties of the 
dynamics system under TSS will remain the same as long as the tax rates are of 
opposite sign to the values of 
aýs(2) 
and 
a. fs. 
3Es OHS 
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4.3.4. b The TPP system 
Under a TPP system each firm receives an initial quantity of "pollution" 
permits, comprising effluent discharge permits and water abstraction licenses. 
Initial distribution is either through auction or via "grandfathering" by the 
environment authority. The initial allocation are denoted as e° and ß for the 
pollution at site s from the firm at site i. The firm will demand more permits if 
its pollution emission and water abstraction effects exceed the amount of permits 
that it holds for the site it influences. If it is more costly to increase abatement, the 
firm will try to purchase the extra permit it requires from the market, or vice versa, 
supply its permits to the permit market if it has surplus amount of pollution 
permits. 
Although the TPP system and the TSS are usually considered as having 
equivalent regulatory effects, there are still some differences between them. One 
obvious difference is that the optimal tax rate has to be chosen by the environment 
authority while value of permits under the TPP system would be set by market 
automatically without intervention from the environmental authority. There is 
another important difference relating to the dynamic nature of the problem. 
Pollution permits grant a right to pollute, therefore once permits are purchased, 
the pollution activity would be allowed since then until it expires. So the purchase 
of pollution permits is more to involve a lump-sum payment rather than the 
annual payment required under the TSS. Although pollution permits are not to be 
valid forever, the permit is renewable at a negligible price compared with the 
purchase payment. The expense or revenue generates for the firm through permit 
trading in the market is Peg " e, (t), where Pes is the price of effluent discharge 
permit at site s and e, (t) are the additional permits purchased (or sold) in the 
market in a particular year. Since the initial permits could be obtained either 
through "grandfathering" or auction, the model used here only considers the 
pollution control costs incurred after the initial permit distribution. 
The cost minimisation problem for a firm at site i (assuming its effluent 
discharge and water abstraction are carried out locally) can be indicated as below: 
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Min je-rt . 0, (q;, a;, ß; 'Ii)+1 er, 'Pe, +Zß;, . PPSJ ... (4.69) 
o,, 
s. t. Eq (4.49), e(t) >_ 0ß(t) ?0 and k; ' (0) is given. Different value of j 
represents the three elements of capital stock, production, effluent abatement and 
water abstraction. 
Since 
ae., Lei öe 8k' öe 
is eý =`=b. "'=b. `'=b"'' at 'S at 'ý ök; at IS ök; ' 
and similarly ý; s = 
di, " 
a8'. 
" 
k; 
, Eq (4.69) can 
be rewritten as: 
ý 
Tao Wang 
(4.70), 
Iaý /ý 1 
Je-r' C; (9;, ar, Q;, 1')+b+s äk; r' 'Pes 
+dý ök' 
k; Pas 1... (4.71). 
lSýJ 
The current-value Hamiltonian for this cost minimisation problem is: 
ae. 
H= C((9;, ar, /3r, I, ')+2: Pes 'bis . ök, 
' . (I/ -5, ' "k') 
+PaS . d. s . 
ýýý 
"(I; - ý, ' "k')+ýfý; "(Ir -S; 
' "k; ') 
si 
(4.72). 
The FOCs of the cot minimising solution imply the following equations, 
OH 
=0 Pr -- 
OC, ' () 
+ b,, ae Pes + dr, ' 
mi 
' PAS (4.73); öl; ' 0l s ök, ' s ök 
ýý = (Y -}- 
ýj )pi 
- 
aC'* (') 
-ýl 
Pes 
UK; 
d; 
s' 
a2R. Z 
dk' 
D 'ei* 
ak; 'Z 
öe" 
" k; -PeS " bi, " ý' " ök'ý 
) 
i... (4.74); 
aQ ') 
-Pas di, " 8;; "; ak! 
k; = I; *- 6'k ' ... 
(4.56); 
and the relevant transversality condition is 
lime-" " i/ (t) " k; ' (t) =0 r-. w 
1=4, a, ß" 
(4.57), 
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In order to examine the steady state solution and compare that achieved under 
the TSS, we differentiate Eq (4.58) with respect to time to obtain: 
k, ' = a"`' au; aI. -- ac; 
(. ) aI' 
_-i (") " I' ... (4.75). at at at al at ` 
By substituting the ,i and 1u/ 
in Eqs (4.75) and (4.73) into Eq (4.74), we 
obtain: 
I, =-c"(I; ')-'. [-(r+ö,. '). 
aC; (. )_aC, '(. >-ýP"b; 
ý 
a2e,. 
d/1' dk; 7 -- '- ak; < 
(4.76) 
_ZP. d., . k; r. Pes ,b. 
äe' 
_Zr. Pd , 
a)6, * 
s 
as t 
aý ýZr 
bi, ak, 
s 
as dis aký 
At the steady state equilibrium where k/ = I,. ' =, u/ = 0, Eq (4.76) could be 
reduced to Eq (4.68) if PeS = tes /r and Pa, = tas /r. Therefore the TSS and TPP 
system lead to the same steady state equilibrium for investment and each element 
of the capital stock. This result is understandable because that through the 
purchase of one unit pollution permit the firm saves an infinite stream of tax 
payments which would otherwise be incurred for this unit of pollution. Therefore 
the firm needs pay an amount that is equal to the present-value of the aggregate 
tax payment (i. e. the present-value of the stream of tax payments into the infinite 
future, which equals tes /r and tas /r for effluent discharge and water 
abstraction respectively). It can be proved that the convergence and stability 
properties of the steady state equilibrium under the TPP system would be the 
same as those in the TSS (Xepapadeas 1997), hence also same as those discussed 
under the direct control and command option. 
4.4 Comparative Statics 
Comparative statics analysis studies the displacement of the equilibrium 
solution, evaluating how the equilibrium values of the variables respond to a 
change in one or more parameters. The response is examined by considering in 
which direction the steady state configuration moves to establish a new 
equilibrium to match the new configuration of parameters (Gandolfo 1997). 
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Changes in the values of exogenous variables will in general affect the optimal 
solution, and also vice versa, i. e. the optimal equilibrium can be modified by 
changing the exogenous changes. In our case of pollution control along the river, 
adjustment of tax rate is inevitable because of the difficulty in setting the optimal 
tax rate at the outset. As a policy instrument, changing the emission tax rate would 
influence the optimal equilibrium for investment and capital stock for each 
element and thus generate new equilibria for capital stock, investment, costs and 
water quality. Changing total amount of pollution permits in the market would 
function in a similar way to changing the tax rates. Therefore it is important to 
analyse the comparative statics of equilibrium under the tax and TPP schemes so 
that the environmental authority can ensure that the equilibrium would move to 
the desired direction when changes are made to tax rates or to the total amount of 
pollution permits in the market. 
Taking the TSS as an example, two types of comparative statics analyses are 
carried out in the following section to indicate the effect of change of tax rates on 
the firm's pollution relevant activities and its investment decision. Short-run 
comparative statics indicate the effects of changing tax rate on the effluent 
discharge and water abstraction in a static system without considering the 
dynamic change in capital and investment; the steady state comparative statics, on 
the other hand, indicate the effects of tax policies on path of the accumulation of 
capital stocks and investment in each element in the long-run equilibrium. 
4.4.1 Short-run Comparative Statics in the Static System 
As specified in the static analysis, effluent discharge is a function of 
production output and abatement level, e; = Z; (q;, a, ). Thus the FOCs for the 
optimal solution under a TSS, Eqs (4.27) and (4.28), can be rewritten as 
aC; (") 
+ te, . b, 5 =p... 
(4.27), 
öe; 
aC; (") 
+ý tas ' d; 3 =0 aQ; , 
(4.28). 
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Using the implicit function theorem (Gandolfo 1997; Xepapadeas 1997; Hoy et 
al. 2001), the short-run comparative statics analysis based on the Eq (4.27) and 
(4.28) can indicate the effects of changing effluent discharge tax rate on the 
effluent discharge and water abstraction, which are shown as below: 
Cee , Cep ae1. [i1ates - b,, 
... (4.77), yea, C , 6a aß, laQ 0 
where Cee represents the second order partial derivative of cost function with 
respect to effluent discharge. The abatement cost functions are assumed to have 
increasing marginal cost, i. e. Cee, C, ß, Cßß >_ 0. 
When I DI Cee Cv -CQ>0, by applying the Cramer's rule, it can be 
shown that 
ae; 
ate, 
-b15, Cep 
0 Cpp 0 Cýý 
IDI 3v' ., 
f 0 
Cee 
-1 g, 
aß_ Cep 0 
ates IDI 
> 0, if IDI > 0, i. e. increasing the effluent tax rate reduces 
the effluent discharge, and on the other hand increases the water abstraction, 
because water abstraction now becomes a cheaper option of pollution comparing 
with effluent discharge, so the firm will increase the effort in effluent abatement 
but pay less effort in reducing water abstraction. 
Similarly, the effects of water abstraction tax on the pollution activities can be 
obtained from 
Cee , CeQ ae; atas 0 
.. (4.78). 
1C"6' 
C, aß; latas - -ds 
r 
o' coo 
ae, dis CßQ 
atas IDI 
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Cee ý, 
a` 
= 
C,, 
8 - di, 5 0. 
aros IDI 
Therefore, it can be shown analytically that when the tax rate on one type of 
pollution (either effluent discharge or water abstraction) increases, the 
corresponding activity will be restrained by the more potent policy whereas the 
other activity will become a relatively "cheaper" option and hence will increase, 
assuming the tax on the "other" activity remains unchanged. 
4.4.2 Steady State Comparative Statics in the Dynamic 
System 
In the steady state equilibrium of dynamic optimisation, I=k; ' =0 as 
described in Eqs (4.56) and (4.68) so we have 
- C, O' (r+S'), u _aC; 
O_ý 
tes"b1. 
öe, 
+tas"ds"a'g' =0 
ak s ak 
ak,! 
I'' = 3i'k; '` 
J =9, a, Q. 
(4.79), 
(4.80), 
As C, (")-' ý 0, (4.79) can be reduced to 
(r +J ), Ui 
i aC; (')-1: (t, "b - 
Le, * 
+t "d "aý` =0 ... (4.81). ý; - ak' ýs ak; as « ak; ,5ýý 
Since 5' >0 (all capital stock will depreciate), it will be concluded from Eq 
(4.80) that at the steady state equilibrium, capital stocks and investment in each 
element always move to the same direction when there is perturbation. Applying 
the implicit function theorem to Eq (4.79), gives 
128 
Chapter 4: Economics of River Policy 
bae; 
` 
ak; af/ateS 
_ 
,s ak, ' 
ateS flak/ azC'(") a2eý aZQ ýZ +teSb; s z +tosd; s z) ak, ' s Oki' s Oki ' 
where f denotes the LHS of the Eq (4.81). 
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(4.82), 
Having assumed the relationship between water quality and each element 
capital stocks in the stability analysis in 4.3.3, it can be concluded consequently 
z 
that 
ýkez 
>_ 0, Vj, so the denominator of Eq (4.82) must be positive. Therefore, 
9 
the overall sign of Eq (4.82) is determined by the numerator, therefore 
ak' 
<0 
es 
and i- >0. For the same reason discussed in the short-run comparative at 
es 
Q 
analysis, there is 
ak' 
> 0. The change in effluent discharge tax rate has the same ateS 
effect on the investment as it has on the capital stocks in each element. We can 
derive the effects of change in the tax rate of water abstraction on these variables 
through the same process. The results of comparative statics on the TPP system 
are very similar to those of TSS (Xepapadeas 1997), which are summarized in 
Table 4.1 and 4.2. 
Table 4.1: Short-run comparative statics 
les 
-+ 
las +- 
PeS 7 
-+ 
Pas 
+- 
7 The equilibrium prices of pollution permits are not determined by the environment authority but 
the permit market, however the environment authority can raise (decrease) them by increase 
(decrease) the amount of pollution permits it distributes. 
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Table 4.2: Steady State Comparative Statics 
k9 Q k,. ° k; I, 9 Ii I; 
tes 
- ++-++ 
tas uncertain uncertain - uncertain uncertain - 
P. 
- ++-++ 
Pas uncertain uncertain - uncertain uncertain - 
4.5 Conclusion 
4.5.1 Theoretical Analyses 
The choice of policy instruments in pollution control has been discussed in the 
literature for considerable time and most economists have agreed that, although 
there are still some limitations in implementing policies successfully into practical 
environmental management, the MBIs have superior properties to the direct 
command approach. The superiority of MBIs arises for several reasons, including 
cost savings realised in achieving the environment target and the continuous 
motivation provided to undertake the pollution control. In this thesis, taking into 
account both emission discharges and water abstraction as forms of pollution, I 
will explain why and how MBIs could be implemented to manage water quality in 
the tidal Ouse and also explain the potential benefits MBIs offer for river policies 
in water quality management, in situations when the actual location of emissions 
and abstraction matters. 
The static and dynamic analyses of preceding sections have indicated the 
necessary conditions for the least cost solution of pollution control problem. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the necessary conditions which arise from 
the static and dynamic analyses: 
1. Because of the different location effects of pollution, a matrix of transfer 
coefficients needs to be produced by the environmental authority, in order to 
assign responsibility for pollution at each WQM site back to the pollution 
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source depending on its location. Therefore the pollution equilibrium for the 
least cost solution will vary from place to place, and time to time as these 
transfer coefficients vary following the variation of assimilative capacity in 
the river. 
2. Static analysis has shown that when the least cost equilibrium is achieved, 
the ratio between the marginal cost of abatement and the marginal effect of 
abatement on water quality should be the same across all the options at all 
the binding WQM sites. This ratio will reflect the shadow price of river 
water quality at each WQM site at the cost effective equilibrium. 
3. When the dynamic optimisation is considered with a positive discount rate, 
in addition to the first order conditions required by the static analysis, the 
least cost solution of pollution abatement in a dynamic system requires that 
at steady state equilibrium, investment in capital stock should be such that: 
the internal rate of return on that investment will be the same as the external 
rate of return which could be achieved by investment elsewhere in the 
economy. 
4. The steady state equilibrium for the capital stock and investment is a saddle 
point equilibrium. The combination decisions on capital stock and 
investment must therefore follow a particular trajectory in order that the 
least cost solutions in each period of time will eventually lead to a stable 
equilibrium of the dynamic system. Since the capital stock is determined by 
investment, the industry must find this temporal investment path in order to 
achieve the stable equilibrium of the dynamic system. 
4.5.2 Policy Implications 
The primary objective of this research is to analyse the potential inefficiency 
that exists in current river policy as applied to the Humber system, and to 
illustrate that pollution control at reduced cost could be realised more easily 
through the use of integrated river policy and MBIs rather than direct CAC 
approach alone. From the results of both static and dynamic analyses, it is 
apparent that implementing an MBI would bring substantial cost savings in 
pollution control, either TSS or TPP system. This is mainly due to the flexibility 
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they offer to pollution sources in achieving their pollution reduction targets. The 
flexibility property is particularly crucial when there is significant spatial variation 
in the impacts of pollution location on the river water quality. When water 
abstraction is also taken into account as a form of "pollution", the flexibility in 
these two MBIs allows integrated management of both effluent abatement and 
water abstraction. In this integrated management, effluent discharge and water 
abstraction are treated as substitutes for each other, therefore each plant is 
encouraged to find the least cost combination of the two options. 
The environmental policy imposed on the pollution source seeks to induce 
them to approach the equilibrium which produces the desired environmental target 
at a least cost. Choices between the direct command approach and MBIs are 
analysed in static and dynamic situation. However, it is apparent that the choice of 
option depends, as we can see in reality, on the pertinent circumstances: the nature 
of the pollutant and its geographical conditions, and on various political and 
administrative considerations (Baumol and Oates 1988). Therefore, there is no 
panacea for all situations; each environmental issue needs to be considered on an 
individual basis. Nonetheless, our static and dynamic analyses remain valid in 
general, with the following implications for environmental policies: 
It is almost impossible to achieve the least-cost solution in practice by a 
direct command approach. Market-based instruments are cost-effective 
themselves for any pollution control they achieve, but the environmental 
authority has to design them to carefully achieve the prescribed target. 
2. A tax-subsidy scheme may incur less criticism than a simple emission 
charging scheme because it does not impose extra financial burden on plants 
and thus weaken their competitiveness. Neither would such a scheme 
increase the overall pollution level as what an abatement subsidy usually 
does. The choice between an effluent permit system and ambient permit 
system depends on many factors including how important location effects 
are in practice. A hybrid pollution-offset system may well be a means of 
differentiating the location effects among pollution sources without 
imposing too many impediments to the trading process. 
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3. In a dynamic system, a firm can decide its own time path of investment to 
accumulate its capital stocks which underpins production, abatement and 
abstraction. Hence these investment decisions can cause the firm to diverge 
from the optimal outcome for river water quality to different destinies. The 
direct command approach has limited influence on the firm's investment 
choices whereas comparative statics analysis shows that the firm's 
investment paths could be altered by a tax-subsidy scheme or a tradable 
pollution permit system. 
4. Although a tax-subsidy scheme and a tradable pollution permit system have 
equivalent effects on the pollution control, the tax rate and permit price at 
the steady state equilibrium in a dynamic system are no longer identical as 
was the case in the static analysis. Through the purchase of one unit 
pollution permit the firm saves an infinite stream of tax payment in the 
future and therefore must pay a price for the permit equal to the 
present-value of the aggregate tax payment over this infinite time horizon, 
which equals to the tax rate divided by the interest rate. 
5. A novel feature of my research is the integrated spatially explicit 
management of effluent discharge and water abstraction implemented 
through the use of different environmental policy instruments. Thinking of 
the interdependence between these two activities, environmental policies are 
proposed which will reduce their combined effects on river water quality 
rather than managing effluent discharge and water abstraction separately. 
Therefore, any environmental policy directed towards one activity would 
have a consequent impact on the other activity at the same time, as indicated 
by comparative statics analysis. This integration would enable 
environmental policy to reflect the interdependent effects on the water 
quality from both effluent discharge and water abstraction It would also 
provide flexibility in pollution control options which could allow substantial 
cost saving to be achieved in achieving the prescribed environmental targets. 
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Chapter 5 Data Sources and Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the data sources that were used to evaluate the cost 
effectiveness of alternative management actions for pollution abatement and water 
quality control in the tidal Ouse. Two, essentially separate, data sets were used. 
Hydrological data for the tidal Ouse comprise the first data set. These data are 
supplied to the QUESTSID river model to evaluate the improvement in river 
water quality which would be produced by alternative pollution abatement 
strategies. These hydrological data comprise, for the tidal Ouse and its tributaries: 
" river flows; 
" river water quality; 
" ambient concentrations of water-borne substances; 
" effluent discharges from STWs, local industries and other sources of 
emission. 
The structure of the river system is embedded within the structure of the 
QUESTS 1D model. 
The second data set details economic aspects of the different options for 
pollution abatement. A comparison of cost effectiveness requires that the costs 
incurred by the different pollution abatement options are evaluated and then 
compared with the pollution reductions predicted by the QUESTS ID model for 
each abatement option. Abatement options are not regarded as static in this 
analysis. Data describing the capital cost of improving abatement capability are 
therefore required, as well as data describing the operating and depreciation costs 
of abatement facilities. 
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Modifications to effluent discharges and to water abstractions are evaluated in 
this research to investigate the potential which an integrated discharge and 
abstraction strategy offers for the management of water quality in the tidal Ouse. 
The interdependencies between discharges and abstractions must be accounted for 
appropriately within the hydrological model, and within the economic 
calculations. The QUEST model can accommodate water abstraction at specified 
locations. Economic data detailing the operating and depreciation costs of 
abstraction facilities are also required. 
The capital cost of abatement facilities, and the operating and depreciation cost 
of abatement and abstraction equipment comprise the direct costs of water quality 
management. 
This chapter comprises three further sections. The first describes the sources of 
the hydrological data used by the QUEST model, and explains how these data are 
pre-processed for utilisation by the model. The next section describes how 
questionnaires and interviews were used to obtain economic data. The processing 
of these data to provide the marginal costs of abatement for each management 
option is also described. The final section describes changes in the statutory 
consents for effluent discharges from industrial sources and STWs over the past 
10 years. Water abstraction licences over the same period are also detailed. 
5.2 Dataset for QUESTS modelling 
5.2.1 Data requirement for QUESTS modelling 
The QUESTS 1 1) model is a one-dimensional representation of the tidal river 
system stretching from tidal limits of the Ouse, Wharfe, Aire, Don and Trent to the 
sea spurn. To utilize the model to simulate water quality under alternative 
pollution abatement options, the following data for the tidal Ouse and its 
tributaries are necessary: 
" The river flows of the tidal Ouse and Trent, and their tributaries including 
the Wharfe, Derwent, Aire, Don and Hull. 
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" The concentration of various water-borne substances at the headwaters of 
each of the river reaches mentioned above. 
" The effluent discharges from the major STWs, industries and other 
emission sources along the tidal Ouse, Trent, Humber and their tributaries, 
in terms of effluent flows and pollutant concentrations, such as BOD5. 
NH3 and suspended solids. 
These data enable the QUESTS ID model to simulate hydrodynamics and water 
quality in the tidal Ouse, Trent and Humber system. Data regarding river flows 
and concentrations of the water-borne substances, particularly DO, BOD5, NH3 
and suspended solids were recorded at six WQM sites along tidal Ouse (Naburn, 
Cawood, Selby, Long Drax, Boothferry Bridge and Blacktoft). 
The data are compared with the simulated results to validate the predictions 
from the model. To evaluate the effects of water abstraction on the water quality, 
the following data are also required: 
" The water abstraction levels in the tidal Ouse catchment 
" The pattern and effect of water returns to the Ouse system. 
5.2.2 Data sources for QUESTS 
The EA provided most of the hydrological data from their routine surveys and 
monitoring, as well as the QUESTS 1D model. The data from the EA was divided 
into three categories. 
The first category comprised data embedded within the QUESTS ID model, or 
supplied to fulfil the data requirements for simulation. These data were obtained 
from routine sampling at the effluent sources and gauge stations along the tidal 
Ouse, Trent, Humber and their tributaries. Self-monitoring data from each effluent 
source are provided as checking data. 
The data input at the river boundaries comprise the river flow of the tidal Ouse, 
Trent, Wharfe, Derwent, Aire and Don from 1993 to 2004, and concentrations of 
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eight major water-borne substances at the headwater of these rivers from 1995 to 
2004. The effluent data cover fifty point sources of effluent discharges, including 
the industries, STWs and other sources along the Ouse, Trent, Humber and their 
tributaries. It also covers various periods for the different point sources, but each 
contains data for the years 1995 to 2002, with exception of 1998. The QUESTS 1D 
model simulation therefore covered the period of 1995-2002 to evaluate water 
quality under various pollution abatement options. 
The second data category comprises the observed water quality data from the 
WQM sites along the river system. These data include all the WQM sites and a list 
of water-borne substances from the EA's routine sampling at different frequencies. 
This dataset stretches from 1994 to 2004 and is therefore used to validate the 
simulated results from the QUESTS 1D model. The data from the LOIS Ouse 
dataset served the same purpose in validating the simulation results. 
The third category of data details water abstraction from the tidal Ouse. The 
major water abstraction from the Ouse occurs at Moor Monkton, and from the 
River Derwent at Barmby and Elvington. Data detailing water abstraction licenses 
and actual water abstractions were only available for the years 1996,1997,2003 
and 2004. Significant water is also lost from the tidal Ouse at Drax, where the 
Drax Power Station takes the river water for cooling and approximately half of it 
evaporates during the process. Only limited data are available to describe the 
amount of water lost and the temperature change in the returned water. 
5.2.3 Hydrological data processing for QUESTS 
The EA dataset for effluent discharge was incomplete. Some effluent 
discharges from the Selby industries after 2000 are missing. In order to evaluate 
the DO saturation with the possibility of improved discharge consents in Selby 
after 2000, two separate datasets were constructed for 2001 and 2002. One 
assumes the same level of effluent discharges as in previous years; the other is 
updated to allow for "future" effluent discharge consents, which are likely to be 
implemented by the EA (Cashman et al. 1999). 
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The data for validation of the simulation covered 1995 to 2004. However, data 
for 1998,2003 and 2004 are insufficient or incomplete. Therefore other data 
elements are missing from the dataset. These issues were solved as follows: 
1 Salinity data are estimated for the whole period. Salinity is defined as the 
mass of dissolved inorganic compounds in 1 kg of seawater, after all the 
bromide and iodide has been converted to chloride, and all carbonates 
converted to oxides. This can be calculated from the chlorinity following 
the Knudsen equation: S%o = 0.030 +1.8050 x Cl (g Cl/l) x 1/P, where P 
is the density of seawater at that chlorinity. Since the river and tributaries 
upstream from the confluence of the Ouse and Trent are regarded as fresh 
water, P is same as the fresh water density 1000g/l. 
2 Data detailing total phosphorus content are not available for these years. It 
is suggested that orthophosphorus, for which data are available, comprises 
approximately 80% of total phosphorus content for all the inputs, 
including riverhead water along the River Ouse (pers. comm. Trevor 
Hardy; Environment Agency). Therefore, in this research total phosphorus 
data are calculated accordingly from orthophosphorus. 
3 Data detailing effluent discharges from BOCM and TLCA are missing. 
For both of the industry plants, effluent discharges before 2000 were 
assumed to be of the same level as reported in 1996 and 1997 (Cashman 
et al. 1999). Effluent discharges since 2000 were assumed to match the 
Environmental Agency's anticipated "future" consents described above. 
This is reasonable because since 2000 TLCA has managed to reduce its 
effluent discharge below the "future" consent, although the consent was 
not in force at that time. Effluent discharge from BOCM was assumed to 
be the same as that of 1996 and 1997 that reported by Cashman et 
al. (1999). 
As the dynamic model of river water quality in order to generate simulation 
results at much higher frequency than the routine sampling, the data from the river 
boundaries and effluent sources have to be processed to produce a daily dataset. A 
statistical program called SHARE within the QUESTS 1D under the Test Data 
Facility (Ellis et al. 1992; Clark and Ellis 1993; Slade and Morgan 1993a) is used 
to generate a rough description of input data. More than 20 samples within three 
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consecutive years period are required for this process. After the SHARE program, 
the routine sampling data of both river boundaries and effluent inputs are 
extracted as a line of rough descriptors that describe the main statistical 
characteristics of the samplings. The rough descriptors from all the river 
boundaries and the fifty point sources of effluent then constitute aggregate 
descriptors, which are reconstructed into separate daily estimations of inputs for 
that year by the SYNTH program. A program called COLLATE then generates an 
auxiliary file from the results of SYNTH, which contains a time series of daily 
input data. This file is then fed into the QUESTS ID model for simulation. 
The simulations of the QUESTSID model provided good predictions of the 
water quality subject to changes in the level, location and timing of effluent 
discharges and water abstraction. A simplified function describing the influence of 
pollution abatement and water abstraction on the water quality is required in order 
to optimise the level and location of these activities. This simplified water quality 
function is derived from repetitive simulations of the QUESTSID model, and 
therefore retains the accuracy of prediction of the model simulations. All the 
variables not subjected to change were regarded as constant, and adjacent effluent 
sources were aggregated to reduce the number of independent variables. This is 
valid provided that they are of similar composition and the transfer coefficient 
between the aggregated sources is sufficiently high. The DO saturations at three 
WQM sites, which usually suffers from DO sag, are regressed against one set of 
effluents and water flow, using the "System of Regression Equations" provided by 
Limdep (Econometric Software Inc. 1995). The dataset of effluents and water 
flow could predict the EWPCS composite score along the Ouse/Humber reaches 
or over the whole estuary catchment as well, to provide a more comprehensive 
constraint instead of the DO saturations at several discrete points. 
5.3 Economic dataset 
5.3.1 Economic data requirement 
For evaluating the cost of pollution abatement at the effluent sources 
(industries and STWs), the capital cost and operational cost incurred in pollution 
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abatement are required. Pollution abatement would be implemented by investing 
in new plant (increasing capital cost) or operating existing plant more intensively 
(increase in operational cost). It is also necessary to know the specific effluent 
discharge consents for each of the major effluent sources. Alternative pollution 
abatement options such as moving discharge locations or shifting discharge timing 
may require investment in additional capital stock such as tanks or pipes. Tradable 
water abstraction licences and the associated cost incurred by increasing or 
decreasing water abstraction level will also be considered in this research. The 
required economic data are therefore as follows: 
a. The capital and operational costs of pollution abatement undertaken at the 
effluent sources to comply with the EA's effluent discharge consents. 
b. The capital and operational costs of alternative pollution abatement 
strategies considered in the research. 
c. The capital and operational costs associated with increasing or decreasing 
water abstraction in the catchment. 
d. Any trading transactions of water abstraction licenses, including the price, 
quantity traded, and the cost incurred in the bargaining process. 
e. Alternative technology or management introduced to reduce the effects of 
effluent discharges on the tidal Ouse or to improve the DO saturation in 
the river water. 
f. Any commitments required by regulation and policy. Any fines and 
penalties for non-compliance. 
g. The indirect costs of pollution abatement from each pollution abatement 
option, particularly on the local economy of Selby. 
5.3.2 Economic data sources 
Cost data for pollution abatement were provided by the three industrial plants 
at Selby for varying levels of effluent discharge and abatement. BOCM has now 
modified its production process and no longer discharges effluent to the Ouse. 
Yorkshire Water (YW) supplied cost data for the STWs considered in this 
research. STWs included were Barlby and Selby on the River Ouse, Snaith on the 
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River Aire, and Sandall and Thorne on the River Don. Water was abstracted at 
Moor Monkton on the River Ouse, and at Elvington and Barmby on the River 
Derwent, all beyond the tidal limits of the other rivers. Abstraction costs and 
details of abstraction licenses were obtained from YW and the EA. 
Questionnaires and interviews with the managers of the industries in Selby, 
YW, and the EA were undertaken during summer 2005 to collect the economic 
data required for the research. Data detailing the cost of piped transfer of effluent 
and waste storage facilities were obtained from a report published by Ofwat 
(1999). 
The following data were obtained from the questionnaire to the Selby 
industries: 
a. Output levels of main product and changes in the last few years 
following modification of effluent discharge consents. 
b. Current effluent discharge levels and changes required to comply with 
the new consents. 
c. Changes in the effluent discharge consents granted by the EA. 
d. Effluent treatment facilities implemented in the plants. 
e. Capital and operational costs of the ETP in each industry, capital 
investment in the ETP, life expectancy and depreciation rate of capital 
stock, the changes of capital and operational costs in the plant to meet 
the EA's revised effluent discharge consents. 
f. The physical effectiveness of ETP in terms of removal BOD5 and 
other pollutants, past and current. 
g. Rough estimate of the total production costs. 
Similar questions were posed in the questionnaire to YW regarding its STWs 
and the water abstraction activities. Data required were: 
a. Changes in the effluent discharge consents in the STWs as a 
consequence of the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive (UWWTD) 
Regulation. 
b. Current effluent discharge levels and changes required to comply with 
the UWWTD Regulation. 
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c. Capital and operational costs of sewage treatment. 
d. Capital investment in the sewerage facilities, life expectancy and 
depreciation rate of capital stock, the changes of capital and 
operational costs as a consequence of the implementation of UWWTD. 
e. The physical effectiveness of sewage treatment in terms of removing 
BODS and other pollutants, past and current. 
f The levels of water abstraction from the River Derwent and the River 
Ouse, along with the water abstraction licenses held at these 
abstraction locations; 
Capital and operational costs of water abstraction estimated by YW. 
The cost to Selby industries and the major STWs of reducing the level of BOD5 
and other pollutants was estimated from the data described above. The costs 
which YW incurs in water abstraction were also estimated. The cost of capital 
investment in abatement facilities was also estimated for use in the dynamic 
economic model of water quality management. Views expressed by YW and 
Selby industries were taken into account when developing alternative options for 
water quality management in the research to ensure that the options considered 
were feasible and practical. 
5.3.3 Economic data processing 
The availability and details of economic data are restricted by confidentialities. 
It was therefore necessary to aggregate the cost data from all the industrial plants 
concerned into a single dataset for the industries. This inevitably introduces some 
deviation from reality, which however is considered acceptable because the plants 
all use anaerobic abatement facilities to reduce the load of BOD5 in their effluent. 
The dataset also utilised cost data collected by Cashman et al. (1999). Cost data 
were also aggregated from the five STWs to estimate a cost function for their 
pollution abatement. The five STWs operated by YW provided more 
comprehensive and detailed data than the industries, although operational costs in 
each STW only covered three years since 2000. 
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The situation regarding water abstraction is more difficult. Because of its legal 
duty to provide potable water to the consumers in the catchment, YW has to 
maintain sufficient water abstraction to satisfy demand. YW would therefore be 
required to transfer water from other river systems if the total water abstraction 
within the Ouse catchment were to be reduced. YW has several contingency plans, 
so called "resource solutions", to meet any shortfall in water supply if water 
abstraction from the tidal Ouse catchment becomes insufficient. The cost of 
"resource solutions" allowed for estimating the cost of reduced water abstraction. 
All the cost data are defined as the summation of operational cost and the 
depreciation of the capital stock throughout the year, inflated to 2004/05 prices 
using GDP deflator (HM Treasury). Capital depreciation differed between the 
industries in Selby and the assets of YW including STW plants and water 
abstraction facilities. Industries in Selby all assume an average life expectancy of 
10 years for their ETPs. The capital value of ETPs in these industries thus 
depreciates at 10% of the remaining value each year. YW however assumes an 
average life expectancy of 40 years for its assets, and a depreciation rate of 2.5% 
net down on the original capital value is therefore used. Most of the STWs and 
water abstraction facilities were built during the 1960s and 1970s. Sandall STW, 
however, was built in 1947, while the Selby STW and water abstraction facilities 
at Moor Monkton were built much more recently in 1999 and 1996 respectively. 
This wide age range leads to the use of a constant depreciation rate for capital 
equipment in STWs and abstraction facilities which is much lower than that 
applied to ETPs in the industries. Applying 10% depreciation rate to the recently 
built plants would produce very high depreciation values, out of line with the old 
plants which have gradually depreciated for over 30 years. As a result, the much 
higher capital depreciation would overshadow the operational cost in these new 
plants, leading to overvalued abatement costs. 
Once the costs of BOD5 removal in the industries and STWs are revealed, a 
cost function of pollution abatement for BOD5 removal in both industries and 
STWs can be estimated using regression techniques. The estimated cost functions 
for abatement and abstraction produced by this approach are smooth curves. The 
cost and marginal cost curves of pollution abatement and water abstraction in 
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reality are more likely to be stepwise. The use of smoothed cost functions is not 
intended to suggest that actual abatement cost at a particular site would follow 
such a curve, but rather that the curve provides an approximation across the 
relevant industry as data allows. Similarly, a cost function for abstraction can be 
estimated by regression once the costs, which would be incurred by changing 
water abstraction levels, are known. 
5.3.4 Opinion of new management options 
The questionnaire sent to the industries in Selby enquired their opinion of 
alternative options for river management, including moving the location and 
timing of effluent discharge. The responses received reflected their priority and 
capability for pollution abatement, and proved helpful in assessing the 
acceptability of proposed options to improve water quality. 
Three completely different responses were received from the Selby industries 
regarding their willingness to be involved in a permit market for effluent 
discharges to the tidal Ouse. Rigid Paper said "no" to this option as a middle-sized 
source of effluent. This suggests that it does not want to be bothered by the market 
instrument or to expend more effort to reduce the pollution load further, 
particularly considering the fact that its consents, and actual discharge, of BOD5 
has been increased significantly since 2002. TLCA, as the biggest source of BOD5 
in the Selby area replied "don't know" to this question, because it has the ability 
to reduce the load of BOD5 at lower price than a plant of a smaller scale, but it 
might find it difficult to locate a buyer for substantial discharge permits in the 
catchment. Greencore, however, would welcome the introduction of a TPP 
system. Greencore has the smallest BOD5 discharge consent among the three 
industries, making it more likely to buy discharge permit rather than sell them. 
Greencore supports a TPP system for river quality management partly because it 
already participates in an emissions trading scheme relating to greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
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Shifting effluent discharges from summer to winter was clearly rejected by 
TLCA and Rigid Paper, but again welcomed by Greencore. Greencore's support 
for season-dependent effluent discharge probably arises because its production is 
seasonal, subject to provision of raw material, and so is its discharge. Greencore 
had previously different levels of effluent discharge for summer and winter, but 
these have now been replaced by a uniform consent over the year. The other two 
companies rejected this option for various reasons, but the fact that both maintain 
constant production output over the year was clearly influential. Effluent storage 
required for this option is also an obstacle to acceptance. 
None of the three companies showed any interest in moving the location of 
effluent discharges. Their major concern is the cost of laying pipes necessary to 
relocate discharges downstream. A rough estimate of £2 million pounds for 10 
miles of pipes was given by Greencore, which believes this cost to be prohibitive. 
However, shared costs for a common pipe transporting effluent from the three 
plants and two nearby STWs would potentially reduce the individual cost for each 
plant substantially. 
5.4 Effluent consents and water abstraction license 
As mentioned previously, there have been some changes to the effluent 
consents of industries in Selby and the STWs in the catchment, subject to either 
PPC regulation or UWWTD. Effluent consents take different forms. Consents for 
BOD5 are specified as either concentration (mg/L) or as flows (tonnes/day). 
Consents are also applied to total effluent flow (m3/day). TLCA and Rigid Paper 
had their effluent consents reviewed under the PPC regulation in 2004 and 2002 
respectively. Greencore's consent was not changed under the PPC regulation, but 
was amended separately by the EA. BOCM has now ceased effluent discharge to 
the tidal Ouse permanently. Among the five STWs considered in this research, 
Barlby is not yet regulated by the UWWTD due to its small size, and it is the only 
one with just primary treatment to the inlet effluent before discharge. The other 
four STWs all apply secondary treatment to the effluent using slightly different 
technologies. An upgrade of the Barlby STW to secondary treatment is being 
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carried out currently. The four STWs that are subject to the UWWTD are of 
different scales. Selby and Thorne, as major STWs serving an agglomeration with 
a population equivalent of more than 15,000, were required to comply with the 
UWWTD by 31st December 2000. Snaith and Sandall are smaller, serving an 
agglomeration with a population equivalent of between 10,000 and 15,000. They 
were required to implement the UWWTD by 31st December 2005, but in fact 
have been compliant since early 2000s. 
Effluent consents for TLCA have been continuously reduced from 13.89 
tonnes/day in 1989 (Cashman et al. 1999) to 8 tonnes/day in 1994 for BOD5, and 
to currently less than 3 tonnes/day. Total flow has been reduced from 15000 
m3/day to 9999 m3/day since 1994, while its production increased. Rigid Paper 
has however seen an increase in its effluent consents since 1995 after the PPC 
procedure, when its flow consent increased from 1250 m3/day to 1400 m3/day in 
average, with a maximum of 2500 m3/day. Its BOD5 consent increased from 3.3 
tonnes/day to 4950 mg/L at maximum, which equivalent to 6.9 tonnes/day for 
mean flow at 1400 m3/day, and a possible maximum of 12.4 tonnes/day with 
maximum flow. Greencore expanded its flow consent recently from 1000 m3/day 
since 1990s to 5500 m3/day after June 2004. At the same time, the consent for 
BOD5 discharge has been reduced significantly. Greencore used to have two 
separate consents seasonal for BOD5, being 1 tonne/day between May to 
September and 2.5 tonnes/day between October to April. A uniform BOD5 
consent of 0.75 tonne/day has now replaced them. 
Changes to the effluent consents for the STWs are less substantial. Effluent 
flows from STWs have gradually reduced over the last ten years, but Snaith has 
increased its flow four-fold from 570 m3/day to 2140 m3/day. Improvement in the 
STWs on the rivers Aire and Don have been beneficial to the water quality of 
these tributaries, but STWs at Barlby and Selby are still partly contributing to the 
DO sag around Selby in the tidal Ouse. 
The data detailing tradable water abstraction licenses are limited. No trade has 
taken place so far. YW is the major water company in the Humber catchment and 
holds the majority of water abstraction licenses. Licensed water abstraction by 
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YW is 82,500 thousand cubic meter per year (tcma) at Elvington and 33,440 tcma 
at Barmby on the River Derwent, 35,000 tcma at Acomb and 73,000 tcma at Moor 
Monkton on the River Ouse. Water abstraction varies over time, but is usually 
well below the amount granted by the licenses. There is also significant water 
uptake by Drax Power Station for cooling water. Approximately half of the 
volume abstracted is returned to the river after use. Water abstraction at Drax has 
been included in the water quality simulations produced by the QUESTSID 
model, although no actual data are available to verify reported abstraction and 
return levels. Water abstraction from the Ouse for irrigation and agriculture is 
negligible in comparison with abstraction for potable use. Therefore a Business As 
Usual (BAU) approach is adopted for agriculture abstractions, and assuming no 
change for the purpose of this research. 
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Chapter 6 Static Optimisation 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methods and results of the static cost minimization 
model. In this model the system of water quality functions is combined with 
economic cost functions of various options to identify the strategy that complies 
with water quality target at least cost. 
For all the analyses below, the simulation results of QUESTSID model are 
used to generate the system of water quality functions that can predict the water 
qualities at the EA's WQM sites. The system of water quality functions consists of 
five functions for five different cells in the QUESTS ID model around three WQM 
sites, which are likely to experience severe DO sag issue during low flow summer. 
In this research, the water qualities of cell 180 at Selby, cell 192 and 193 at Long 
Drax, and cell 197 and 199 at Boothferry Bridge were predicted through the 
system of water quality functions based on iterative simulations of QUESTSID 
model, in term of 5%ile DO%. The functions predict the water qualities at these 
cells using the most significant determinants of water quality at each point. These 
determinants are the effluent discharge levels from various sources, water 
abstraction from river Ouse and tributary, and the effluent discharge locations. 
Since the predictions through the system of water quality functions were quite 
consistent with the simulation results of the QUESTID model, the system is used 
to represent the water quality constraint in the optimisation model. The associated 
costs of these options are estimated using the data provided, and their sum is 
minimized subject to the achievement of given water quality targets. 
The static optimisation is solved using the General Algebraic Modelling 
System (GAMS), and the sensitivity of the outcome to the assumptions made was 
tested over a range of scenarios. The least cost solution indicates the combination 
of effluent abatement levels in individual sources, water abstraction from the 
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rivers, and where to discharge the effluent along the river Ouse. Despite 
differences among the optimal solutions for different scenarios, relocating the 
effluent discharges proved to be the most cost effective measure. With effluents 
from Selby area being discharged downstream of the river Ouse, water quality 
along the river Ouse could be significantly improved even in low flow conditions 
(as in 1996), but at much less cost than would otherwise occur. The feasibility of 
the least cost solution is also discussed, particularly in the light of Europe's Urban 
Waste Water Treatment Directive (UWWTD). 
This chapter tests the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions of the cost 
function of effluent abatement. The least cost solution proved to be insensitive to 
the change. The sensitivity test also considered different water quality targets in 
the tidal Ouse. We find that under the low flow conditions, the options considered 
in the optimisation analysis are not able to achieve 5%ile DO% target higher than 
40% in the tidal Ouse. One implication of this is that the establishment of water 
quality targets appropriate to flow conditions needs to be considered to avoid 
imposing excessive costs. 
There are five sections in the chapter. The second section describes the 
constraint and objective functions of the static optimisation problem. It shows 
how the system of water quality functions is derived from simulations results of 
QUESTS 1D model and why this is necessary. It also details estimation of cost 
functions for various options of improving water quality of river Ouse. The third 
section displays the results of static optimisation under different scenarios. The 
combinations of actions that satisfy the water quality target at the least cost are 
calculated through GAMS. This section then discusses the feasibility of the least 
cost solution in reality. A fourth section discusses the results of the sensitivity 
tests. Different cost functions of effluent abatement within the industries and 
STWs are applied to investigate the possible change in the optimal solution. It 
also discusses the reason for the consistent optimal solution. Different water 
quality targets for the tidal Ouse together are also considered. The last section 
summarises the outcome of the optimisation analysis and points to the policy 
implications of the outcome (to be addressed in the following chapters). 
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6.2 Constraint and Objective Functions of Static 
Optimisation 
6.2.1 Constraints: the System of Water Quality Functions 
In this research, water quality along the river Ouse is treated as a constraint that 
needs to be satisfied through river management. The DO% of the river water was 
chosen as indicator of water quality. The EA monitors water quality at several 
WQM sites along the river using a series of indicators including DO%. The DO% 
is directly linked with the DO sag issue in the river Ouse. Since the EA only 
monitors at certain sites, the optimisation only includes constraints at these sites. 
Nevertheless, the water quality of the whole river system was checked afterwards 
against the same constraints to ensure compliance at each point along the river. 
The QUESTS ID model is a comprehensive dynamic water quality model, 
which takes into account many influencing factors. This is very useful to assess 
the impacts on river water quality of some particular management options when 
the change is known and manageable in the model. By simply changing the 
parameter values or structure of the model, new management options can be easily 
assessed and modified according to the outcome of simulations. However, this 
kind of "black-box" feature becomes less convenient if one wishes to find out the 
best solution for a river that is unknown beforehand. It is used here to identify the 
most cost effective river management option for particular environmental targets, 
which need to combine the cost function of pollution abatement with the effects of 
pollution on river water quality as a function of various abatement levels. A 
simplified system of functions for water quality under different scenarios is used 
to identify the combined option without knowing it beforehand. 
In order to reduce the modelling work, the simplified system of water quality 
functions predict water quality at specific points instead of along the whole river 
length, but the predicted results from the simplified functions are checked against 
the simulation of QUESTSID model to ensure compliance at all points. Five 
points around the EA WQM sites where DO sag issue is likely to occur during the 
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summer are chosen. The functions are derived from repetitive simulations of the 
QUESTS ID model, and therefore reflect the predictive accuracy of the model. 
The most significant factors at each of the points were carefully chosen and 
assessed in different forms. All variables not subjected to change were treated as 
parameters and adjacent effluent sources were aggregated to reduce the number of 
independent variables. In the research, the effluent discharge around Selby area 
was aggregated as a single effluent source because (a) they are all discharging 
organic effluent of similar composition and with similar impact on the DO% of 
river water, and (b) they are located close to each other and the transfer 
coefficients between them are sufficiently high that their effluents can be treated 
as perfectly mixed. This is also helpful for the estimation of abatement costs 
discussed in the next section, as the abatement cost data do not allow abatement 
cost functions to be estimated individually for each source. The water quality 
predicted at each point is the 5%ile DO% of the cell in the QUESTS 1D model, 
using the "System of Regression Equations8" provided by Limdep (Econometric 
Software Inc. 1995). The same dataset of effluents and water flow can also be 
used to predict the EWPCS composite score along the Ouse/Humber reaches or 
over the whole estuary catchment, providing a more comprehensive prediction 
instead of the DO saturations at several discrete points. 
The simplified system of water quality function for the following points in 
1996 is shown in table 6.1. The first column is the cell number of points predicted 
through the simplified system. Cell 180 is at the WQM site at Selby, cells 192 and 
193 are located at Long Drax and cells 197 and 199 are at Boothferry Bridge. The 
WQM sites of Naburn Weir and Cawood were not regarded to be at risk as their 
DO% are more than 60% even in the worst conditions in 1996, therefore the water 
quality functions did not take into account these two sites. The same applies to 
Blacktoft, where water quality is dominated by the flow of Trent and is insensitive 
to various management options in the river Ouse. The water qualities at the five 
points are predicted simultaneously through this system of equations giving the 
5%ile DO% of the cell. 
s The regression results from System of Regression Equations will only be the same as equation 
by equation ordinary least squares if the estimators of each equation are the same and there is no 
linear restriction imposed. Otherwise, the results differ. In our case, the result will be different as 
three STWs on the tributaries are omitted from the first three equations of the regression system. 
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Cell Constant x X2 In(SBOD) In(Ouse) In(Derw) In(Sna) In(Sand) In(Tho) 
180 -442.09 1.474 -0.042 -3.604 128.210 9.220 None None None 
192 -113.406 -0.028 -0.020 -9.238 37.174 23.418 None None None 
193 -79.943 -0.424 -0.011 -9.432 28.993 23.206 None None None 
197 37.749 -1.552 0.019 -9.032 1.060 17.697 0.141 0.228 0.085 
199 42.566 -1.518 0.020 8.922 -0.763 16.800 0.160 -0.261 0.098 
The following nine variables are the estimators of water quality. The first is the 
constant. X in the second and third column is the distance from discharge 
location to the Trent Falls in kilometres. SBOD is the total tons of BOD5 
discharged from the sources around Selby per day. Ouse and Derwent are river 
flows (m3s-') of rivers Ouse and Derwent while the flows of other tributaries 
remains unchanged. Sna, Sand and Tho are three different STWs in the tributaries 
Aire and Don, and have no effects on the first three points. The location of 
effluent discharges is best fitted to water quality as a quadratic function; 
improvement being quite slow when X is large (upstream) or small 
(downstream), but much faster in the mid-range of tidal Ouse. The effect of BOD5 
discharge on water quality is best described as logarithmic function, as is the 
effect of river flow. This is understandable as both factors have diminishing 
marginal impacts on water quality. See Appendix 3 for the details of the regression 
analysis. 
The results obtained from the reduced system of water quality functions is in 
close agreement with simulations from the QUESTID model, which has been 
carefully calibrated and validated against water quality observations throughout 
the years. It is therefore, reasonable to conclude that the simplified system of 
water quality function is reliable for purposes of determining the most cost 
effective river management option. However, it is important to point out that the 
results reflect the data on which the reduced system was calibrated. The system of 
water quality functions was estimated based on flow conditions in 1996, which is 
a dry year with high risk of DO sag. The functions, therefore, are best able to 
predict water quality under similar low flow conditions. A year with much higher 
flow such as 2002 would doubtless have higher assimilative capacity and 
therefore produce a different picture of the dynamics of water quality. Even under 
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the similar flow conditions, the water quality function needs to be applied with 
caution. The effect of BOD5 discharge on water quality has been estimated over a 
wide range of variation, but the same is not true for water abstraction. The effect 
of water abstraction was estimated around the actual levels, which were between 
29 to 35 m3s"1 for river Ouse and 7 to 12 m3s' for river Derwent. For water 
abstraction much different to this, i. e. much higher or lower water flows from the 
two rivers, the water quality functions may not be as reliable. But for the purposes 
of this research, the variation of water abstraction is reasonable. The coefficient of 
Ouse flow was diminishing along the river, having less impact on downstream 
water quality. It becomes negative at cell 199, which is probably due to the fact 
that the small dilution impact at Boothferry Bridge was overwhelmed by the DO 
consumption from resuspended sediments caused by the flow. As seen, the 
coefficients of the STWs on the tributaries Aire and Don (Snaith, Sandall and 
Thorne) have no effects on water quality upstream of Drax, and have much less 
impact on water quality at Boothferry Bridge compared with BOD5 sources in 
Selby. This is because they all locate in tributaries far from the river Ouse. While 
they do have an impact on water quality, they have fewer impacts on the water 
quality of river Ouse than on their own tributaries. 
6.2.2 Objectives: Pollution Abatement Cost Functions 
The objective is to achieve the least cost solution for the given water quality 
target in the river Ouse. Three different options for improving water quality were 
taken into account, and the aggregate cost of all three was minimised. These 
comprise the cost of effluent abatement within individual industry and STW, the 
cost of reducing water abstraction from rivers Ouse and Derwent, and the cost of 
moving effluent discharges along the river Ouse. The least cost solution involves a 
combination of the three options. All costs in the functions were annual costs of 
these options in million British Pounds (£m). 
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6.2.2a Cost function of effluent treatment in industries and 
STWs 
One firm has ceased its effluent discharge to the river Ouse and it was reluctant 
to provide previous cost data. A cost function for effluent treatment for the Selby 
industries was estimated based on the data from the remaining major industrial 
sources of pollution in the town. Due to the confidentiality of much cost data, 
there are only seven observations available from three discrete years. In this 
research, two abatement cost functions were derived from the aggregated 
abatement cost data corresponding to the industries and STWs respectively. The 
Selby industries were treated as a single source in the water quality functions, as 
discussed in last section. Although the abatement technologies implemented in 
each industry are not exactly the same, all are based on similar methods of 
anaerobic treatment. The paucity of observations inevitably casts some doubt on 
the reliability of the estimation; however, the consistency of the results obtained 
from regression gives some confidence. Details of the regression result are shown 
in Appendices 4 and 5. A two-stage process was adopted in the treatment of the 
industrial and STW effluent abatement. The abatement cost functions were 
calculated from available data and used to optimise abatement levels from each 
cluster. Following this an analysis aws carried out to consider the efficient 
allocation of abatement between the individual industries and STWs. The first 
stage is discussed in terms of the static (Chapter 6) and dynamic (Chapter 7) 
optimisation models. Chapter 8 then discusses the allocation of abatement 
responsibilities among the sources. 
The estimated cost function of effluent treatment for the industries in Selby 
took the following form, where a is the abatement level of the effluent treatment 
in each industrial plant in terms of tons of BOD5 removal per day. 
Cost, 
nd = 0.256e" 
109a 
The estimated cost was a function of abatement levels only, without taking 
product output or input into account. The reason for not using variables of output 
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or input is as follows. First, although the different output or input level will result 
in different load of BOD5, the working efficiency of the anaerobic treatment 
remains relatively constant. This is because the Effluent Treatment Plant (ETP) 
manager will always maintain the inload BOD5 concentration at the most 
favourable level for bacterial growth in the plant, through such manoeuvres as 
varying the residence time of effluent. Therefore the efficiency of abatement is to 
some extent independent of inload, as is the cost of abatement. Second, the 
complexity of multi-outputs from the same industry and the wide range of inputs 
make it difficult to convert them into commensurable units. 
The cost data for effluent treatment in the STWs provided by YW are better 
than those of industries. However, they were not sufficient to evaluate the cost 
function of STWs separately. The five STWs in the river Ouse and the tributaries 
that are considered in this research were therefore also combined as for the 
industries. 
As in the industries, the cost data for STWs came from three discrete years, 
with twelve observations altogether. The cost function was estimated against the 
abatement level in each STW. The resulting cost function of effluent abatement in 
the STWs is as follows, where a is tons of BOD5 removal per day by each STW. 
The details of the regression for STWs are given in Appendix 5. 
Costs,, « = 0.249e 
0.245a ... 
(6.2) 
Exponential abatement cost functions have been widely found in empirical 
work, particularly in water pollution control (Baumol and Oates 1988; Hanley et 
al. 1997; Perman et al. 1999; Tietenberg 2001), with increasing marginal cost of 
abatement (MCA). Needless to say, in reality, there is almost no smooth 
abatement cost function. The exponential function provides a reasonable 
approximation of the stepped cost function seen in reality. The results are 
discussed in section 6.4. 
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The application of the cost function for the industries needs to be carried out 
with caution. The cost function was only able to predict the change of abatement 
cost incurred by marginal changes in the abatement level. This is to say, the cost 
function only applies to effluent treatment under the current abatement facilities, 
and the predicted cost only takes into account operating cost, interest, capital 
depreciation, and maintenance. It does not include the cost of replacement of new 
facilities or applications of new techniques. When there is major change of 
abatement facilities, either in facilities or in techniques, the cost function would 
not be able to reflect the change of costs. 
6.2.2b Water abstraction cost functions in the river Ouse 
catchment 
As part of its legal duty, YW is responsible to provide sufficient potable water 
to the residents and to satisfy the various water demands. Therefore the cost of 
water abstraction per se, is not the cost incurred for pollution control in the river 
basin, but the cost of production as a water supplier. However, since the water 
abstraction has adverse impacts on the water quality, the cost incurred from 
reducing water abstraction could be regarded as the cost of ameliorating water 
quality reductions caused by water abstraction. In the case of the Ouse, YW is 
unable or very unlikely to reduce the water supply for the whole catchment, which 
is currently at 360 Mega Litre (Ml) per day or 4.167 m3s' (Mega Litre =1 million 
Litre). If there has to be reduction in the water abstraction in the Ouse catchment, 
YW has to find enough water sources from somewhere else. Because of this, the 
cost of water supply in the Ouse catchment accounts for two aspects of cost. The 
first is the abstraction cost of water from the Ouse and the Derwent. The second is 
the cost of water supply from alternative water resource options. 
The cost of water abstraction from the Ouse and Derwent comprises the capital 
depreciation and operating costs. According to YW, water abstraction could be 
switched between Ouse and Derwent at negligible additional cost within the 
licenses since the cost mainly comes from electricity usage and basic treatment. 
Therefore, apart from different capital depreciation, there is almost no difference 
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in abstraction cost for water abstracted from different sites. On the other hand, 
YW also has estimated the possible costs for the alternative water supply sources 
or options. The possible sources include leakage control, pipeline option from 
Elvington, Ouse bank side storage and desalination at Hull. Each option has 
different water yields and associated costs, and the choice between the options 
was based on their yields and cost of water supply. 
The cost function for water supply was estimated against different levels of 
water abstraction from the catchment. The cost is the aggregate cost from both 
water abstraction and alternative water resource options. The operational cost of 
water uptaking was provided from YW for both rivers. The alternative water 
supply sources were generally more expensive than water abstraction within the 
catchment. The cost function of water supply was estimated by various water 
abstraction levels from rivers Ouse and Derwent in aggregate. The cost of waster 
supply followed an exponential function of the aggregated water abstraction when 
it ranged from 0-50% reduction of current levels (see details in Appendix 6). The 
function is shown below, where ß, and ßz are the respective levels of water 
abstraction from rivers Ouse and Derwent. Currently, the maximum water 
abstraction rate of YW allowed by the water abstraction license in an annual 
average is 3.530 m3s 1 from the river Derwent and 0.833 m3s"1 from the river 
Ouse. 
Costabs = 39.607e 042«''pZý (6.3) 
It should be stressed that, this function is derived from the data obtained from 
YW, in which only up to 50% reduction of water abstraction were evaluated due 
to data limitations. Because of this, some alternative options have not been taken 
into account because they are relatively more costly. Had all the alternative 
options for reducing water abstraction from river Ouse been considered, the cost 
would have been higher than estimated. Therefore, the estimated cost function of 
reducing water abstraction is reliable only when abstraction ranges between 50% 
and 100% of current level, but less reliable for levels of abstraction below 50% of 
current level. 
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The cost of moving effluents from Selby to other points along the river was 
estimated using the method adopted in Cashman et al. (1999). Piping and storage 
costs were based on the benchmark price of UK water industries (Ofwat 1999). 
The effluents from Selby are from five main sources: Industry A, Industry B, 
Industry C, STW A and STW B. They are scattered in a small area around Selby, 
discharging effluents within a3 km section of the river Ouse. Before moving them 
downstream, the aggregate effluents would need to be piped into a central 
collection point within Selby, which a storage facility is able to adapt to variations 
in the effluents. Preliminary treatment in the storage facility before pumping the 
effluents downstream is possible, but not always necessary. A pipe along the river 
would then transfer the effluents downstream of the river Ouse, where 
environmental targets may be met at minimal cost. The construction of pipes 
collecting the effluents within Selby to the central storage tank might be costly as 
it entails pipeline construction within an urban area (Cashman et al. 1999). The 
storage facility is assumed to have a four-hour capacity in order to balance the 
variations in flows and act as buffer in case of emergency. The aggregate flow 
from the five sources in 2004 was about I ML per hour over a 24-hour working 
time. Therefore the storage tank needs a capacity of 4 ML. The diameter of pipes 
within Selby is 150 mm and the main pipe to transfer the effluents downstream is 
300mm. Details of other capital investments are available in Appendix 7. The 
majority of the operational costs of transferring the effluent are the pumping costs 
to transfer the effluent downstream. Details of operating costs can also be found in 
Appendix 7. The annual cost of moving effluents is the depreciation of all the 
capital investments required plus the estimated operating cost. 
As may be expected, the cost of moving effluents is a linear function of the 
distance from the new discharge location to Selby. In order to be consistent with 
the water quality function, the cost function is evaluated against X, the distance 
from the new discharge location to the Trent Falls in kilometres, and the distance 
from Selby to the new discharge location is (41 - X) km. The resulted cost 
function is therefore as follows: 
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COStmOY = 0.820 - 0.005X ... (6.4) 
Unfortunately, this underestimates the full opportunity cost of transferring 
effluent. Establishing the collecting point is not technically a problem in Selby 
and most of the construction of pipeline occurs in rural areas where the impacts 
could be minimized through good planning and practice (Cashman et al. 1999). 
But possible obstacles of this option could be anticipated from those living 
downstream as well as landowners and interest groups. Therefore, a proper 
consultation processes would be needed to address this issue and this is costly in 
terms of time and money. 
6.2.3 Costs of Changing the Timing of Effluent Discharge 
Another option that could result in significant water quality improvement in the 
river Ouse without changing the location of effluent discharge is to change the 
timing of effluent discharges seasonally from summer to winter. Since the DO sag 
issue happens mostly in summer months, this option would store effluents from 
Selby during the summer months, and discharge in the winter at double rate. This 
25% storage scenario described in section 3.4.3. b is able to increase the 5%ile 
DO% at Selby in 1996 from less than 10% to around 20%. 
However, this option does not come at a low price. Cashman et al. (1999) 
estimated a similar option of storing 75% of the effluent discharges from the four 
industries during the summer to involve a capital investment of more than £27m 
required by this option and £0.2m operating costs, making it less cost effective 
than the option of effluent abatement in each individual industry. The total 
effluents from Selby sources in this research were double as much as that 
considered by Cashman et al. (1999), so this option was not considered in this 
research. 
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Having estimated the cost functions of effluent treatment, abstraction 
reduction, discharge relocation, and the system of water quality functions, the cost 
of meeting an arbitrary water quality target at the water WQM sites is minimised. 
The static optimisation takes the following form, where Q, and a, are water 
quality prediction and targets at cell s in terms of DO%: 
Minimize 
/ (/ý C,.., =I Costind (aind) + 
1] Cost, lllSTT{, ) + COStabs (/J I//ýý ! '2) + COStmov (X) 
ind stw 
Si. 
QS = %s (X, SBOD(2] (Bser - ase, ), Ouse(/. 3, ), Derw(/32 ), Sna(asna ), Sand 
(asnn ), Tho(ano)) >_ QS 
Se! 
. (6.5). 
In the function, aind is the abatement level in the industry and a5 , is for the 
STWs. ß, and 82 are the water abstraction levels in the Ouse and Derwent. B is 
the original BOD5 inload in the source before any abatement therefore 
SBOD(E (Bser - aser) represents the aggregated BOD5 discharge from the 
Sel 
sources around Selby, including the remaining industries in Selby and two STWs. 
The cells s predicted in this research are cells 180,192,193,197 and 199, 
reflecting the water qualities at Selby, Long Drax and Boothferry Bridge that are 
at risk of DO sag during the summer. The arbitrary water quality target for these 
cells are assumed to be 30% DO% at 5%ile (in order to protect the return of 
salmon). All the three options have effects on water quality improvements at 
different prices. Analysing the effects on water quality and economic cost of the 
trade-off among these options, the static optimisation is able to find the best 
combination that meets the quality target at least cost. When no other constraints 
are applied, the least cost solution is at the point where each option has the same 
marginal cost of water quality improvement. 
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Tao Wang 
Under the BAU scenario, it is assumed the EA would achieve the target of at 
least 30% DO% at 5% at the WQM sites in a dry year, through tightening the 
effluent discharge consents for the three industries and STWs (STW A and STW 
B) near Selby. Effluents from the STWs C, D and E are discharged from the 
tributaries Aire and Don, with only little impact on the water qualities at the 
predicted cells. They are therefore not affected. The water abstraction reduction 
and effluent relocation options were not considered in the BAU scenario. The only 
variable allowed for variation in Eq (6.5) was SBOD, the aggregated BOD5 
discharge from Selby into the river Ouse. Therefore the BAU scenario implies the 
costs of water quality improvement incurred within the Selby industries and 
STWs in order to comply with the water quality target during a dry year. It turns 
out to be infeasible to achieve the water quality target at the five cells through the 
reduction of SBOD alone, however. That means no matter how much BOD5 to be 
abated through the industries and STWs in Selby, the DO% of at least one of the 
cells would still fail to comply with the 30% requirement at 5%ile, even if the 
industries and STWs could somehow manage to afford the financial costs of 
abatement. The simulation of QUESTS ID model also confirmed this. When there 
were no BOD5 effluent discharges from the five sources around Selby, the river 
water quality in terms of DO% at 5% along the river Ouse was as shown in Figure 
6.1. 
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Figure 6.1 DO% of BAU & No SBOD (BAUNS) 
The red line in Figure 6.1 is the simulated 5%ile DO% over the river Ouse 
during a dry year under the current effluent discharge consents, without changes 
in abstraction and discharge location. The blue line that has better water quality is 
the result of zero-emissions to the river Ouse from the Selby area. Even so, the 
DO% around the WQM site of Selby was just at 30%, although water quality at 
Long Drax and Boothferry Bridge was significantly improved. The predictions 
from simplified system of water quality functions are even more pessimistic than 
the QUESTID simulation indicating that even with zero emissions in Selby, the 
30% DO% requirement could not be met. In both of the predicted results, the DO 
sag around Selby is attributed to the upstream transportation of resuspended solids 
mentioned in earlier research (Cashman et al. 1999; Freestone 2003). Therefore 
the arbitrary water quality target of 30% DO% at 5%ile is infeasible (either 
technically or economically) just through variation of effluent abatement. 
6.3.2 No Constraints (NC) Scenario 
Under this scenario, effluent treatment, water abstraction reduction and 
discharge relocation were all allowed as options to meet the water quality targets 
at the WQM sites. The water abstractions considered in the Ouse catchment are 
from the Ouse and Derwent, whereas their impacts on the water quality are 
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different due to the nature of the rivers. Therefore the option of reducing water 
abstraction also included the possibility of switching water abstraction between 
the river Ouse and the river Derwent. The range of water abstraction reduction 
was up to 50% of current abstraction levels, and the solution did not consider the 
situation with higher than current water abstraction levels. The relocation of 
effluent discharges was evaluated within the section of river Ouse, between Selby 
and the Trent Falls. Moving effluent discharges further downstream is possible, 
but the impacts need to be evaluated after taking into account the dilution effects 
from river Trent, which is beyond the range of this research. Since the industries 
in Selby are implicitly assumed to operate under the same cost function and the 
same location of discharge, it might be expected that aggregate abatement levels 
for the effluents of industries would be equally divided among them in the optimal 
solution. In reality, the industries have different abatement capacities and do face 
different abatement costs, and such solution might be infeasible. The aggregate 
reduction in emissions would thus have to be allocated between industries using a 
mechanism such as tradable emission permits. This will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
The required average abatement levels in the industries and STWs are given as 
tons of BOD5 per day (t/d); the reduction in water abstraction from the river Ouse 
and river Derwent is given in m3s' while X is the distance from new discharge 
location to the Trent Falls in kilometres. Table 6.2 indicates the optimal abatement 
levels from each effluent source, the water abstraction levels in the Ouse and 
Derwent and the new effluent discharge location for the least cost solution under 
the NC scenario. For example, the first three cells indicate that an average of 
2.036 t/d of BOD5 should be abated by each of the three Selby industries. The 
next two cells indicate optimal abatement by the two STWs around Selby, and the 
last three cells indicate optimal abatement levels for the three STWs on the 
tributaries Aire and Don. Under the least cost solution, none of the STWs are 
required to abate their effluent at all, which means the inload BOD5 could be 
discharged without any abatement. The two cells for Ouse and Derwent suggest 
that 0.637 m3s"' water should be abstracted from the site on the river Ouse, and 
3.530 m3s"' of water is to be abstracted from the river Derwent. The value of X is 
the optimal location of Selby effluent discharges under the least cost solution, 
14.673 km upstream from the Trent Falls. 
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Industry 
A 
Industry Industry 
BC 
STW STW 
AB Ouse Derwent X 
STW 
C 
STW 
D 
STW 
E 
2.036 2.036 2.036 0.000 0.000 0.637 3.530 14.673 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Site Seib Long Drax Boothfe Bridge 
Cell 
180 192 193 197 199 
DO% 30.000 34.494 34.262 32.539 30.000 
Abatement Abstraction Relocation Total 
Cost m£ 2.205 5.54 0.747 8.493 
In the NC scenario, only the three industries were required to abate their 
effluent discharges, while there was no requirement at all for the STWs to abate 
their effluents. This is understandable since the marginal cost of abatement by the 
industries is less than that of the STWs. Moreover, the relocated BOD5 discharges 
from the STWs could be absorbed by much diluted river water without failing 
water quality target. Instead of purer and more manageable effluent inload to their 
treatment plants in the industries, the STWs have to deal with mixed effluents out 
of their control from all kinds of sources, such as small industries, households and 
other sectors. This inevitably involves higher abatement costs. 
Under this scenario, the static least cost solution implies water abstraction 
occurs in the river Derwent at the maximum of license permission, and the rest of 
water abstraction is from river Ouse to satisfy the water supply demand. No 
reduction in water abstraction is required due to the higher costs that would incur 
from alternative resources in terms of improving water quality. This concluded 
that (a) under the NC scenario the marginal effect of water abstraction on the 
water quality was in general higher in the river Ouse than in the river Derwent, 
therefore it was better to abstract from river Derwent first; (b) the marginal cost of 
improving water quality through reducing water abstraction was all time higher 
than the other two options so there was no reduction needed in the optimal 
solution. 
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Relocation of effluent discharges proved to be very effective in improving 
water quality along the tidal Ouse, considering the slack conditions required for 
the two management options above. The optimal location to discharge effluent 
from Selby was 14.673 km upstream of the Trent Falls, which is about 1 km 
upstream of the confluence of river Don. The dilution effects from tributaries Aire 
and Don seemed quite promising according to this choice of discharge location. 
The annual costs of river management under the least cost solution for the NC 
scenario was £8.493m and yielded water quality of at least 30% DO% at Q180 
and Q 199 (Table 6.3 and 6.4). It needs to be pointed out though, that £5.541 m out 
of the total annual costs was the cost of water abstraction, as production cost of 
YW to provide water supply, accounting for over 65% of the total cost of river 
management. The costs of improving water quality through treatment and 
discharge relocation was only £2.952m in total, less than 60% of the current 
effluent treatment costs (£4.936m) that incurred in the industries and STWs. 
However, despite the obvious cost advantages of the least cost solution under 
the NC scenario, it is not an easy solution. One constraint is the European 
Directive of UWWTD. One of the elements of UWWTD is the secondary 
treatment of discharges from the STWs. It is inappropriate to have the inloads of 
STWs discharging without any treatment. UWWTD also requires the STWs to 
reduce nutrient inputs to sensitive areas, in order to prevent eutrophication 
problem in the water bodies. The abatement of effluents is therefore necessary 
even without of the issue of DO% sag. The STWs have all been continuously 
investing during the last decades to comply with UWWTD. The cost of closing 
down these facilities (as abatement was not required in the STW according to the 
solution) is not considered in this research, but will certainly be unacceptable to 
the water company. The second problem is due to nature of research that mainly 
considers the water quality along the river Ouse. If the STWs in the Aire and Don 
were closed, there would be considerable deterioration in water quality those 
rivers, as well as in the section of river Ouse below their confluence. As a result, 
some constraints have to be placed on the static optimisation. 
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6.3.3 UWWTD Constraints (UC) Scenario 
For the reasons given above, changing abatement levels in industries is likely 
to be more possible than changing abatement levels in the STWs. Two of the 
industries have been using their effluent treatment plants for quite a long period 
and would have to install new plant if the effluent discharge consents become 
more stringent. Given competitive pressures, both industries and the local 
economy of Selby would benefit following the least cost solution from less 
restrictive emission requirements. In the UC scenario, all five STWs were 
assumed to be working at no less than the current levels in compliance with the 
UWWTD requirements, while abatement in industries, water abstraction and 
effluent discharge location were assumed to be choice variables. 
Industry Industry Industry STW STW STW STW STW 
AB C A B 
Ouse Derwent X 
C D E 
1.081 1.081 1.081 0.599 1.955 0.637 3.530 14.890 0.498 7.902 2.954 
Site Selby Long Drax Boothferry Bridge 
Cell 180 Q192 193 197 199 
DO% 30.000 34.231 33.968 32.481 30.000 
Abatement Abstraction Relocation Total 
Cost m£ 4.074 5.541 0.746 10.361 
The optimal abatement levels of the three industries in Selby, water abstraction 
levels in Derwent and Ouse, and effluent discharge location are given in Table 6.5. 
The least cost abatement level for the three Selby industries under UC scenario is 
1.081 t/d of BOD5, in aggregate only 16% of their current abatement level. Given 
the water supply cost function, reducing water abstraction levels was quite costly 
as a means of improving water quality than the other options. Therefore no 
reduction in the water abstraction was required. The pattern of water abstraction 
under the UC scenario is the same as NC scenario. In addition, the optimal 
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discharge location under UC scenario was 14.890 km upstream from the Trent 
Falls, several hundred metres upstream than that in the NC scenario. Unlike the 
NC scenario, the abatement levels of STWs are same as the current levels because 
of the UWWTD constraint. Although higher abatement levels in the STWs are 
possible, it is not cost effective to do so hence the STWs are suggested to remain 
at their current abatement levels. Water quality in the Don and the Aire were 
maintained as the STWs are discharging at current levels along these two 
tributaries. Furthermore, the good quality of water in the tributaries improves 
water quality in the tidal Ouse through dilution effects. This is reflected in the 
optimal discharge location, which takes advantage of the dilution effects of the 
tributaries Aire and Don. 
Table 6.6 shows water quality at the five points concerned under the UC 
scenario. The two points at which the water quality constraints are binding are 
same for both NC and UC scenarios, Q180 and Q199. Under the UC scenario, 
water quality at the other three sampling points is similar to that under the NC 
scenario. Water quality along the river Ouse is improved between Selby and 
Boothferry compared to the BAU scenario, and the DO sag disappears from the 
river Ouse even in a low flow year as 1996. The QUESTS 1D simulation using the 
pattern of emissions and abstraction identified in the least cost solution confirms 
the prediction from the water quality functions. Figure 6.2 indicates the 5%ile 
DO% along the river Ouse simulated by the QUESTS model following the least 
cost solution generated by GAMS. 
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Figure 6.2 DO% under the least cost solution in the UC scenario 
The least cost solution of optimisation results in slightly better water quality in 
the QUESTS ID model simulations than predicted by the system of water quality 
functions, with reduced risk of non-compliance. The DO% of the river Ouse under 
the least cost solution decreases near Naburn due to the tidal inflow and the 
resuspended sediments, increases after Selby and reaches a local maximum 
around Drax, then decreases again, but finally becomes stable around 35% and 
eventually recovers towards saturation after the confluence with river Trent. 
The least cost solution involves an aggregate cost of £10.361m to comply with 
the 30% DO% requirement. As in the NC scenario, almost half of this is 
accounted for by abstraction costs. Costs of effluent abatement and relocation of 
the effluent discharge account for £4.820m, achieving much better water quality 
along the river Ouse at slightly less cost than that is currently endured by the 
industries and STWs. Abatement in the STWs account for more than 60% of the 
costs of effluent abatement and discharge relocation. The relocation of effluent 
discharge only accounted for 15% of the costs but had obviously much significant 
impact on the river water quality. 
There are some uncertainties associated with the least cost solution under the 
UC scenario. The first one involves the cost of the infrastructure needed to 
transfer effluents to the new discharge location. Although the annual cost of 
5%ih Dissolved Oxygen 
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transfer is small, the capital investment required to build the storage facility and 
lay down the pipes is close to £lOm. This cost could be a possible obstacle to the 
acceptance of the solution. The second is because the cooperation between 
industries and STWs, which is critical to the solution, is not guaranteed under this 
scenario. Since the STWs have to maintain their current abatement levels because 
of UWWTD, they would be reluctant to pay for the effluent relocation 
infrastructure that does not affect their abatement levels. If the industries have to 
bear the cost of infrastructure alone, the required investment of capital would be 
too high to be acceptable in current trading conditions. 
Reallocation of the benefits among the industries and STWs through 
negotiation might be sufficient to ensure the STWs' participation, since industries 
could save costs from the abatement done by the STWs. Alternatives would be 
either an emission tax-subsidy scheme or a TPP system. On the other hand, 
although the STWs are unable to reduce their abatement levels under the UC 
scenario, they still benefit from future expansion allowed by the fact that the DO 
sag issue is removed from the Selby area. That is, they can respond to increasing 
demand for sewage services due to the growth of the population and the economy 
in North Yorkshire and Lincolnshire (Jarvie et al. 1997b). The STWs would also 
benefit from a reduction in the risks of failure during extreme conditions such as 
flood or storm. 
6.4 Sensitivity Tests 
The best-fit individual abatement cost functions for the industries and STWs is 
in fact a power function and a linear function implying a constant MAC. Since the 
data are limited it was decided to test the sensitivity of the outcome to the 
functional form of the abatement cost function. Using a power function for the 
industries and a linear function for the STWs (for the estimation of these see 
Appendix 8 and Appendix 9), 
COStind = 0" 18 la 0.660 
Costs,. W = 0.172 + 0.194a 
(6.6) 
(6.7) 
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the system was re-optimised under the UC scenario, and yielded the 
following solutions for abatement levels in the industries and STWs (Table 6.8). 
Table 6.8: Static Optimal Solutions (Sensitivity Tests) 
Industry LA Industry 
B 
Industry 
C 
STW 
A 
STW 
B 
STW Ouse Derwent XC STW 
D 
STW 
E 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.599 1.955 0.416 3.530 10.461 0.498 7.902 2.954 
Table 6.9: Water qualities at WQM sites (Sensitivity Tests) 
Site 
Cell 
DO% 
Selby 
I80 
30.000 
Q192 
Long Drax 
33.990 
Q193 
33.826 
Boothfei Bridge 
Q 197 I Q199 
32.558 
Table 6.10: Cost of river management (Sensitivity Tests) 
30.000 
Abatement Abstraction Relocation Total 
Cost m£) 3.558 6.151 0.752 10.461 
Comparing with Tables 6.5-6.7, the STWs end up at the same levels of 
abatement, as under the UC scenario before but now the industries do not have to 
abate their effluent at all, which means they could discharge their inload effluent 
directly into the tidal Ouse without any treatment. Accompanied with this, the 
water abstraction in the river Ouse is reduced compared with 0.637 m3s"' in the 
UC scenario. More significant change comes from the location of Selby effluent 
discharges. The new location is 10.461 km upstream of the Treat Falls, 4 km 
further downstream of the optimal location of UC scenario. The change in the 
function of STWs' abatement cost seemed irrelevant to the solution of STWs' 
abatement levels, but ruled out the need of abatement in the industries because of 
the change in function of industrial's abatement function. As a result, water 
abstraction in Ouse was reduced and the location of effluent discharge from the 
Selby sources has to be moved further downstream. 
A second set of sensitivity tests relate to the choice of water quality targets. The 
actual water quality targets are RE4 classification (pers. comm. Peter Stevenson; 
Environment Agency) at these three WQM sites along the tidal Ouse, which 
requires 50% DO% at 10%ile value. As the water quality functions were derived 
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from 5%ile value of DO%, new functions based on 10%ile would be needed to 
apply the optimisation analysis. Here we consider different water quality targets at 
5%ile at these three sites using the water quality functions. Tables 6.11 and 6.12 
indicate different optimal solutions for various water quality targets, and the 
resulted cost of river management. Changes of abatement levels within the STWs 
were disallowed, because of the effect of the UWWTD. 
Table 6.11: Static Optimal Solutions for various water targets 
Target Industry A Industry B Industry C Ouse Derwent x 
20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.833 3.334 29.235 
25 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.833 3.334 19.978 
30 1.081 1.081 1.081 0.637 3.530 14.890 
35 6.540 6.540 6.540 0.637 3.530 18.170 
40 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Table 6.12: Cost of river management for various water targets 
Target Abatement (m£) Abstraction 
m£ 
Relocation 
m£ 
Total (m £) 
20 3.978 5.541 0.674 10.193 
25 3.978 5.541 0.720 10.239 
30 4.074 5.541 0.746 10.361 
35 4.776 5.541 0.729 11.046 
40 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Once again, there is no need for the industries to abate their effluents until the 
target reaches 30% DO% at 5%ile value. This is because, with the abatement 
undertaken in the STWs, the effluents from the industries are within the 
assimilative capacity of the river when discharged at the optimal location, thus 
their effluent could be naturally degraded without abatement needed before 
discharge. When the DO% target was raised to 30%, each industry in Selby was 
required to abate an average of 1.081 t/d BOD5, and maximum water abstraction 
was required from the river Derwent to reduce the impacts of water abstraction 
from the river Ouse. The allocation of abatement responsibility among the three 
industries' different abatement capacity is a separate issue, and will be discussed 
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later in this thesis. Both tradable pollution permits system and pollution 
tax-subsidy scheme could be appropriate options. 
Water quality target of 40% DO% at 5%ile along the tidal Ouse is not 
achievable in the optimal solution. This does not rule out the possibility of 
achieving better water quality, but implies that it is not attainable along the river 
given the current water quality management options, for the given low flow year. 
Better water quality may still be possible if more effective instruments could be 
identified and in the years with better flow conditions. Figure 6.3 indicated the 
change of aggregate costs of river management in the tidal Ouse for different 
water quality targets. The cost displayed in the chart is the aggregated cost of 
effluent abatement and discharge relocation alone. The water abstraction cost was 
not included since the total abstraction remains unchanged during the optimisation 
and the cost is purely for water supply rather than improving water quality. 
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Figure 6.3 Change of aggregate costs of river management in tidal Ouse 
The aggregate costs of river management were only slightly increased when 
the water quality target increased. But a sheer increase was observed after the 
target became 35% DO% as the industries in Selby were require to increase their 
abatement levels significantly. If the target increases further and the option of 
reducing water abstraction from either Ouse or Derwent had to be implemented, 
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the cost of river management would increase more rapidly. Therefore it is 
important to choose water quality target carefully for the compliance of 
regulations. 
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has considered the least cost solution for water quality 
management in the tidal Ouse for a particular water quality target. The problem 
was posed as the minimization of the cost of water quality management through a 
mix of management options, subject to minimum water quality targets being 
achieved at a number of sampling points along the river. The least cost solution 
complied to UWWTD requirement involves the relocation of the point of effluent 
discharges from the three industries and two STWs around Selby to a point 14.890 
km upstream from the confluence the river Trent and river Ouse at the Trent Falls. 
The discharge location is close to the main tributaries of the river Ouse, and not 
far from its confluences of the river Trent. It makes it possible for the effluents to 
be sufficiently diluted to maintain water quality at all receptor points. Shifting 
water abstraction from the Ouse to the Derwent was also suggested in order to 
reduce the impacts of water abstraction on DO% in the Ouse. The solution takes 
account of the variation in assimilative capacity of river water along the tidal 
Ouse, in order to avoid excessive cost in water quality management. With 
abatement levels unchanged in the STWs, the industries are allowed to abate 
much less of their effluents than they currently do. Compared with the current 
water quality regulatory regime, which is mainly through the reduction in the 
on-site effluent discharges from various sources, this least cost solution yields 
significant water quality improvements and removes the DO sag around Selby and 
Drax, whilst yielding cost savings of £116,000 a year. 
The least cost solution is calculated for a low flow year (1996) in which it has 
been shown that the 30% DO% target is infeasible through the on-site effluent 
abatement within the industries and STWs alone. The least cost solution involves 
an integrated water quality management regime which is sensitive to the variation 
in assimilative capacity and abatement costs. Of course the arbitrary water quality 
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target of 30% DO% for all WQM sites (to allow salmon passage throughout the 
tidal Ouse and the tributaries) is unlikely to be the only criteria of water quality in 
the tidal Ouse. For example, the current WQOs for the tidal Ouse are RE2 for 
Naburn, RE3 for Cawood, RE4 for Selby, Drax and Boothferry Bridge. These are 
70%, 60% and 50% DO% at 10%ile respectively. Using the framework of cost 
minimisation discussed above, the management regime could be used to identify 
the least cost solution for any water quality targets. As the water quality target 
becomes more stringent, the costs of water quality management rise. In general, 
determining ecologically sound and economically reasonable water quality targets 
for the tidal Ouse that reflect public attitudes and ethical choice is a very 
challenging task for the policy maker. How to determine the appropriate water 
quality target is beyond this research, however, the framework is able to determine 
the most effective way to comply with any target once the environmental authority 
decides the target. 
A separate issue that has not been addressed here is the optimal allocation of 
abatement between the Selby industries in particular, but also between the STWs 
and water abstraction plants. Fixed effluent discharge consents or water 
abstraction licenses, as given in the optimal solution, could jeopardise the cost 
savings and flexibility offered by the integration of water quality management. 
They are especially inappropriate when the required abatement level is 
implemented to various sources with different abatement costs or when there is 
demand for a change in the scale of production or discharge from an effluent 
source. This problem may be solved by implementing economic instruments of 
river policy, either a TPP system or an emission tax-subsidy scheme. This will be 
discussed in details in Chapter 8 for the results of both static and dynamic 
optimisation after the discussion of dynamic optimisation in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 Dynamic Optimisation 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 discussed the optimal solution to water quality management in a 
static situation, in which all parameters are assumed constant over time. The 
values of variables are fixed once the optimisation for one point of time is done, 
and no changes are expected from both the internal and external systems. More 
particularly, the optimal solution indicated the most cost effective water quality 
management given the capabilities of effluent abatement in the industries and 
STWs, and given water abstraction levels. This assumption excludes change over 
time and the uncertainty it might bring. 
In fact, the industries and STWs have both been investing in ETPs over the last 
few decades in response to various pressures, including output growth, population 
increase in the catchment, and more stringent effluent consents imposed by the 
EA. Therefore, the effluent abatement capability of ETPs has changed over time, 
implying the need for a dynamic analysis. In this research, we assume that the 
variables that drive the change in capabilities of ETPs are their capital stocks and 
the investment, which builds up the capital stock through time. It is of particular 
interest as well, for the research to not only investigate the impact of river policy 
on the industries and STWs' abatement levels, as we did in Chapter 6, but also to 
identify how the policy would affect investment decisions that indirectly affect the 
water quality in the long term. 
This chapter accordingly aims to investigate the dynamic changes in the water 
quality management options discussed in the last chapter. Due to limited data, this 
research only investigated the dynamic changes in the effluent abatement levels of 
ETPs in the STWs and Selby industries. As the effluent abatement capabilities are 
driven by endogenous investment decisions in the STWs and industries, we expect 
the dynamic analysis to reveal the impact of river policy on the investment 
175 
Chapter 7 Dynamic Optimisation 
Tao Wang 
decisions of the STWs and industries. On the other hand, it is assumed that the 
river policy or water quality targets in the dynamic analysis are exogenous to the 
industries and STWs, while environmental regulation and policy instruments are 
considered time independent in this analysis. 
As has been shown before (Gandolfo 1997; Barro and Sala-i-martin 1999; 
Shone 2002), the dynamic problem is not easy to assess, particularly when 
nonlinearity leads to more than one equilibrium. When multiple equilibria are 
present in the dynamic system, only local stability properties can be investigated 
through linear approximation. A dynamic equilibrium would be much less 
meaningful in economic management if it were unstable; therefore, the stability of 
equilibrium and the path approaching to the equilibrium are as important as the 
dynamic equilibrium itself. 
In this research, the minimization of the overall cost of water quality 
management over time was difficult due to both data limitations and the 
nonlinearity of the cost and water quality functions. To carry out the dynamic 
analysis, some critical simplifying assumptions had to be made. These 
assumptions will be explained in more detail in the following sections. 
This chapter consists of five sections. The second introduces the dynamic 
system, listing the dynamic elements in the system and the way they are involved 
in change over time. The third discusses optimal water quality management. The 
impacts of various conditions (constraints) on the dynamic optimum are explored 
and compared. In the fourth section, the local stability of the dynamic optimum is 
investigated for a simple case. This section also identifies the investment path that 
leads to the dynamic optimum for the industries' ETPs. The last section points out 
the policy implications of the outcomes in these two chapters. These policy 
implications are discussed further in Chapter 8. 
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7.2 The elements of dynamic optimisation 
The dynamic analysis was carried out based on the model discussed in Chapter 
4. Since the effect of labour cost was negligible in this research and the 
operational cost was assumed positively correlated to the capital stock, effluent 
treatment capacity was therefore assumed to be a function of the capital stock of 
the ETP. In contrast to the static analysis, the abatement cost of the ETPs in the 
dynamic analysis was not determined by the BOD removed in each day, but by the 
capital stock and investment in ETPs. Decisions on investment in the ETPs are 
what determine water quality in the tidal Ouse in the long-term. 
GAMS was utilised to find the long-term equilibrium level of capital stock and 
investment for each ETP to comply with particular water quality targets cost 
effectively. The constraints in the dynamic optimisation were the water quality at 
the monitoring sites, and the dynamics of capital stocks, i. e. the dynamics of 
investment and depreciation. To simplify the problem, water abstraction and 
discharge relocation were treated as in the static optimisation problem. Only 
effluent abatement by the industries and STWs was considered in the dynamic 
analysis. Due to the limited data, the results produced are illustrative only. They 
are insufficient to support decision making, and are less convincing than the static 
results discussed in Chapter 6. This chapter aims to explore the methods and 
procedures which would be used in further research based on a more adequate 
dataset. 
7.2.1 Dynamics of effluent treatment capacity 
The capacities of effluent treatment in the ETPs of industries and STWs were 
treated as a function of capital stock only. The capital stocks in the ETPs are 
driven by the investment decisions of each pollution source. The investments in 
the ETPs of the STWs and industries in the tidal Ouse are mainly ETP upgrades. 
As a consequence of the UWWTD, the STWs were obliged to implement 
secondary treatment before effluent disposal. This has been done in four of the 
five STWs with similar technology. The exception is Barlby STW, whose 
upgrading to secondary treatment is currently in progress. The industries have 
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long been using various treatments before discharging effluents to the river, 
except for BOCM, which shut down its effluent discharge by the time of research. 
These technologies include aerobic and anaerobic treatment, and waste 
minimisation technologies. The capital depreciation in each ETP was also taken 
into account, the depreciation rate being 2.5% in the STWs and Selby industries. 
The relationship between effluent treatment capacity and capital stock was 
estimated based on pooled data across all the industries and STWs. 
The approach taken involves the estimation of abatement functions. Data for 
the ETPs of STWs and industries were aggregated respectively. Separate 
estimation for each of the industries would be more reasonable had data on their 
capital stocks been available. The results of the estimation suggest a consistent 
relation between capital stocks and ETP capacities. The estimated effluent 
treatment capacity functions were as follows, reflecting the diminishing marginal 
effect of increasing capital stock on abatement capability. 
Industries: a; nd 
(kind) = 3.180 + 3.9771n(k; nd) , 
(R 2=0.855) ... (7.1) 
STWs: a, s, (ks{) = -4.108 + 3.2241n(ks,,,, 
) 
, 
(R 2=0.768) ... 
(7.2) 
Details of the estimation procedure can be found in Appendices 10 and 11. The 
logarithmic functions of capital stocks in both STWs and industries imply 
diminishing marginal effectiveness of investment. As in Chapter 6, capital stocks 
k° are measured in million Sterling Pounds (m£) and ETP capacity a is 
measured in tons BOD5 removed per day (t/d). The estimated functions imply that 
the capital stock requirement for ETPs in the industries was less than that required 
in the STWs for same abatement. This is consistent with the finding in Chapter 6, 
and reflects the large amount of effluents to be treated and the complexity of 
incoming wastewater to STWs. 
7.2.2 The effluent abatement cost function 
The costs of pollution abatement were assumed to be function of current capital 
stock and investment in ETP during the same period. Due to the confidentiality of 
this information, only limited data were available from the industries in Selby. On 
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the other hand, the STWs were able to provide data on investment in ETPs during 
the last ten years. However, these estimations are rather approximate at best. As a 
result the estimation of pollution abatement costs is based on pooled data from the 
STWs and industries. The estimated pollution abatement function is shown in Eq 
(7.3), details of which are given in Appendix 12. As shown by the t-value, 
investment is not a significant explanatory of abatement costs in the regression. 
This is expected to be improved by future research with access to more detailed 
and accurate investment data. Because of this, the dynamic optimisation discussed 
later can provide only a rough approximation to the dynamic optimum of capital 
stocks in the industries and STWs. Nevertheless, the analysis below identifies a 
methodology for understanding the dynamic problem of pollution control in the 
Ouse. 
C; °(kr , I; °) = 0.068k0.952 10.0 
17 
, (R 
2=0.980) (7.3) 
In equation 7.3, capital stock, investment and abatement costs are all in units of 
m£. Abatement costs are annual costs for each source; capital stocks are the 
current-value of ETPs at the beginning of the period and investment is the value 
of ETP upgrades during each period. 
7.2.3 The dynamic optimisation problem 
The water quality targets used in this dynamic analysis are same as that in 
Chapter 6, and have to be complied with at all points in time during the period. 
Water quality at the five receptor points is predicted by the system of water 
quality functions. It is based on the low flow conditions in 1996. The original 
water quality target is 30% DO% at 5%ile. Due to the insufficiency of data on 
investment decisions in the past, and lack of evidence for the cost of changing 
water abstraction to achieve water quality improvement; changes in water 
abstraction were not considered in this analysis. The total amount of water 
abstraction was fixed at current levels, although the allocation of abstraction 
between the rivers Ouse and Derwent was still treated as variables. The location 
of effluent discharge was taken as given in the optimisation. It is treated as an 
exogenous variable that only takes two values, corresponding to the two locations 
that might be chosen for effluent discharges. The first is the optimal location of 
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effluent discharge in the UC scenario of Section 6.5: 14.890 km upstream of the 
Trent Falls, just before the confluence of the River Don. The second is the current 
location of effluent discharges in Selby, around 40.7 km upstream from the Trent 
Falls. The dynamic problem considers the impacts of different choices as to 
effluent discharge location, on capital stocks of the ETPs and on the compliance 
with water quality targets. The difference between the optimal and current capital 
stock in the ETPs provides a target for investment, given depreciation and interest 
rates. 
7.3 The dynamic optimum 
The general form of the dynamic optimisation problem is as follows: 
w 
Minimize,, f e-" [C. (k,. ° (t), I; ° (t)) + Costabs (8 , ß2 )+ Cost, ,, (X)]dt (7.4), 0 
S. t. 
QS (t) = 
fs (X, SBOD(a; (k° (t»), Ouse(ß, ), Denv(, ßZ ), Sna(asna (t)), Sand (asQn (t)), Tho(a. o 
(t))) >_ QS 
... (7.5); 
and k,. ° = I; ° - 8,. ° k; ° ... (7.6), 
k1 (0) is given. 
This minimizes the costs of water quality management in the tidal Ouse by 
choice of the level of investment in ETPs through I, a (t) . SBOD 
is BOD5 
discharged from the three industries and two STWs near Selby, which is 
determined by the initial total BOD5 inloads (constant) and the sum of their 
aggregated effluent abatement levels, (BOD5 - a, (K, " )) . The 
BOD5 
discharged from the other three STWs, Snaith (Sna), Sandall (San) and Thorne 
(Tho), is represented by their initial BOD5 inload (constant) and their existing 
abatement levels. The water quality targets a. are set at 30% for 5%ile DO% at 
the five monitoring points. Under some conditions however, this water target has 
to be reduced, as it becomes infeasible. Eq. (7.6) expresses the dynamics of capital 
and investment. Capital stocks change over time, k,. ° , because of 
investment 
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If (t) and depreciation 5, k, ' at any instant of time. At steady state equilibrium, 
Eq. (7.6) implies that k. ° = I0` - k; ''[5,. ° =0, in which k; °' and I; °' are the 
optimal levels of capital stock and investment in each ETP. That says at the 
equilibrium, the capital depreciation is just offset by the new investment to 
maintain the equilibrium level of capital stock. 
The discrete time equivalent of this problem is as follows. 
ý Minimizet 
a 
2: ý pt " [C. ° (k., ° I. ° ,)+ 
Cost (ý3 ýß )+ Cost (X)] (7.7) t tt ý t, t abs 1ý 2 mov ý 
t=0 i 
S. t. 
Qs. t = 
, 
)), Ouse(ß ), Denv(ßz ), Sna(asna. t 
), Sand (asan. t ), Tho(a,. tio, t 
)) >_ Q fs, t 
(X, SBOD(a;, (k, ' 
... (7.8); 
and k; 4r+ k i- ; at =I' :-S; 
°k; °t . (7.9), 
k°p given. 
In both the continuous and discrete time problems, water abstraction levels and 
effluent discharge locations were treated as constant over time to simplify the 
situation. A time horizon of 10 years and a discount rate of 4.5% annually (UK 
average in the same period) was adopted for the dynamic optimisation, and the 
capital depreciation rate was assumed to be 2.5% annually across the industries 
and STWs (taken from the industries and STWs). At the end of the 10 years, all 
the costs from the date onwards were summed up through integration. 
To render the problem tractable, the objective was reduced to the minimization 
of the annual cost of water quality management. The capital stock and investment 
level corresponding to the minimized annual cost were then assumed to give the 
steady state equilibrium for capital stock and investment. This offers a rough 
approximation of the real dynamic equilibrium. The problem solved using GAMS 
was of the form: 
Minimizefl C(k; 
, 
1Q)-I-COSta6s(A 
9 Y2) 
+COStmov(X) "ý7.10ýý 
Si. 
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Qs 
= 
fs (X, SBOD(a; (k; a )), Ouse(ß1), Derw(ßz ), Sna(asaa ), Sand (asaa ), Tho(arna )) >_ Q9 
... (7.11); 
and 1' = 8, °k,. ° ... (7.12). 
Objective Eq (7.10) is similar to Eq (7.4) but without integration over time. 
That is, it solves a current rather than a present-value problem. Capital stocks, 
investment and abatement are all solved for the steady state, as is the constraint 
function for water quality. Eq (7.12) simply requires investment to be equal to 
depreciation in order to hold the capital stock at the equilibrium level. 
The main purpose of the exercise is to make it possible for policy scenarios 
analysis. Scenario 1 analyses the equilibrium levels of capital stock in the ETPs 
when the UWWTD requirement was applied to the STWs. Scenario 2 assumes a 
step up from scenario 1 in which the inload of BOD5 to all the ETPs is increased 
by 50%. In the first two scenarios, the effluents from the Selby sources are 
discharged at 12.472 km upstream from the Treat Falls, as suggested under the UC 
scenario in Chapter 6. In scenario 3, the effluents of Selby sources are discharged 
from their current locations. 
7.3.1 Scenario 1: Dynamic optimisation with the UWWTD 
constraint 
The UWWTD requires STWs to apply secondary treatment to effluent before 
discharge unless is exempted. This is not just to address DO consumption in the 
river water but also to protect the river system from eutrophication caused by 
nitride and phosphorous compounds. In the scenario 1, the UWWTD requirements 
for the STWs were adopted. Abatement of BOD5 in the ETP of each STW was 
required to be no less than their current levels, so the water qualities in the rivers 
Aire and Don will be maintained. The Selby effluents were discharged 14.890 km 
upstream of the Trent Falls and the total water abstraction level in the catchment 
was fixed. 
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Under this scenario, the dynamic equilibrium for the capital stock and 
investment in each ETP, derived from the solution to Eq (7.10) subject to Eqs 
(7.11) and (7.12) was similar to that in static analysis 6.3.3, shown in Tables 
7.1-7.3. The BOD5 in STWs at the dynamic equilibrium a; was abated at the 
current levels. The abatement level required for the ETPs of the industries is 1.082 
t/d BOD5 removals, the same as that under the UC scenario in Chapter 6. Water 
quality in this scenario was much better than current in the tidal Ouse and its 
tributaries in a low flow year such as 1996, and saw a saving of £270k over the 
£4.936m current cost of effluent abatement. 
No change in the capital stocks of the ETPs in the STWs is required at this 
dynamic equilibrium, since abatements are maintained at current levels. On the 
other hand, the steady state capital stocks of ETPs in the industries are less than 
current. In other words, the conclusion is similar to that reached under the UC 
scenario in section 6.3.2, which highlighted the possible saving in costs and 
significant water quality improvement if the effluent discharges from Selby were 
relocated to14.890 km upstream of the Trent Falls. 
Table 7.1: Dynamic equilibrium with UWWTD 
Industry 
A 
Industry 
B 
Industry 
C STW A 
STW B STW C STW D STW E 
K, ° 0.590 0.590 0.590 4.306 6.557 4.173 41.479 8.939 
I; ° 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.108 0.164 0.104 1.037 0.223 
a; 1.082 1.082 1.082 0.599 1.955 0.498 7.902 2.954 
C; 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.263 0.395 0.255 2.360 0.533 
Ouse m3s 1 Derwent m3s 
) X 
0.637 3.530 14.890 
Table 7.2: Water qualities at monitoring sites with UWWTD (Dynamic) 
Site Selby Lon Drax Boothfe Bridge 
Cell Q180 Q192 193 Q197 Q199 
DO% 30.000 34.231 33.969 32.481 30.000 
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Abatement Abstraction Relocation Total 
Cost m£ 3.921 5.541 0.746 10.208 
7.3.2 Scenario 2: Dynamic optimisation with increased 
BOD5 load 
One of the advantages of an integrated river policy is that the STWs and 
industries would be able to increase output using current abatement facilities. This 
is because the policy makes better use of the assimilative capacity of the river. 
This section aims to predict the consequent variation in abatement levels and 
capital stock of the ETPs in the industries and STWs at Selby if the total inload of 
BOD5 to the ETPs increased by 50%. This is an approximation for increasing 
pollution due to industrial growth, population growth and economic development 
in the river basin. 
In this scenario, the effluent discharge location is the same as in scenario 1, so 
is the total water abstraction. UWWTD requirements were also applied to the 
ETPs in the STWs. The optimal level of capital stock K° and investment I; ° are 
listed in Tables 7.4-7.6, along with the resulting water qualities at the monitoring 
sites, and river management costs. 
Table 7.4: Dynamic equilibrium with 50% BOD increase 
Industry 
A 
Industry 
B 
Industry 
C STW A 
STW B STW C STW D STW E 
K; 1 2.022 2.022 2.022 4.306 6.557 4.173 41.479 8.939 
I; ° 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.108 0.164 0.104 1.037 0.223 
a; 5.981 5.981 5.981 0.599 1.955 0.498 7.902 2.954 
C; 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.263 0.395 0.255 2.360 0.533 
Ouse m3s 1 Derwent m3s ý X 
0.671 3.496 14.890 
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Table 7.5: Water qualities at monitoring sites with 50% BOD increase (Dynamic) 
Site Selb Long Drax Boothferry Bridge 
Cell 180 Q192 193 Q197 199 
DO% 30.000 34.529 34.279 32.525 30.000 
Table 7.6: Cost of river management with 50% BOD increase (Dynamic) 
Abatement Abstraction Relocation Total 
Cost m£ 4.186 5.541 0.746 10.472 
The results indicate that if the inload of BOD5 were increased by 50%, then at 
the equilibrium the STWs would still retain their current abatement levels at the 
dynamic equilibrium. However, the ETPs in the industries would be required to 
abate at a level of 5.981 t/d BOD5. This is still less than their current abatement 
levels. In 2004, the BOD5 abatement from the three industries in Selby was 19 t/d 
in aggregate, I t/d more than that suggested in Table 7.4. For all ETPs in the 
STWs and industries, the equilibrium abatement level under scenario 2 would be 
18 t/d BOD5 more than that required in the scenario 1, while a 50% increase 
implies an extra 20 t/d BOD5 in the inload to the ETPs. Therefore, by integrated 
management the river system absorbs an extra input of nearly 2 t/d BOD5, a third 
of the total BOD5 discharge from the Selby industries. Water qualities at the 
monitoring sites comply with the stringent water quality target in a low flow year, 
whilst the demands of growth in industry, population and economic output are 
satisfied. With 50% more BOD5 inload, the minimal annual abatement cost in 
scenario 2 was about £265k more than that under scenario 1. The minimised cost 
under scenario 2 from an integrated river management solution is equivalent to the 
current abatement cost in industries and STWs, a scheme that fails to comply with 
the water quality target with current BOD5 inload. 
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Figure 7.1 The simulated DO% of tidal Ouse under scenario 2 
Figure 7.1 shows the simulation from the QUESTID model, for the DO% in 
the tidal Ouse under scenario 2. The purple line is DO% under the current 
abatement conditions while the brown line shows the improvement in DO% 
achieved under this scenario 2 with integrated management. The DO% simulated 
by the QUESTID model is slightly better than the prediction from the water 
quality functions, which was slightly above 30% DO% along the whole length of 
the river. Relatively low DO% occurred around Selby and downstream of 
Boothferry Bridge. Therefore it is reasonable to believe that the system could cope 
with a 50% increase in the BOD5 inloads in all the major sources to the tidal Ouse 
and still maintain the water quality in the tidal Ouse. 
7.3.3 Scenario 3: Dynamic optimisation with current 
discharge locations and current abstraction levels 
The last scenario to be discussed assumes that effluent from the industries and 
STWs in Selby are discharged at their current locations around Selby. Water 
abstraction from the rivers Ouse and Derwent are also fixed at current levels, so 
increasing abatement from the ETPs is the only option to improve water quality 
under this scenario. The UWWTD requirements are applied to all STWs as 
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before. The solution under this scenario identifies capital stocks of the ETPs in the 
industries and STWs that meet water quality targets through effluent abatement 
alone. A comparison between scenarios then reveals the different impacts on water 
quality and management costs of an integrated river policy versus current 
regulation. As they are now the only option to improve water quality, the BOD5 
abatements required in the ETPs are higher than in other scenarios, and more 
investment is required. The results are reported in Tables 7.7-7.9. 
Table 7.7: Dynamic equilibrium with discharge in Selby 
Industry 
A 
Industry 
B 
Industry 
C 
STW A STW B STW C STW D STW E 
K,. ° 3.000 3.000 3.000 4.306 6.557 4.173 41.479 8.939 
Iia 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.108 0.164 0.104 1.037 0.223 
ai 7.549 7.549 7.549 0.599 1.955 0.498 7.902 2.954 
Ci 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.263 0.395 0.255 2.360 0.533 
Ouse m3s' Derwent m3s"' X 
0.637 3.530 40.700 
Table 7.8: Water qualities at monitoring sites with discharge in Selby (Dynamic) 
Site Selby Lon Drax Boothfe Bridge 
Cell 180 192 Q193 Q197 Q199 
DO% 15.000 23.311 26.129 37.770 37.381 
Table 7.9: Cost of river management with discharge in Selby (Dynamic) 
Abatement Abstraction Relocation Total 
Cost m£ 4.362 5.541 N/A 9.903 
It should be stressed that the water quality target under this scenario is less 
stringent than in other scenarios. The original water quality target for 5%ile DO% 
over 30% was not applied because the BOD5 abatement required was so high that 
almost no BOD5 could be discharged. Part of the problem is that the predictions of 
the simplified system of water quality functions were inaccurate when the BOD5 
discharge from the industries was very low, as it was not calibrated on data with 
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low BOD5 discharge. To avoid these difficulties, a water quality target of 15% 
DO% was chosen for this scenario. The water quality around Long Drax was still 
struggling to reach the 30% due to the persistent DO consumption due to effluent 
discharge, but water quality became much better at Boothferry Bridge after the 
dilution effects from the Aire and Don tributaries. Heavy DO sag that is sufficient 
to prevent the return of salmon, could be seen around Selby and Long Drax even 
after a significant improvement in BOD5 abatement. 
The required BOD5 abatement in the ETPs of STWs were, as before, due to the 
constraint of the UWWTD, while the industries were required to abate much more 
BOD5 under this scenario than before. Specifically the industries in Selby were 
required to abate 22.647 t/d BOD5 from an aggregate BOD5 inload of 25.509 t/d. 
This is equivalent to an aggregate effluent discharge of only 2.8 t/d BOD5 for the 
three industries, about a half of their current discharges. 
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Figure 7.2 The simulations of DO% in the tidal Ouse (a) under current effluents 
conditions; (b) under the dynamic equilibrium of scenario 3; (b) without BODs 
discharge from all the Selby sources; and (d) without BODs discharge from the Selby 
industries. 
The increased abatement requirements under this scenario imply higher 
investment in ETPs. Since the abatement cost function was derived from the data 
on STWs (due to data shortage discussed in 7.2.2), the abatement costs for the 
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industries are not precise. However comparison between abatement costs under 
the different scenarios nevertheless sheds light on the problems faced by the Selby 
industries. Under this scenario, the annual abatement cost of ETP in each industry 
was 0.185 m£, 50% more than the cost under an integrated river management 
scenario which handled a 50% increase in BOD5 inload and still complied with 
the 30% DO% targets. Furthermore, under the scenario 3, the water quality target 
of 30% DO% was not attainable, as shown in the Figure 7.2 of the QUESTSID 
simulations. 
Figure 7.2 simulates the 5%ile DO% in the tidal Ouse under different 
conditions when the effluents are discharged at Selby without relocation. The 
brown line predicts DO% under current discharge conditions, which would result 
in very severe DO sag around Selby and Long Drax in low flow years. The DO% 
in the worst area would fall to just 5% due to the DO consumption of pollutants. It 
could be improved to 20% DO% under optimum abatement as shown by the blue 
line (the simulation from QUESTSID model is higher than the prediction from 
the derived system of water quality functions). This is slightly higher than the 
15% DO% target but still remains poor quality and prevents the return of salmon. 
The orange and purple lines indicate the best possible DO% that could result if 
there was no BOD5 discharge from the industries in Selby or no BOD5 discharge 
from all the Selby sources, including the industries and Barlby and Selby STWs. 
As indicated by the orange line, the consequent 5%ile DO% was still significantly 
less than 30% even when no BOD5 was discharged from the industries. This 
implies a 100% abatement of the BOD5 inload, which is far beyond the 
capabilities of current ETPs in Selby. The purple line, which resulted in just about 
30% DO%, assumed the BOD5 discharges from the Bariby and Selby STWs could 
also be completely removed. Therefore, the QUESTSID simulations produce a 
very clear indication that with the current discharge locations in Selby, it is not 
economically practical to achieve the target of 30% DO% in the tidal Ouse in low 
flow years such as 1996. 
Although the total costs under scenario 3 are somewhat lower than those in 
other scenarios, this scenario may not be favourable to either the EA or the 
industries. Even for an unacceptable water quality target to the EA, 15% DO% at 
189 
Chapter 7 Dynamic Optimisation 
Tao Wang 
5%ile, more than 94% of BOD5 inload has to be abated in the ETPs of industries. 
This requires a higher efficiency of BOD5 treatment than is currently in operation 
in any industrial ETP. Current technologies applied in the industries are unlikely 
to achieve this target. If new abatement were to be adopted in the future, the costs 
could be much different to the cost function derived from current data. The 
practical and management difficulties in installing new ETPs should also be taken 
into account when comparing the different scenarios. Even more than that, the 
reduced DO% target will probably not be acceptable to other interested parties. 
7.3.4 Shadow Costs of Water Quality 
As shown by table 7.8, under scenario 3 the only binding water quality target 
constraint was at cell 180 in Selby. As a result, for the dynamic equilibrium of 
scenario 3, we have As =0 (the shadow cost of water quality equals zero) for all 
the four points except for A, at cell 180. This simplifies the calculation of the 
shadow cost of water quality. This is mainly due to the geographic location of 
effluent discharges from the Selby sources. For similar reasons, the calculation of 
As at the dynamic equilibria under scenario I and scenario 2 can also be 
simplified9. Since the dynamic equilibria of the three scenarios were actually 
approximated by the static system defined by Eqs. (7.10) - (7.12), the only 
non-zero 2 under each scenario can be estimated approximately from the first 
order necessary conditions of static optimisation. This is so because the marginal 
cost of abatement aC, ' (") / aa, and the marginal effect on water quality of 
abatement Of, *(. ) / aa; can be calculated. The estimated shadow prices of water 
qualities at the binding points under different scenarios is 0.023 m£/DO% at cell 
199 under scenario 1,0.074 m£/DO% at cell 199 under scenario 2, and 0.037 
m£/DO% at cell 180 under scenario 3. The values of shadow prices indicate the 
changes which would arise in the minimized cost of river management under 
9 Under the scenario 1 and 2, both cell 180 and cell 199 are binding. But under these two 
scenarios, the effluents of Selby were discharged from 12.472km upstream of the Trent Falls. 
According to the transfer coefficients matrix shown in section 3.4.3, the effluents would have no 
effects on the water quality at Selby, which means of eo (") / aa1 =0 for Selby. This produces 
the situation in which 1] A" 
afs+ O_" af, 
99 
(") 
= 
aci* O 
for scenario 1 and 2. 
SS aa, 
99 
aa; aa; 
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these scenarios, if a small change were to be made in the water quality target. It 
should be pointed out that the water quality target was 30% at 5%ile for scenarios 
1 and 2, but only 15% at 5%ile for scenario 3, (recall that there is no change in the 
location of effluent discharges from the Selby sources under scenario 3. 
7.4 The investment path 
The equilibria discussed above are, as explained, not the exact dynamic 
equilibria but rough approximations obtained by solving a current-value cost 
minimisation problem instead of a present-value problem. The equilibria found by 
this method would only be accurate if discounting could be ignored, which is 
often not the case. Although the current-value estimations of the above three 
scenarios do provide estimates of the equilibria for capital stocks and investment 
levels, they do not give information about the saddle patterns; neither do they 
provide information regarding the interdependent variation in capital and 
investment. In order to investigate these dynamic characteristics of capital stocks 
and investment levels, and to identify the saddle arms of the equilibria, the 
analysis below tries to solve the dynamic system described by Eqs (7.4) - (7.6), 
i. e. the system of equations which describes the discounted net present-value of 
cost rather than current-value of total cost. The dynamic system can only be 
solved analytically when simplified cost and abatement functions are assumed. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the steady state equilibrium of the optimised 
dynamic systems of I, k is saddle-point equilibrium. This implies that the 
dynamic optimum can only be reached by following the stable saddle arm. For the 
dynamic system of If, k, the saddle arm leading to the dynamic optimum 
indicates the optimal investment for each level of capital stock, through which the 
system can approach to the dynamic equilibrium of cost minimisation. This stable 
saddle arm is therefore regarded as the optimal investment path, i. e. the 
investment level to be allocated at any time to reach the steady state equilibrium 
of the dynamic system. 
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In this section, I will try to identify the optimal investment path which the 
Selby industries should follow to manipulate the capital stocks of their ETPs 
following the dynamic equations that describe the variation of I; ', k/ . Changes in 
the STWs were not considered because of the constraints of the UWWTD. The 
three industries in Selby were treated identically in the proceeding analysis, 
therefore the dynamic system for their investment and capital status are identical, 
and so are their investment paths. As explained in Chapter 4, the dynamic systems 
described by , it ,k and 
I; ' 
, 
k; ' describe the same dynamic change through 
different variables and thus portray the same change on different phase planes. To 
give more concrete results, we choose the dynamic system of I; ', k; for the 
analysis. Since abstraction was treated as static variable, the capital and 
investment in the dynamic analysis are for abatement only, j=a. Other factors 
such as water abstraction, STWs abatement and Selby effluent discharge location 
were assumed unchanged from their current-values as in scenario 3. This is for 
two reasons: (a) the capital stock for Selby industries would be higher than 
current, as discussed in 7.3.3, hence there is a demand to upgrade abatement from 
current levels, hence the optimal investment path is of interest; and (b) due to the 
water quality recovery after effluent discharge, the water quality target was 
binding only at cell 180 in Selby, making the calculation simpler. 
7.4.1 Dynamic equilibrium of I, `7 and ka 
The first step in analysing the dynamic system of I,. °, k; ° is to locate the 
dynamic optimum of I; ° and k7 . 
This is not available for the dynamic 
optimisation problem described by Eqs (7.4) - (7.6) with the original cost and 
abatement functions. Simplifications to the original cost and abatement functions 
were made in order to make it possible to identify the steady state equilibrium of 
dynamic optimisation. Although this doubtlessly reduces the empirical relevance 
of the results, it does help us to explore the characteristic behaviour of the 
dynamic system, and to investigate the issues confronting the industries. It needs 
to be noted, however, that the results are illustrative only and cannot be used for 
the purpose of policy making in reality. The equation system in I; ", k,. ° describing 
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the dynamics of I; a and ka has been discussed in section 4.3.3. b of Chapter 4 
as following. 
kia =Ia--S, k, a* =F(k; °, I°) ... (4.56) 
1 
r+8 CI äC'()+ ý 
afsý() 
G k° I. ° 4.65 C; (I; a") 
ýý( 
, 
Q) 
ý( , 
+) 
ök° 6., aka 
(", )"" () 
rr 
The dynamic steady state optimum of Ij' and k, ° is the point at which 
I, ' =0 and k, ° = 0. This cannot be solved without knowing the value of 2, . 
This problem must therefore be solved numerically with the values of the shadow 
costs of water quality at the five points to find the dynamic optimum. However, 
the shadow price of water quality at the dynamic optimum described by Eqs. (7.4) 
- (7.6) cannot be calculated directly as was described in 7.3.4 for situations in 
which is actually a static equilibrium. For cell 180 in Selby under scenario 3, it 
gives f180(") = 15. Putting this together with the equations (4.56) and (4.65), 
x, 80, Ii * and k; °` could be found, if the following simplifications made to the 
cost and abatement functions of industries: 
(a) the abatement cost function specified by Eq (7.3) is simplified as below: 
C; ° (K,. ° , I; 
°) =-0.320+ 0.6 ln(K °) + 0.07 ln(1 °) , (R 
2=0.874) 
... (7.13), stedv: 0.520 0.078 0.492 
and 
(b) the effluent treatment capacity function for the ETPs in the industries, Eq 
(7.1) is replaced by a simplified function, in which the effluent treatment 
capacity is a linear function of the capital value of ETPs, 
aid (Krnd) = 0.69 +1.641*Kind (R2 = 0.915) ... 
(7.14). 
stedv: 0.400 0.000 
The simplifications are assumed to allow simpler forms of derivatives so the 
system of equations could be solved. The cost function accordingly takes a 
simpler form than in Eq (7.3). Substituting Eqs (7.13) and (7.14) into (4.56) and 
(4.65), and setting f, so () = 15, the optimal values of I, *, k, *, 1., ao and ui 
for the Selby industries were calculated as in Tables 7.10 and 7.11. 
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Table 7.10: Dynamic Optimum of River Management Options 
Tao Wang 
Industry 
A 
Industry Industry 
BC STW A STW B STW C STW D STW E 
4.180 4.180 4.180 4.306 6.557 4.173 41.479 8.939 
0.105 0.105 0.105 0.108 0.164 0.104 1.037 0.223 
a; 7.549 7.549 7.549 0.599 1.955 0.498 7.902 2.954 
ý[, -0.670 -0.670 -0.670 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Ouse (m3s 1 Derwent m3s 1 X 
0.637 3.530 40.700 
Table 7.11: Water qualities at monitoring sites (Dynamic Optimum) 
Site Selby Long Drax Boothferry Bridge 
Cell Q180 Q192 Q193 19 Q199 
DO% 15.000 27.847 30.859 42.451 41.994 
As 0.03310 0 0 0 0 
The results suggest that at the dynamic optimum, capital stocks and investment 
levels for the three industries in Selby are identical, with identical abatement 
levels at 7.549 t/d BODS, as in scenario 3. The STWs abatement was fixed at their 
current level, as was water abstraction from the Ouse and Derwent. Effluent from 
Selby sources was discharged at their current locations which is about 40.7 km 
upstream of the Trent Falls. The industries' abatement levels were same as those 
in scenario 3 because they were both determined by the binding water quality 
condition flg0 (") = 15 . 
The two analyses produced different values of . 2,180 
however, because of the changes in the cost functions and the differences between 
the static and dynamic optimisation. At the dynamic optimum 
"1.180 = 0.037 m£/DO%, implying a cost increase of 0.037 m£ for the water quality 
management if the water quality target at Selby were set higher at the margin. 
The shadow price of capital accumulation in abatement, u, *, represents the 
price of one extra unit of capital stock at the dynamic optimum in units of 
10 The value of Bo is different to that under scenario 3, which 
is 0.037 m£/DO%. This is due to 
the simplified cost abatement functions (7.13) and (7.14). 
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current-value cost at the time of equilibrium. It is the imputed marginal value of 
state variable, in this research the capital stock of abatement k; , which is equal to 
the marginal increase to the current-value of minimum cost that incurred to the 
industry when the capital stock of abatement k; °` increases by a small amount. At 
the dynamic optimum of this research, uu = -0.627 , 
implying that the 
current-value cost of pollution abatement would be roughly 0.627 m£ less for each 
I m£ more capital stock of abatement made in the ETP. However, this is the cost 
saving to the industry only, not taking into account the environmental cost of 
water quality at the same time caused by pollution. Therefore the value of , u; 
°' at 
the dynamic optimum should be so to equate the internal and external rate of 
return of capital as indicated by the equation below, taking into account the 
environmental cost of water quality, which was explained in details in the section 
4.3.2 of Chapter 4: 
1 
. (aC; 
(-) 
-1] 'j, 
als ('))- 
ý° ak; s ak; 
°=r (4.63). 
Doubtless that the simplifications made have weakened the results. For the 
same reason, the cost of integrated river management under the dynamic optimum 
was not evaluated. Nevertheless, the results do enable us to explore the stability of 
the real dynamic equilibrium of integrated water quality management. 
7.4.2 Stability of dynamic optimum 
Equations (4.56) and (4.65) form a2x2 simultaneous system of differential 
equations for the investment and capital stock. Since this system is non-linear, we 
can only investigate the local stability of the steady state equilibrium using the 
linearization method (Gandolfo 1997). The method of linearization has been 
discussed in Section 4.3.3. After linearization, the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic 
system defined by Eqs (4.56) and (4.65) is represented by 
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Figure 7.3 The phase plane of investment and capital stock for the ETPs in Selby 
industries 
=o 
At the dynamic optimum, the value of each element of the Jacobian matrix can 
be calculated as below, 
all =-S, ' -0.025, 
a12 = 
z a2C.. - 
a21 =ýý°ýIiý) 1 (ýýs 
af ý) 
s_, 
ý'))=0.083, 
ak, ' ak, ' 
a22 =r+, 5,1 = 0.070. 
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The determinant of the Jacobian matrix is 
det A= a a22 - a12 a21 = -0.085 < 0, therefore the non-linear differential system 
has a saddle-point equilibrium in the neighbourhood of steady state point, which 
is regarded as the optimum of water quality management scheme in 7.4.1. The 
phase plane representing the dynamics of investment and capital stock is 
displayed by Figure 7.3. This phase plane was produced by Maple 8, and 
describes the motion of the system for different combinations of existing capital 
stock and on-going investment. Trajectories in the phase plane portrayed the 
changes in the investment and capital stock from each initial combination (i,, k; ) 
following their motion equations (4.56) and (4.65). 
Trajectories in the phase plane are indicated by the blue arrows in Figure 7.3, 
while the two black lines show the isoclines of i=0 and 
k=0. Their 
intersection at (4.180,0.105) is the dynamic optimum of investment and capital 
stock of the ETPs. The maximum level of capital stock in ETPs is 
k;. ' 
,=4.795 since total 
BOD5 abatement cannot exceed total BOD5 inload. Each 
point in the phase plane represents a combination of capital stock and investment 
level for the ETPs. The two isoclines I=0 and k=0 divide the phase plane 
into four sections each of which produces different directions of change. 
According to the properties of saddle-point equilibria (Gandolfo 1997; 
Xepapadeas 1997; Barro and Sala-i-martin 1999), only one investment path will 
eventually converge to the dynamic optimum and only the points initiated 
from 
the path will reach the dynamic optimum by following the motion of trajectory. 
This path is called the stable saddle arm to differentiate it from the unstable saddle 
arm, which moves away from the optimum. The stable saddle arm for the phase 
plane of investment and capital stock in Figure 7.3 reflects the optimal investment 
decisions at each point of time for the ETPs, defining an investment path to the 
dynamic optimum. 
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Because the non-linear system of simultaneous differential equations had a 
saddle-point equilibrium around the neighbourhood of the steady state 
equilibrium, the two saddle arms of the phase plane in Figure 7.3 may be 
determined from the eigenvectors of the linearised simultaneous system (Shone 
2002). The linearised simultaneous system of differential equations for (4.56) and 
a 
(4.65) was defined by Y= A(Y - Y') where Y= 
kä 
and A-= 
a"' a12 
as 
I; azi, azz 
defined in 7.4.2. The stable path of the saddle-point corresponds to a negative 
eigenvalue (Gandolfo 1997), one of the solutions to 
IA- qI(= 0. The solutions 
could be found by solving 172 - (a + a22 )q+ (a11a22 - a12 a21) =0 
... (7.16). 
The two values of 17 for the simultaneous system defined above are 
r7, = 0.314 and '72 = -0.269 . 
Here q, and '72 are the eigenvalues (or 
characteristic roots) of the Jacobian matrix A. Each of the two eigenvalues is 
associated with an eigenvector (or characteristic vector) for the linearised system 
of differential equations. The two eigenvectors are determined from the two 
values of A as below (Gandolfo 1997; Shone 2002). 
The unstable arm r: 
(a1, -r1)(k, " -k,. °')+a12(Ii -I; °*)=0 
or 
a21(k° -k°*)+(a22 -rl, )(1; -Ia*) =0, 
rii r 
az, l - 
[0.339 I 
and the eigenvector is 1 -71 - an for 
l a, Z 
qi -a22 J 
The stable arm s: 
(a,, -'72)(k; ° -k; 
Q")+a,, (I7 -I°')=0 
or 
az, (k,. ° -k; *)+(azz -'/z)iI, 
° 
-I, °`)=0 , 
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and the eigenvector is 11 z1- a or 
a, z 
1 
azi 
iz - a2z 
.ý 
_ 
- 0.1244, 
After simplification, the two saddle arms in the phase plane of Figure 7.3 are 
illustrated in Figure 7.4 together with the isoclines i=0 and k=0 and the 
steady state equilibrium - produced using Maple 8 (Shone 2002). The two saddle 
arms across the steady state equilibrium are marked by the blue line r and red 
lines 
. As discussed before, the line r represents the unstable arm with direction 
away from the steady state equilibrium while line s represents the locus of all 
points moving to the steady state equilibrium following the arrows in Figure 7.3. 
All (i ;, k, 
) pairs along line s will eventually converge to the steady state 
equilibrium following the direction indicated by the arrows. When approaching 
the equilibrium, the motion represented by j and k also tends to zero so it 
will, in theory, take infinite time to reach the equilibrium. 
Because of the saddle-point stability of the dynamic steady state equilibrium, 
all other points on the phase diagram will ultimately diverge away from the steady 
state equilibrium, as indicated by the arrows. The probability that the initial state 
of the system happens to be located on the stable arm approaches zero. In a 
controlled system, however, choice of the control variable makes it possible to 
locate on the stable arm. For example, in the phase plane of Figure 7.4, the ETPs 
of the industries could choose their initial investment level freely, so as to position 
the starting point of their investment trajectory on the stable arm s in accordance 
with their initial capital stock. More specifically, if the stable arm for the 
simplified dynamic system was known sufficiently accurately, the linear function 
of the stable arm (by substituting 72 = -0.269 into the function of stable arm 
given above), I; ° = -0.244 " k,. ° + 1.202 could be utilized to find the appropriate 
investment levels corresponding to the various capital stocks ranging from zero to 
k; ° 
,,, ax 
(4.878 m£). 
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Figure 7.4 The saddle arms of steady state equilibrium 
7.5 Conclusion 
4.8 
In this chapter, I investigated the dynamic equilibrium of water quality 
management, minimising the overall cost of water quality management over time 
in the tidal Ouse subject to particular water quality targets. As already mentioned 
in the introduction, the limited dataset and nonlinearity of the system has made the 
analysis in this chapter less rigorous than the conclusions produced from the static 
analysis in Chapter 6. Nonetheless, the analysis in this chapter is still indicative of 
the control problem for improving water quality. It provides a useful discussion of 
the way to develop policy, since there are as yet relatively few studies in this area 
(Xepapadeas 1997; Dellink 2005). The chapter investigated only the most 
common option for improving water quality, abatement in the ETPs of pollution 
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sources. Different scenarios were designed to test the impacts of various 
conditions on the dynamic equilibrium. The chapter also discussed the local 
stability of the steady state equilibrium for the simplified dynamic system and 
identified the stable saddle arm of the saddle-point equilibrium, analysed using a 
simplified "current-value" approach. 
The three different scenarios in section 7.3 discussed three different policy 
options. Not surprisingly, scenario 1 in section 7.3.1, whose conditions are similar 
to the UC scenario in Chapter 6, pointed to similar solutions. In scenario 2, I 
investigated the possible change in the effluent inload to the STWs and industries. 
The chosen 50% increase in the BOD5 inload to all the STWs and Selby industries 
reflected the demands of growth in Yorkshire and Humber area. In the equilibrium 
analysis, the only changes in response to the increased BOD5 inload were found in 
the abatement levels of ETPs in the Selby industries. However, adopting the 
solution of an integrated river policy with relocation of Selby effluent discharge, 
the total abatement of BOD5 required by the Selby industries was still 1 t/d less 
than their current level, and this produced much better water quality than that 
currently observed despite the 50% increase in BOD5 inload. The river also 
absorbed 2 t/d more BOD5 than at present, by following the integrated policy 
solution. In the final scenario, I evaluated the consequence of current policy 
without changing effluent discharge location or water abstraction. This result 
indicated that more abatement would be required from the Selby sources and that 
water quality in Selby would be lower than under the other scenarios. This 
demands higher investment in ETPs and requires the introduction of new 
technology or wastewater management. 
The dynamic optimum for achieving the least total cost of water quality 
management over time was represented by optimal levels of capital stock and 
investment level for the ETPs in the Selby industries, while abatement levels of 
the STWs were constrained by UWWTD. The global stability of the dynamic 
equilibrium could not be investigated, however the local stability around the 
neighbourhood of dynamic optimum was investigated through linearization. The 
Jacobian matrix of the linear approximation suggests that the optimal equilibrium 
is a saddle-point equilibrium, which is only conditionally stable. A method to 
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achieve the stable equilibrium was also discussed following identification of the 
stable saddle arm. Since the industries could (relatively free) select their 
investment level, identification of the stable saddle arm indicates how the initial 
point of investment could be selected, knowing the start-up level of abatement 
capital, to ensure that on-going investment could drive the system following the 
stable saddle arm to the dynamic equilibrium. 
One assumption has to be emphasized before closing the discussion of these 
two chapters. The cost data for effluent abatement were aggregated to yield 
functions for STWs and industries respectively. The situation for the STWs is 
constrained by the UWWTD and the tributaries on which the STWs were located, 
so abatement levels in the integrated policy solution were differentiated for each 
STW according to their own inload. The Selby industries, on the other hand, share 
the same cost function and discharge at almost the same location under all the 
scenarios discussed in these two chapters. This was mentioned in Chapter 6.2.2a 
when deriving the cost function for the Selby industries. They were treated as a 
single source with the same water quality and abatement cost function, although in 
reality the industries have quite different abatement levels and capacities. This 
assumption was applied throughout the analyses in Chapter 6 and 7. In the next 
chapter, mechanisms that allow efficient allocation of abatement responsibilities 
among the sources will be discussed, referring to the different policy instruments 
discussed in Chapter 4. This will allow the integrated river policy to take into 
account the difference between industries. 
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The optimisations in last two chapters are based on the important assumption 
that the industries in Selby have identical effluent abatement capacities and costs. 
Therefore the impacts of their effluents on the river are identical too. This is not 
the case in reality. The assumption simplified analysis of the problem and made it 
tractable given the limitations of the data. From the perspective of the physical 
pollution problem, the assumption is reasonable in that the river at that point is 
close to being completely mixed (Freestone 2001) and the effluents from various 
sources are of similar composition and effect. However, it does leave the question 
of the allocation of pollution burden among the Selby industries, which is to be 
determined for the practical implementation of an integrated river policy in the 
tidal Ouse. 
The results from the static and dynamic optimisations indicate the optimal 
levels of total abatement under various scenarios. The allocation of that abatement 
is not considered in the optimisations but can be achieved through specific policy 
instruments, which will be discussed in this chapter. The policy instruments that 
are discussed most in the literatures are command and control (CAC) and 
market-based instruments (MBIs). The CAC approach is more favoured in the 
current administration and management, but has been accused of lacking 
flexibility and being cost ineffective by many economists (Hanley et al. 1997; 
Tietenberg 2001). The MBIs generally recommended as alternatives to command 
and control involve two policy instruments, emission charges and tradable 
pollution permits (TPP). The MBIs are more flexible in achieving compliance, 
more cost effective and provide a continuous incentive to reduce effluents, which 
make them more appealing to many economists. However, each of these MBIs is 
likely to be problematic in managing water quality in the tidal Ouse. 
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The discussions in this chapter are based on two scenarios, According to the 
discussion in this chapter, the tax and subsidy scheme (TSS) derived from 
emission charge and discussed in the section 4.2.3. b, was considered suitable to 
act as a complementary policy instrument in the tidal Ouse together with the CAC 
approach. The TPP system was believed not to be very suitable to control the 
non-uniformly mixed pollutant along the whole length of a river system such as 
the tidal Ouse, particularly because of the spatial differences along the river length 
and the multiple constraint points on water quality in the river system. The small 
number of industries also makes it difficult for the TPP system to be effective 
(Tietenberg 2006). 
This chapter reviews the general selection criteria for policy instruments, and 
the effectiveness of each instrument within the study setting against those criteria. 
We then discuss the possible implementation of TSS and TPP systems under two 
different scenarios. Finally, the choice of policy instruments is made based on the 
practical feasibility and the potential policy implications investigated. 
8.2 Applications of the policy instruments 
In the following section, I investigate specific instruments for water quality 
management in the tidal Ouse, based on the optimal level of total BOD5 
abatement among the industries obtained from the static and dynamic 
optimisations. The TSS scheme and TPP system are investigated, and their 
advantages and disadvantages are discussed given the criteria for policy 
instrument selection. Two scenarios are considered as representative of the static 
and dynamic optimisation problems to be solved, the UC scenario in the section 
6.3.3 and scenario 3 from the section 7.3.3 (I hereafter call it `the Selby scenario') 
in the dynamic analysis. 
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8.2.1 General criteria for selection of policy instruments 
There has been a controversial debate for decades over the choice of policy 
instrument in environmental management. The instrument that is most commonly 
implemented takes the form of fixed standards and consents. This kind of CAC 
regulates the quantity of outputs or inputs, or the technology used in production 
processes, and is called quantity-based instrument. The other kind of policy 
instrument is economic or price-based incentive instrument, and uses taxes or 
prices to regulate emissions. As they act through market forces to regulate the 
emission and abatement without obligatory commands they are called MBIs 
(Turner et al. 1994; Hanley et al. 1997; Perman et al. 1999). There are also other 
forms of policy instruments such as voluntary regulations and liability rules, and 
moral suasion (Common 1995; Perman et al. 1999), but they are likely to act as 
complementary instruments only. In the case of the tidal Ouse, research has been 
done to explore the possibility of implementation of MBIs, in particular the TPP 
system, for water quality management (Cashman et al. 1999), but no MBI 
instrument has yet been implemented. The current water abstraction license in the 
UK has some of the characteristics of MBIs, as it is tradable among the agents 
taking water from the river, but in reality there have hardly been any trades since 
the license system was introduced. 
The literature suggests that MBIs have considerable advantages over CAC in 
some criteria, such as cost-effectiveness, information requirements, flexibility and 
dynamic incentive. The criteria are as follows: 
" Cost-effectiveness: whether the instrument can reach the target at the least 
cost? 
" Information requirement: what information the instrument requires the 
control authority to posses to effectively use the instrument? 
" Flexibility: capability of the instrument being adapted quickly and cheaply 
to accommodate the changes in economic circumstances? 
" Dynamic incentive: does the instrument encourage the adoption of new 
technologies or new production process to continuously reduce pollution? 
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On the other hand, CAC approaches are not always inferior to MBIs. Here are 
some examples of criteria by which the CAC approaches perform better. 
" Dependability: how reliable does the instrument deliver the desired target? 
" Monitoring and enforcement: feasibility and cost to monitor pollution 
abatement and to enforce compliance. 
" Political acceptability: the distributional effects of instruments. 
" Costs under uncertainty: the cost when the instrument is used with incorrect 
information or when dealing with environmental incidents and hazards? 
In this chapter, the TSS scheme and TPP system are investigated for their 
potential application to the tidal Ouse in delivering the optimal solutions obtained 
from the analysis. It is worth stressing here that when the total amount of water 
abstraction in the catchment is more flexible, the two instruments could also be 
evaluated for inclusion in an integrated river policy to regulate both effluent 
discharges and water abstractions based on their impacts on the water quality, as 
shown in Chapter 4. For simplicity, this chapter only considered the applications 
to effluent discharges. 
8.2.2. Tax and Subsidy Scheme (TSS) 
One important advantage of the effluent charge or tax scheme is its relative 
simplicity in administration and management. The EA only needs to set an 
appropriate tax/subsidy rate for the industries in Selby. The industries will choose 
their own level of abatement according to their abatement cost. In this thesis, 
abatement cost was assumed to be the same across the three industries in the 
absence of industry-specific data, and as a result this leads to the same abatement 
levels among them. This is not the case in reality and the industries will end up 
with different abatement levels. 
There are two disadvantages to the TSS scheme. The first is the financial 
burden it imposes on industry. This is the main concern of the industries, 
particularly in current trading conditions. The second is the uncertainty 
surrounding the water quality obtained from any given effluent tax rate. The 
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effluent tax cannot guarantee water quality without incurring monitoring and 
enforcement costs to the EA that may initially be greater than those incurred in the 
implementation of pollution consents, and the effects are often lagged. Therefore 
it ends up as a 'trial and error' process to find the appropriate effluent tax rate. The 
unique feature of TSS is that it potentially combines tax and subsidy in one 
system, and takes into account the necessary abatement level needed for target 
compliance. The industries either pay a tax or receive a subsidy according to their 
abatement effort in relation to a target effluent discharge level, determined by the 
EA. Under this scheme, industries are encouraged to implement the optimal 
solution. The industries pay taxes on the amount of effluent over the target but 
receive subsidies if they are willing to abate more. Therefore the financial burden 
may be minimized. The industries still have flexibility in choosing the abatement 
level they want, but also have an incentive to adopt more efficient abatement 
technology due to tax saving or subsidy seeking. At the same time, cost 
effectiveness may be achieved, as the TSS is a cost effective instrument. The 
difficulties for the EA arise from the quantification of the appropriate tax/subsidy 
rate and the determination of target effluent discharge level for each industry. 
Following the discussion of policy instruments in sections 4.2.3. b and 4.3.4. a 
in Chapter 4, under both static and dynamic scenarios, the TSS needs set the 
and tax/subsidy rate at each WQM site as shown below: t =-A, 
aaE 0 
tas = -As " 
afs () 
, for effluent discharge or water abstraction respectively. 
In 
alls 
another word, it equals the product of the shadow price of water quality at the 
WQM site and the impacts on the WQM site of increasing effluents or water 
abstraction. For each pollution `source', either effluent discharge or water 
abstraction, the total tax or subsidy to be paid or received is, as defined in these 
two sections above, T,. e = 
(e; 
- e,. °) bi, te, and Ti,, = 
(, 3; - 6°) " di, " tas , 
ss 
where e° and ß,. ° are the target levels of effluent discharge and water abstraction 
for each source, bs and dis are the transfer coefficients indicating the effects of 
effluents and abstraction from site i to the WQM site , defined in section 4.2.2. a. 
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In following analyses, 
of i) 
and 
2f-(-) 
were not evaluated, but we could aEs aH, 
quantify 
aý (-) 
and 
as () 
through the system of water quality functions. As ß, 
aEs 
= b;, and 
0Hs 
= dis 
a 
bis = 
a-s 
and 
aaH 
dis = 
ads ý'ý 
. There ae; aE ß aß, ss 
are 
Tie (ei 
-eiý"b, s "teý, "(e; -e" 
a. fsi") 
ss/ ae; 
Tý -ý(ja -Qý°). a; S 'ras =s 
. (8.2). 
Therefore, the optimal tax/subsidy rate to achieve the water target can now be 
quantified if the shadow prices of water quality at each WQM site are found. The 
shadow prices vary at the static and dynamic equilibria, as we indicate below. 
" TSS under the UC scenario 
The optimal result for the UC scenario was derived from static optimisation in 
section 6.3.3, in which the integrated river policy achieves the water quality target 
at least cost through a combination of management options. As discussed before, 
the three industries were treated identically in the static optimisation under the UC 
scenario, regardless of their specific effluent treatment capacity and effluent 
inloads. This section discusses the introduction of a TSS into the regulating 
system under this scenario, to solve the issue of abatement allocation based on the 
actual situations encountered with the industries. 
Under the least cost solution for the UC scenario, the three industries in Selby 
were required to abate an average of 1.081 t/d of BOD5 compared with their 
current discharges which, in 2004, averaged above 5 t/d. This means less 
abatement effort than their current levels. Once the tax/subsidy rate is determined, 
each industry will choose the effluent discharge level at which its marginal cost of 
abatement is equal to the tax rate. 
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Since none of the industries abstracts a substantial amount of water from the 
river, the total tax or subsidy to each industry was defined by Eq (8.1). The target 
effluent discharge level for each industry e° can be determined by the BOD5 
load to the ETP and the optimal abatement levels required under the UC scenario, 
which is 1.081 t/d. For the same reason discussed in section 7.4.1, under the UC 
scenario cell 199 is the only point at which water quality is a binding constraint on 
the industrial effluent discharges, therefore the shadow cost of water quality at cell 
199 can be determined. According to section 7.4.1, . 1799 = 0.079 m£/DO%. So the 
complete form of effluent tax or subsidy to each industry is 
-0.079 " 
afs () (e. 
- e° 
). In this function, 
ýfeL(-) 
is the marginal effect of ae; 
, 
effluent discharged from site ion the water quality at site s, which can be 
evaluated through the water quality function for cell 199. Under the river flow and 
effluent condition of the UC scenario, 
afs O= 
-0.398 DO%/(t/d BODS), and ae; 
assuming the common abatement costs, the target effluent discharges are 5.499, 
4.438 and 12.329 t/d BOD5 for the industries A, B and C. 
To sum up, under the UC scenario, an effective TSS to meet the water quality 
target at least cost, taking into account the differences among industries, is shown 
below for the three industries in Selby. 
Ti, = 0.031 (e4 - 5.499) for Industry A; and 
Ti, = 0.031 " 
(eB 
- 4.438 for Industry B; and 
Ti, = 0.031 " (ec -12.329 for Industry C. 
Facing this TSS scheme, the industries will choose their abatement levels and 
effluent discharge accordingly. When the cost function of abatement is accurate 
enough, the marginal cost of abatement of each industry at its target effluent 
discharge level should be the same as the tax/subsidy rate it faces. Because of the 
increasing marginal cost of abatement, a rational industry aiming at minimizing its 
abatement cost will choose to abate its effluent at the target level. If the industry 
could mange to abate BOD5 at less cost than predicted, it would abate more to 
209 
Chapter 8 Policy Implications 
Tao Wang 
receive the subsidy. On the other hand, if its marginal cost were higher than the 
function predicted, the industry would choose to pay the tax rather than abate. The 
TSS scheme cannot completely remove the "trial and error" process because of 
the uncertain responses from the industries to the tax and subsidy rate. However, 
the target effluent discharges clearly indicate the desired effluent discharges from 
the perspective of the EA. The industries also have an incentive to reduce their 
abatement cost and to abate more than the required minimum in order to obtain 
the subsidy. Hence the water quality compliance risk could, to some extent, be 
reduced. 
" TSS under the Selby scenario 
For the dynamic equilibrium in the Selby scenario, the story is quite different. 
Although the value of tax/subsidy rate is still determined by the same function and 
the shadow price of water quality has already been found in 7.4.1, the problem 
arises from the increased aggregated optimal abatement level that is required to 
comply the water target, 22.647 t/d BOD5, In average, that is 7.549 t/d BOD5 for 
each industry, which exceeds the BOD5 inloads to their ETPs for two of the three 
industries. Therefore it is impossible for the industries with less BOD5 inloads to 
reach the average abatement level if they were so required. 
In this case, equal abatement levels across the industries are inefficient and 
impossible. Since the total abatement of BOD5 effluent under the Selby scenario is 
22.647 out of a total 25.509 t/d BOD5 inload, a 90% removal rate is assumed. 
Each industry was required to abate 90% of their BOD5 inload to comply with the 
abatement target of Selby scenario. Under the Selby scenario, the binding point on 
water quality is around Selby at cell 180. The shadow price of water quality under 
this scenario has been evaluated in section 7.4.1, at 0.037 m£/DO%. The marginal 
effect of effluent discharge from site i on the water quality at site s is 
afs ýý 
= -1.201. Therefore the TSS based on the uniform 
90% removal from the 
äe, 
industries is shown as below. 
Ti, = 0.044 (e4 - 0.658) for Industry A; and 
Ti, = 0.044 (eß - 0.552) for Industry B; and 
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Comparing the TSS tax/subsidy rates under these two scenarios, the industries 
are subject to higher tax for their excessive effluent discharges (and higher 
subsidies for extra effort to reduce effluent discharges) under the Selby scenario 
than the UC scenario. 
The discussions of TSS under the static UC scenario are also applicable to the 
dynamic equilibrium under the Selby scenario. The industries were treated more 
equally in the Selby scenario as they remove the same percentage rather than same 
amount of BOD5, but the aggregate cost is higher because they are at different 
levels of marginal cost of abatement. When effluent is discharged at Selby under 
this scenario, the industries have to abate most of their BOD5 inloads to comply 
with their target effluent discharge levels. Instead, if an industry is unable to 
improve its ETP performance, either because of the large capital investment 
required or because its abatement level is already high, they may choose to pay 
the tax for excessive effluent, compromise the water quality as a result. 
8.2.3. Tradable Pollution Permit (TPP) System 
Along with TSS scheme, the TPP system is another MBI for environmental 
policy. A detailed comparison of the two MBIs in theory has already been offered 
in Chapters 2 and 4. One of the advantages of the TPP system prior to the TSS 
scheme is its certain outcome with regard to the environmental target. Unlike a 
regulation on the rate of tax or subsidy, the TPP system directly controls total 
pollution level by the amount of permits issued. Therefore introducing the TPP 
system into the river policy for the tidal Ouse will ensure the total effluent 
discharges from the sources match the target level, without "trial and error" 
readjustment unless the water target itself changes. 
But the TPP system also requires particular conditions in order to work 
effectively, such as low transaction costs, and a reasonably large number of 
potential traders in the permit market. In the case of the tidal Ouse, if only 
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industrial effluent discharges are involved, the transaction costs of permit trade 
may be small, because the industries are closely located and know each other well. 
However the permit market may be too thin to operate effectively (Tietenberg 
2006). It is possible to expand the TPP system to the two STWs around Selby or 
even to those in tributaries, but the UWWTD constraint and their diverse impacts 
on the water quality will add complexity to permit trading. This will be discussed 
with the specific examples of UC and Selby scenarios. 
It should be stressed that the TPP systems in the static and dynamic analyses 
are different. Although the method of permit allocation would be the same, the 
price of permits reflects the different values of permits in the static and dynamic 
cases. This has been discussed in section 4.3.4. b of Chapter 4. The price of 
pollution permits in the static case is the same as the tax rate needed to achieve the 
same target, but is different in the dynamic case, where P" = t; /r. 
If permits are issued for each WQM site, the equilibrium price of permits for 
each WQM site is P' _ -A 
ifs O 
and Pos" = -Aof 
O 
for effluent and es s öE s äH SS 
abstraction permits respectively, identical to the tax/subsidy rate for each WQM 
site in 8.2.2. They become P' =- 
ýS afs () 
and P' _- 
AS afs () 
in the 
es r oE5 °s r OHs 
dynamic case. Consequently, the equilibrium prices of pollution permits for each 
source under the static analysis are equal to the sum of prices at each WQM site 
weighted by their transfer coefficient. Therefore, we have 
Pe; =Zbi, -PPS = -A, . 
afs() 
... (8.3), 
s5 
0e1 
is pq5 " 
>2 afs (") =S 
s a, o, 
. (8.4). 
If the pollution source has impacts on more than one WQM site, this 
complicates trading because traders have to acquire pollution permits from each 
WQM site they affect. The dynamic equilibrium prices of the pollution permits 
are determined in the same way as their static counterparts, as discussed above. To 
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simplify the process, a Pollution Offset (PO) system as discussed in section 
4.2.3. c may be implemented, in which the permits regulate effluents from each 
source instead of WQM site, and can be traded between sources at a rate 
determined by the impacts of each source on all WQM sites, at which the water 
quality constraint is binding. The rate is defined as in section 4.2.3. c of Chapter 4. 
With the total amount of pollution permit determined by the static optimisation, 
the EA could either distribute them to the industries for free (grandfathering) or 
auction them. 
" TPP under the UC scenario 
Under the UC scenario, no change is suggested to the water abstraction from 
the rivers Ouse and Derwent. The pollution permit thus only refers to the effluent 
discharge permits for the three industries. To make the situation simple, effluent 
permits are assigned to industries instead of to each WQM site, and the trade of 
permits is based on the PO system. The total amount of effluent permits to be 
allocated among the three industries under the UC scenario is not difficult to 
quantify and equals the sum of target effluent discharges under the TSS scheme. 
The total BOD5 discharge permits for the three industries are 22.266 t/d under the 
UC scenario. Either through grandfathering or auction to distribute the permits 
among the industries, the EA can always guarantee that the total effluent 
discharges from the Selby industries match the target levels. 
There is an incentive for the industry to initiate trade of pollution permits if 
they can make cost savings by so doing. Trade will be initiated whenever there are 
differences in marginal abatement costs, and will continue up to the point at which 
marginal costs weighted by transfer coefficient are equalized. Comparing Eqs 
(8.3) and (8.1), the equilibrium price of permits is identical to the tax/subsidy rate 
of TSS scheme at 0.031 m£ for I lid BOD5 discharge from the any of industries. 
The final allocation of permits will match the aggregate effluent discharge target. 
At equilibrium, the three industries will all have the same abatement, if the 
aggregated abatement cost function represented the individual function of the 
industries. Otherwise the industries will choose to abate at different levels 
213 
Chapter 8 Policy Implications 
Tao Wang 
according to their actual individual abatement cost functions. But they will always 
reach the equilibrium with the least aggregated cost. 
Since there is only aggregated effluent from the three industries in the TPP 
system, the situation is considerably simplified because all three discharge at the 
same location. The effluents from the three industries have similar composition 
and affect the same WQM site, cell 199, to the same extent. This facilitates trading 
among the industries, as they can trade effluent permits on the "one-to-one" basis. 
There is also no need to worry about pollution "hot-spots", which is a 
considerable risk associated with TPP systems. In this case trade in permits has no 
spatial impact on water quality. This would be true even if the TPP system were 
expanded to include the Barlby and Selby STWs, which also discharge at the 
same location. But difficulties would arise if the TPP were extended to include 
STWs in other tributaries, or to integrate the water abstraction issue. The details 
are discussed in 8.2.3. c. 
" TPP under the Selby scenario 
The total amount of effluent permit under the Selby scenario is small due to the 
high level of abatement required. Altogether, the effluent permits to be allocated 
among the industries are 2.862 t/d BOD5, only half the BOD5 effluent load from 
the three industries in 2004. Due to the demand for effluent permits and the 
long-lasting effects which are reflected in a dynamic analysis, the equilibrium 
price of effluent permits is much higher than under the UC scenario. 
The price of permits reflects the discounted stream of abatement costs saved by 
the purchase of one effluent permit. The equilibrium price of effluent permit was 
shown in 8.2.3 to be: 
P. _ý_ýs 
al5(ý) 
ý sr öe; 
(8.5) 
Compared with Eq (8.1), P, *, = t; /r, where te; is the tax/subsidy rate of the 
TSS under the Selby scenario. The equilibrium price, therefore would be 0.987 
m£ for 1 t/d BOD5 discharge. 
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Given the high price of effluent permits under this scenario, and given the 
small number of potential traders, one would expect trading to be very thin. So the 
initial allocation from the EA needs to be as close to the optimal allocation as 
possible. Another way to increase the vigour of the thin permits market is to 
expand it to include other major pollution sources, the STWs in Selby and other 
tributaries. This then leads to the same problem associated with the UC scenario, 
which is discussed below. 
8.2.4 Disadvantages of TPP system in the tidal Ouse 
management 
The previous discussions pointed out that in this research the trade of effluent 
permits between the three industries could be on a "one-to-one" basis with no risk 
of creating pollution "hot spots". This is because effluents pre- and post- trade are 
discharged at the same location at the same total amount, and influence water 
quality at the same WQM sites. However, things would be much more 
complicated if this were not the case. Two potential disadvantages of permits trade 
are investigated below. 
a. If the effluent sources of trade involve different locations but still affect 
water quality at the same WQM sites. 
In this case, the situation would be slightly more complicated, but is still 
amenable to the PO rules. This is because the binding point of water quality 
will not change during the trade. The ratio of the trade for effluent permits was 
Pes b, 
s 
defined in section 4.2.3. c of Chapter 4, to be 8, =S Since Pes is ýPes b; 
s S 
nonzero only when the water quality at the WQM site is binding, the rate at 
which effluent permits trade is Cse! = 
b`S 
under the UC and Selby scenarios, b; 
s 
in which site s refers to cell 199 and cell 180 respectively. The Transfer 
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Coefficient Matrix (TCM) developed in Chapter 3 would be the appropriate 
reference for the determination of trade ratio under this situation. 
b. If the effluent sources of trade involve different locations and affect water 
quality at different WQM sites. 
WQM sites are not relevant to the permit trade unless water quality at that site 
is a binding constraint. Here we refer to the situation when new binding WQM 
sites emerges or the binding WQM site changes as a consequence of the trade. 
Since the water quality system is spatially heterogeneous, new pollution from 
industries or STWs in other tributaries are likely to result in the second 
situation. In this case, it is difficult to apply the PO rules to determine the trade 
ratio as the shadow price of water quality at the binding WQM site, P*, 
varies. For example, in the UC scenario, if a new effluent source enters the 
river system at a point upstream of the industrial discharge location around the 
confluence with the river Don, it needs to enter the market by purchasing 
effluent permits from some of the industries. However, if the new effluent 
source only has small impact on the water quality at cell 199, which is binding 
(possibly because it is far from the Boothferry Bridge) but mainly affects other 
WQM sites, say Selby, then a single permit sold by a downstream industry 
must be converted to multiple permits for the various WQM sites affected by 
the new entrant following PO rules. This discharge from upstream would then 
violate water quality targets at upstream WQM sites such as Selby and Long 
Drax well before it could affect water quality at cell 199. This would be the 
same for the Selby scenario in which the industries discharge their effluents at 
Selby. A new entrant downstream will possibly result in water quality 
deterioration at downstream WQM sites. The only way to guarantee water 
quality compliance at all the WQM sites is to check the effects of effluent 
discharge on each WQM site, and to make sure that after the trade the water 
quality will not be deteriorating below the water quality target at each site. 
This would complicate the trading process and make it even less appealing to 
the effluent sources. At the same time, whenever there is new source of 
effluent discharged into the tidal Ouse system, the EA has to re-evaluate the 
impact on water quality at each WQM site. When pollution pressure is 
216 
Chapter 8 Policy Implications 
Tao Wang 
imposed on the new-binding WQM site after the trade, extra action has to be 
undertaken by the EA to remove the excessive permits from the market, which 
is very costly. 
8.3 Conclusion: Policy options for the tidal Ouse 
Neither the TSS nor the TPP system can be introduced into the river policy for 
the tidal Ouse without some difficulty. Although these MBIs have been proved 
theoretically superior to CAC methods in terms of cost saving, information 
requirement, providing incentives etc., (Hanley et al. 1997), they are not 
necessarily as convenient in practice, especially in the control of non-uniformly 
mixed pollutants in a spatially heterogeneous system such as a river or an estuary. 
Taking these factors into account, the appropriate policy instrument can only be 
found on a case-by-case basis. 
The CAC approach is currently most favoured by the EA for the tidal Ouse, 
although its information requirements are large and it is, in most cases, not cost 
effective. Some obvious advantages of the CAC approach to the regulator are easy 
management, simple administration and the certainty of the outcome. It is not 
realistic to advise the EA to abandon the CAC approach for MBIs that offers only 
theoretical advantages in most cases, particularly when successful examples of 
MBI implementation in the water quality management are rare (Hanley et al. 
1998; Cashman et al. 1999). 
We have shown that the TSS and TPP system can not be applied to the problem 
of controlling effluent discharges in the tidal Ouse without difficulty. They may, 
however, be complimentary to the CAC approach, offering more flexibility than 
the current regulations alone. Some successful examples of MBIs have been found 
to work well in controlling air pollution in US and Europe (Tietenberg 2006), but 
there is still no good evidence of the value of such instruments in river pollution 
management. Of these two MBIs, the introduction of the TPP system would be 
more complicated because of the non-uniformly mixed pollutant in the river water 
and the spatial difference of effluent discharges along the river when effluent 
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sources at location other than Selby are included. Section 8.2.3. c investigated the 
disadvantages of implementing the TPP system for water quality management in 
the tidal Ouse, and particularly discussed the difficulties associated with trade 
when water quality constraint were binding at more than a single point. 
Considering the complexity that would be added to the operations of industries 
and the EA, it may be inappropriate to choose the TPP system for water quality 
management in the tidal Ouse. The thin permit market, more or less dominated by 
one large pollution source, and the high price of permits could also be drawbacks 
for the effectiveness of the TPP system. We also conclude from the discussion that 
the PO system, which works well for uniformly mixed pollutants, is capable of 
dealing with non-uniformly mixed pollutant only if one constraint (WQM site in 
our case) is binding, but not practical when there are multiple constraint points. 
The TSS scheme is more manageable for the EA and clearer to the industries. 
Although the uncertainty in the outcome would persist even with accurate 
estimation of abatement cost functions, its negative impact could be minimized by 
the subsidy-seeking behaviour of industries. If the TSS scheme acts as 
complementary instrument to the CAC approach, this uncertainty could simply be 
ruled out by effluent consents on the total discharges. For example a total effluent 
consent for the three industries could be imposed by the EA to ensure compliance 
with the water quality target, while the industries submit a plan estimating their 
average daily discharge over the next year to claim subsidy or pay tax. Therefore 
the EA will be able to have a rough estimation of the next year's effluent 
discharges for the three industries, based on which the EA can approve or reject 
their plans. This kind of combination could guarantee compliance as well as 
offering flexibility in the means of compliance. By setting up their target effluent 
discharges appropriately, the equity issue can also be avoided in the TSS scheme. 
In summary, it appears that for water quality management in the tidal Ouse, the 
CAC approach will probably remain the first choice of the environmental 
authority for the near future, while a TSS may be developed as a complementary 
approach. Other forms of policy instruments, such as moral suasion, can also 
contribute to river policy for the tidal Ouse. There is no panacea for the complex 
issue of pollution management in the estuary. 
218 
Chapter 9 Conclusions and Future Research 
Tao Wang 
Chapter 9 Conclusions and Future 
Research 
9.1 Introduction 
Facing the imminent requirements of the European Water Framework Directive 
(WFD) for water pollution control, one of the priorities of river policy is to 
achieve the required improvement in water quality without incurring 
disproportionate cost. The cost of the WFD was estimated at between £450 and 
£630 million, with an estimated benefit between £105 and £522 million per year 
(Defra and Welsh Assembly Government 2003). Although these ranges are wide 
and values are possibly over- or under- estimated due to uncertainty, the water 
quality improvement in a cost effective manner is a fundamental requirement of 
the WFD. This in turn requires a careful review of the river policy decision 
process to improve regulatory efficiency. 
One of the novel contributions of this research to the literature is the method 
implemented to evaluate the effectiveness of river policy. In contrast to comparing 
the consequences of arbitrary changes in specific activities as different policy 
options, which is normal in scenario analyses, this research aims to provide a 
comprehensive optimisation-based analysis of policy options subject to a given 
target. By taking into account various activities influencing the water quality 
including water abstraction, the integrated optimisation combines their effects 
through inter-linked hydrological and economic models, to determine the optimal 
level required for each activity to achieve the desired target. The optimisation 
results can then be compared to current policy options to assess possible 
improvement in cost effectiveness. The framework combining hydrological and 
economic models to identify the potential for integrated and cost effective river 
management options provides a useful framework for the river policy maker 
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confronted with the forthcoming WFD requirements. The construction of this 
framework and its application to the tidal Ouse catchment has been the major 
objective of this research. The main findings of the research are summarised in 
this chapter, along with potential policy implications that arise from the empirical 
application. 
Despite the call for cost effective policies for water quality improvement, the 
current regulatory regime dominated by a command and control (CAC) approach 
is likely to persist for some time. The tradable permits or allowances schemes that 
are seen more often in the policy of air pollution control are not very suitabl for 
pollution control in river policy. However, as water quality targets becomes more 
and more stringent, the issue of the economic costs of water quality improvement 
has attracted increasing attention, not only from regulated pollutions sources, but 
also from regulatory bodies, as well as the general public. Therefore further efforts 
to develop a comprehensive policy for river catchment management can be 
expected in the near future, together with the integration of water management 
with other policy sectors that have impacts upon the water environment. 
9.2 Main Findings and Conclusions 
In England and Wales, the Environment Agency (EA) has developed various 
hydrological and water quality models to assist on the design of regulation for 
managing rivers, lakes and coastal environments. However, very few economic 
analyses of these regulations have been carried out, neither have economic costs 
been assumed to play an important role in the design of these regulations. Also, 
although various factors that affect the water quality, such as spatial and temporal 
differences in discharge location, changes in water volume and anthropogenic 
disturbances, are typically included in the hydrological models of water quality, 
current regulatory regimes either fail to take these differences into account or 
regulate them in a disjointed manner. This thesis has shown that an integrated 
river policy derived from a combined hydrological and economic modelling 
framework can improve understanding of the water quality management problem 
in a spatially heterogeneous river system. This approach potentially can also allow 
comprehensive analysis of resource distribution for water quality management in 
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the river system. Through this research, the author aimed to address the following 
questions. 
I. Does the current regulatory regime include all the options to tackle the 
water quality problem? If not, are there any other options the regulatory 
regime could, and should, take into consideration? 
2. If the current regulatory regime is inefficient and incurs unnecessary costs 
in water quality management, how do we develop a more cost effective 
river policy? 
3. What are the policy implications of the findings from the analyses? How 
could the current regulatory system of river policy be improved, and in 
which aspects? 
To address the first question, Chapter 3 discusses the effectiveness of the 
current regulatory regime for improving water quality, using the dynamic 
hydrological model QUESTSID for the tidal Ouse. Simulations from the 
modelling indicate that current river policy is unable to comply with the desired 
water quality target during the summer of a typical dry year. Several alternative 
water quality management options are evaluated through simulations. These 
alternative options include changes in the location and timing of effluent 
discharge from the Selby sources and changes in water abstraction levels. These 
options are investigated as potential components of an integrated river policy for 
further analysis. Comparison of their effectiveness indicates that a shift in either 
the location or the timing of effluent discharges from the Selby sources could 
produce significant improvement in the DO% sag experienced in the tidal Ouse, 
while changes in the location or amount of water abstraction are at best considered 
as complementary measures, unable to tackle the DO% sag issue alone. The 
findings from the QUESTSID model simulations suggest that the conventional 
mechanisms for effluent load control could collaborate with some effective 
alternative options to achieve an integrated river policy, which makes good use of 
the assimilative capacity of river water and improves water quality significantly to 
comply with the EA's desired target of water quality. 
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The background theory for cost minimising in pollution control in an integrated 
management policy subject to a particular water quality target is developed in 
Chapter 4. Optimisations are developed for both static and dynamic systems. 
These analyses produce two conditions to be satisfied for a cost effective river 
policy when alternative management options are included. For the static system, 
the ratio between marginal cost of abatement and the marginal effect of abatement 
on water quality should be the same across all the options. This ratio is captured in 
the shadow price of river water quality at the cost-effective equilibrium. For the 
dynamic system, the internal rate of return on investment in the capital stock 
equilibrium for pollution abatement should be the same as the return on 
investment made elsewhere in the economy. The dynamic equilibrium of capital 
and investment is characterised as a saddle point equilibrium, which can only be 
approached by the stable arm. These analyses embed the integration of various 
options for water quality management into a comprehensive river policy, covering 
both effluent discharge and water abstraction, and also taking into account 
variation in the assimilative capacity of the river. These analyses also compare 
three different policy instruments for water quality management: command and 
control (CAC) approach, Tax and Subsidy Scheme (TSS) and Tradable Pollution 
Permit (TPP) system in terms of delivering the required regulation targets among 
the regulated industries in an efficient and practically convenient manner. 
Chapters 6 and 7 apply the static and dynamic optimisations developed in 
Chapter 4 to the tidal Ouse catchment, using the hydrological and economic 
dataset constructed in Chapter 5. Some modifications have to be made because of 
insufficient data, particularly economic data regarding the cost of effluent 
treatment and water abstraction. Chapter 6 considers minimum cost pollution 
abatement in a static system to achieve a particular water quality target. The 
analysis recommends an integrated river policy towards the implementation of the 
WFD in the near future, and it also takes account the requirements imposed 
currently on STWs by the UWWTD, together with more modest and realistic 
suggestions for river policy regulations on the tidal Ouse. Details of the integrated 
river policy are based on the simulations of options laid out in Chapter 3 and 
specific costs evaluated from data in Chapter 5. Options considered are: moving 
effluent discharges downstream, shifting water abstraction between the rivers 
222 
Chapter 9 Conclusions and Future Research 
Tao Wang 
Ouse and Derwent, and effluent abatement on-site. The benefits of implementing 
an integrated river policy for the tidal Ouse include a significant improvement in 
the water quality, compliance with the EA's water quality target even in a dry year, 
together with annual abatement cost savings of £116,000 to the industries and 
STWs. The integrated river policy achieves these outcomes mainly through better 
utilisation of the assimilative capacity of the river. The results also point out 
though, 40% DO% at 5%ile along the tidal Ouse is not achievable with any of the 
alternative options as considered in this research. Higher level of water quality 
however still remains possible given that more effective options could be 
identified in the future. Due to the modifications and assumption necessary to 
make the dynamic analysis of Chapter 7 tractable, the research does not undertake 
a detailed discussion of investment paths and capital stocks for the industries in 
the dynamic setting, but tries to assess the capability of this framework to address 
dynamic management if a future research can be less constrained by data 
availability. Nonetheless, the dynamic analysis still illustrates the mechanism 
required to identify the stable arm of the saddle point equilibrium, and the 
corresponding optimal investment path for the industries and STWs. 
The final question is answered by the discussion in Chapter 8 to some extent, 
as river policy is unlikely to be determined by economic concerns alone. Two 
MBIs, a TSS scheme and a TPP system are discussed in the light of selection 
criteria for policy instruments when applied to the tidal Ouse to allocate effluent 
abatement responsibilities among the industries in Selby. After this comparison, 
the author concludes that the CAC approach will still remain the first choice 
instrument of EA for the near future, but a TSS has the potential to be developed 
into a complementary instrument, which could improve the overall cost 
effectiveness of the river policy. It appears inappropriate to introduce a TPP 
system for the tidal Ouse because of the spatial heterogeneity and multiple 
constraints within the river system. 
9.3 Further Research 
This research has produced a relatively accurate optimisation of river policy in 
a static system and has explored capital and investment interactions within a 
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dynamic system. However, this research is more of a beginning rather than a 
conclusion for the comprehensive framework of river policy analysis, and there 
are several critical assumptions that should be addressed in the future studies. 
The first assumption arises from the use of a common function for the 
abatement cost for the industries or for the STWs respectively. This was necessary 
because insufficient abatement cost data were available for the individual industry 
and STW, and therefore cost data had to be pooled for industries and STWs 
respectively. This was done on the assumption that they followed the same cost 
function because of the similar composition of their effluents and treatment 
technologies. Although the data do not reject this assumption, the subsequent 
optimisations produce the same abatement level and marginal cost for all 
industries as a consequence. This could be improved to reflect individual 
differences among the industries and to make the analysis more meaningful when 
different forms of economic instruments for river policy are indtroduced. This also 
applies to the STWs. If a cost function could be estimated for each STW, the 
optimised abatement levels for STWs could be more reflective of the effluent 
impact and abatement cost of the individual STWs. More data on abatement cost 
from each pollution source would also help us to understand the impacts of the 
technologies used on the abatement cost and effluents. 
The second assumption was stressed in the dynamic analysis of Chapter 7. The 
investment data available for the industries and STWs are insufficient to permit 
accurate estimation for the impacts of investment on the industries and STWs' 
abatement cost functions. More investment data need to be collected from the 
interviews or questionnaires to the industries and STWs in order to produce a 
better representation of the interaction between capital investment and cost in 
effluent abatement. New technologies are also an important factor to consider 
when estimating abatement cost. These improved estimations would generate a 
more precise estimation for the stable saddle arm which leads towards the 
dynamic optimum for capital stock and investment for each industry and STW. 
While more data on investment in abatement capacity remains one constraint 
of identifying the dynamic optimum, the functional forms assumed for the 
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abatement capacity and cost functions are other concerns worth considering. One 
of the problems encountered in the dynamic analysis in this research was the 
inability of the GAMS to identify optimal solutions using more complicated 
nonlinear cost and abatement functions. These constraints could be improved 
through further research with programming assistance. 
This research successfully integrated changes in water abstraction levels 
alongside abatement policies as a means of reducing pollution and improving 
water quality. But the level of aggregate water abstraction from the tidal Ouse was 
not changed in either static nor dynamic optimisations, because of the high 
marginal cost of reducing water abstraction and still meeting the requirement for 
water supply. The alternative water resource options considered in the research 
were provided by experts in the water company, ranked by required water yield 
and average cost of water supply. This situation could change when new 
alternative water resource options are identified, if their costs of water supply 
under these options become low enough to make reduction in water abstraction 
from the Ouse and Derwent an economically viable option to improve water 
quality in the integrated river management. 
Due to the limitations of the water quality model, this research only considers 
effluent impacts from point sources along the tidal Ouse system. This is 
reasonable, given the relatively significant impacts imposed directly by point 
source pollution around Selby and Drax. However, agricultural activities are 
believed to be one of the biggest pollution sources in river systems, particularly so 
for the upland river systems. This is a difficult issue to address because pollution 
arises from the runoffs from diffuse sources. Managing diffuse pollution is also an 
objective for comprehensive integrated river management. The urgency and 
importance of diffuse pollution has been emphasised clearly in many researches 
and national legislations, as well as in the EU WFD (Lewis et at. 1997; European 
Commission 2000; Defra 2003b; Defra 2005c). In England and Wales, diffuse 
water pollution from agriculture accounts for 43% of phosphorus and 60% of 
nitrate in the water body (Amin-Hanjani 2006). The uncertainty and difficulties in 
quantifying diffuse pollution make it very difficult for current regulatory 
frameworks to tackle the problem effectively (D'Arcy and Frost 2001; O'Shea 
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2002). One of the very meaningful challenges to this research is to expand the 
framework from point sources to include diffuse sources from farming and other 
distributed land usage, to better assist decision making in river policy. This would 
require not only a more powerful hydrodynamic model to estimate impacts on 
water quality from diffuse sources, but also changes in the economic decision 
making and behaviour patterns of farmers facing a range of different incentives 
from the regulatory system. Some ground-breaking discussion has arisen 
following Defra's consultations in this area (Anthony 2006). It is to be expected 
that social-economic analysis will play a key role in developing an integrated, 
comprehensive river policy system to cope with the water quality requirements of 
WFD, as well as management of water resources. Rosegrant et al. (2000) used a 
similar approach to manage the water resource in the Maipo river basin in Chile, 
by using a rough model of the economic behaviour of farmers facing different 
management instruments. 
9.4 Policy Implications and Broader Application 
Following the results obtained from this research, the main recommendation 
for river policy in the tidal Ouse is to implement an integrated river policy, which 
includes the main factors affecting the water quality, i. e. both effluent discharges 
and water abstraction, to develop a comprehensive systematic set of regulations 
for the river system. The most cost effective single measure to improve water 
quality in the tidal Ouse would be to relocate the effluent discharges from Selby 
sources (collaborating with changes in levels of effluent discharge and water 
abstraction in the tidal Ouse). TSS could be a useful addition to the current 
regulatory toolkit for the tidal Ouse, helping to deliver integrated and cost 
effective river management options in a more efficient way. 
The framework developed here has combined a hydrological water quality 
model with an economic model to provide a quantitative analysis for the activities, 
which have impacts on both water quality and economic outcomes. The 
optimisation approach used has been able to balance the outcomes of activities 
against specific criteria and targets. This is expected to offer advantages to the 
decision making of river policy to regulate water quality and related activities. 
226 
Chapter 9 Conclusions and Future Research 
Tao Wang 
This framework can also be applied to decision making surrounding other 
environmental issues when both environmental targets and economic constraint 
are present in a spatial setting. For example, this framework could also be used to 
investigate the cost effectiveness of measures for air pollution control, to capture 
the impacts of different pollution mitigation options coordinated in the modeling 
to improve cost effectiveness. Depending on the specific modeling undertaken, 
the framework has considerable breadth of application, which could be explored 
in future research. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Proof of Expression (4.3.3. a) 
Consider a system of generic non-linear, autonomous differential equations as 
Y= F(Y), where Y is an nxI vector and F is a Ix n vector. Let Y` be the 
steady state point of the system. 
Expanding the equation in the first-order Taylor approximation, produces 
(Xepapadeas 1997): 
F. (Y")+ aF(Y") EY, i=1,2,... n ... (Al) av; 
Because at the steady state equilibrium, F(Y") = 0, 
aF(Y`) aF(Y")aF(Y`) 
Y=. Y; Y; . Y; + B, y; EY... (A2) 
where B is alxn vector. 
If we assume that 
öl 
yi 
= ay. , then 
A= 
5 
ýa,, 
azi 
a12 ... 
al 
n 
a22 
... 
a2n 
is the Jacobian 
Lan, a2n ... ann J 
matrix of the function F evaluated at the steady state equilibrium. If the 
equilibrium point in the linear approximation is globally stable, then it is also 
locally stable in the original non-linear system. The converse is not necessarily 
true (Xepapadeas 1997). 
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Substitute, u, j' = -C, (. )into Eq (4.61), it becomes: 
Tao Wang 
1 [-(r + i5j' )"C, G(k; , I; )... (A3 ). ý C() ak`ý SS aki 
The value of element a22 in the Jacobian matrix is then determined as below: 
a22 =ä 
ý)=-C; (")-z {[-(r+S,. '). c; (. )"Cr(")-CGý3ý(")" 
[-(r+sj)ý . c, (. )- 
ac, (")+ýý. 
, 
afs`(>]ý 
ak' s akt! 
(A4), 
where C; (. ) and C,! ') (. ) denote the second and third order derivatives of cost 
with respect to investments in each of the three elements respectively. Since the 
Jacobian matrix of the functions is evaluated at the steady state equilibrium, 
I; =0 when 
I iI =I rj* . 
From Eq (A3), it follows that: 
c; ()-ac; `()+ZA, -, 
fs'(")=o 
ak; s ak; 
Therefore Eq (A4) can be reduced to the function below: 
a22 =aGO =-c; O-z [-(r+5/) C; O C; Oý_(r+8,. 
') 
al' 
I 
(A5). 
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Appendix 3 System of Water Quality Functions 
Estimated through Limdep 7.0 
Estimates for equation: D01 80 
Generalized least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = D0180 Mean= . 1181930748 
S. D. = 10.48815805 
Model size: Observations = 190, Parameters = 6, Deg. Fr. = 1841 
l Residuals: Sum of squares= 912.0611517 , Std. Dev. = 
2.226401 
1 Fit: R-squared= 
. 
954700, Adjusted R-squared = . 953471 1 (Note: Not using OLS. R-squared is not bounded in [0,1] 1 
Model test: F[ 5,184] = 775.56, Prob value = . 
000001 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -418.6232, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -715.64391 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 1.632, Akaike Info. Crt. = 4.4701 
1 Log-determinant of W -4.5483 Log-likelihood . 915.90131 1 Durbin-Watson Stat. = 1.2860 Autocorrelation = . 35701 
i 
Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
Constant -442.0904854 17.187262 -25.722 . 
0000 
LOCATION 1.473521240 
. 
10889670 13.531 . 
0000 27.136842 
LOCA_2 -. 4215780044E-01 . 19716017E-02 -21.383 . 
0000 831.33684 
LOGSBOD -3.603665789 . 
65229110 -5.525 . 
0000 . 00000000 
LOGOUSE 128.2103381 4.3375640 29.558 . 
0000 
. 
00000000 
LOGDERW E 9.220113769 1.4394565 6.405 . 0000 . 00000000 
Estimates for equation: D0192 
Generalized least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
Dep. var. = DO192 Mean= . 
1682783934 S. D. = 11.80294199 
Model size: Observations = 190, Parameters = 6, Deg. Fr. = 184 I 
1 Residuals: Sum of squares= 1146.512735 , 
Std. Dev. = 2.49621 I 
Fit: R-squared= . 955035, Adjusted 
R-squared = . 95381 I 
(Note: Not using OLS. R-squared is not bounded in [0,111 
Model test: F[ 5,184] = 781.62, Prob value = . 00000 I 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -440.3567, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -738.0833 
1 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 1.861, Akaike Info. Crt. = 4.6981 
Log-determinant of W -4.5483 Log-likelihood -915.90131 
Durbin-Watson Stat. = . 8038 
Autocorrelation = . 59811 
i 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error lb/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
Constant -113.4061995 19.270106 -5.885 . 
0000 
LOCATION-. 2811491401E-01 . 12209340 -. 
230 . 
8179 27.136842 
LOCA_2 -. 1988166572E-01 . 
22105312E-02 -8.994 . 0000 
831.33684 
LOGSBOD -9.238499987 . 73133931 -12.632 . 
0000 . 00000000 
LOGOUSE 37.17412156 4.8632138 7.644 . 0000 . 
00000000 
LOGDERWE 23.41763058 1.6138978 14.510 . 0000 . 00000000 
+-- ----_--__ _------------____------------ -_+ Estimates for equation: D01 93 
Generalized least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
Dep. var. = D0193 Mean= . 1731819945 
S. D. = 10.78493647 
Model size: Observations = 190, Parameters = 6, Deg. Fr. = 184 I 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 1060.842202 , Std. 
Dev. = 2.401131 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 
950170, Adjusted R-squared = . 94882 I 
(Note: Not using OLS. R-squared is not bounded in [0,111 
Model test: F[ 5,184) = 701.71, Prob value = . 
00000 I 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -432.9788, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -720.9456 
I 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 1.783, Akaike Into. Crt. = 4.621 
Log-determinant of W -4.5483 Log-likelihood -915.90131 
1 Durbin-Watson Stat. = . 8000 Autocorrelation = . 
60001 
i 
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(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
Constant -79.94286489 18.536174 -4.313 . 0000 LOCATION -. 4241536192 . 11744327 -3.612 . 0003 27.136842 LOCA_2 -. 1072496116E-01 . 21263395E-02 -5.044 . 0000 831.33684 LOGSBOD -9.432453421 . 70348505 -13.408 . 0000 . 00000000 LOGOUSE 28.99258921 4.6779903 6.198 . 0000 . 00000000 LOGDERWE 23.20610946 1.5524298 14.948 . 0000 . 00000000 
Estimates for equation: D0197 
Generalized least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = D0197 Mean= . 
1886351801 S. D. = 6.551599510 
Model size: Observations = 190, Parameters = 9, Deg. Fr. = 181 
[Residuals: Sum of squares= 469.4357960 , Std. Dev. = 1.610461 1 Fit: R-squared= 
. 939257, Adjusted R-squared = . 93657 1 (Note: Not using OLS. R-squared is not bounded in [0,111 
[ Model test: F[ 8,1811 = 349.85, Prob value = . 
00000 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -355.5265, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -626.2418 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = . 999, Akaike Info. Crt. = 
3.8371 
Log-determinant of W -4.5483 Log-likelihood -915.90131 
Durbin-Watson Stat. = 1.0401 Autocorrelation = . 48001 
i 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. ErIP[IZhz] I Mean of XI 
Constant 37.74924817 12.427447 3.038 . 0024 LOCATION -1.552492007 . 78737644E-01 -19.717 . 
0000 27.136842 
LOCA_2 
. 1880900270E-01 . 14255648E-02 
13.194 . 
0000 831.33684 
LOGSBOD -9.032303071 . 
47231295 -19.124 . 
0000 . 00000000 
LOGOUSE 1.060207076 3.1364845 . 338 . 
7353 
. 
00000000 
LOGDERWE 17.69696814 1.0415746 16.991 . 
0000 . 00000000 
LOGSNAIT 
. 
1409821105 
. 12094459 
1.166 . 
2437 
. 
00000000 
LOGSANDA -. 2284539360 . 
12589559 -1.815 . 0696 . 00000000 
LOGTHORN 
. 
8543278927E-01 
. 14409510 . 
593 . 
5533 
. 
00000000 
Estimates for equation: D0199 
Generalized least squares regression Weighting variable = none i 
Dep. var. = D0199 Mean= . 1796468144 
S. D. = 5.925286548 
Model size: Observations = 190, Parameters = 9, Deg. Fr. = 181 I 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 376.3486606 , Std. Dev. = 
1.441971 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 
940463, Adjusted R-squared = . 
93783 I 
(Note: Not using OLS. R-squared is not bounded in [0,111 
Model test: F[ 8,181] = 357.39, Prob value = . 000001 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -334.5301, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -607.1505 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = . 
778, Akaike Info. Crt. = 3.6161 
1 Log-determinant of W -4.5483 Log-likelihood . 
915.90131 
1 Durbin-Watson Stat. = 1.1077 Autocorrelation . 
44621 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>zl I Mean of XI 
Constant 42.56558169 11.127295 3.825 . 
0001 
LOCATION -1.518255987 . 70499653E-01 -21.536 . 
0000 27.136842 
LOCA_2 
. 
1959711230E-01 
. 
12764140E-02 15.353 . 0000 
831.33684 
LOGSBOD -8.921968974 . 42314942 -21.085 . 
0000 . 00000000 
LOGOUSE -. 7628892410 2.8084073 -. 272 . 7859 . 
00000000 
LOGDERWE 16.80019207 
. 
93289009 
LOGSNAIT 
. 
1603493699 
. 12898231 LOGSANDA -. 2610663257 . 
13426234 
LOGTHORN . 9815368896E-01 . 15367136 
18.009 . 0000 . 
00000000 
1.243 . 
2138 . 00000000 
-1.944 . 
0518 
. 
00000000 
. 
639 . 5230 . 00000000 
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Appendix 4 Exponential Cost function of effluent 
treatment in the Selby industries 
Estimated through SPSS 11.0 
Variables Entered/Removed' 
Variables Variables 
Model Entered Removed Method 
1 BOD REND Enter 
Model 
1 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: LNC 
Variables 
Removed 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 
. 9015 . 811 . 
773 . 274245 
a. Predictors: (Constant), BOD_REM 
ANOVAb 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Si q. 
1 Regression 1.616 1 1.616 21.485 . 0067 
Residual . 376 5 . 
075 
Total 1.992 6 
a. Predictors: (Constant), BOD_REM 
b. Dependent Variable: LNC 
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Si q. 
1 (Constant) -1.364 . 195 -7.013 . 
001 
BOD_REM . 109 . 024 . 
901 4.635 . 006 
a. Dependent Variable: LNC 
Variables 
Entered 
BOD REND 
Method 
Enter 
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Appendix 5 Exponential Cost function of effluent 
treatment in the STWs 
Estimated through SPSS 11.0 
Variables Entered/Removed' 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 BOO REND Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: LNC 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 
. 
888a . 788 . 
767 . 458993 
a. Predictors: (Constant), BOD_REM 
ANOVAb 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Si a. 
1 Regression 7.827 1 7.827 37.151 . 0005 
Residual 2.107 10 . 211 
Total 9.934 11 
a. Predictors: (Constant), BOD_REM 
b. Dependent Variable: LNC 
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Si q. 
1 (Constant) -1.389 . 185 -7.498 . 
000 
BOD_REM . 245 . 040 . 
888 6.095 . 000 
a. Dependent Variable: LNC 
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Appendix 6 Exponential cost function of reducing water 
abstraction in the rivers Ouse and Derwent 
Estimated through SPSS 11.0 
Variables Entered/Removed' 
Variables Variables 
Model Entered Removed Method 
AA3STRAC Enter T 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: LNC 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 
. 951a . 
904 . 880 . 
231794 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ABSTRACT 
ANOVAp 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.019 1 2.019 37.586 . 
0045 
Residual . 
215 4 . 054 
Total 2.234 5 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ABSTRACT 
b" Dependent Variable: LNC 
Coefficients' 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Si q. 
1 (Constant) 3.679 . 
225 16.366 . 
000 
ABSTRACT -. 472 . 077 -. 
951 -6.131 . 
004 
a. Dependent Variable: LNC 
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Appendix 7 Cost Details of moving effluent discharges 
from Selby 
Estimated Capital Costs 
Item 
Site Establishment 
Pumping Station 
Pipeline within Selby 
Storage Tank 
Main Pipeline 
Subtotal 
Consultancy fees (10%) 
Access rights, legal fees 
Contingencies (10%) 
Total 
Cost (m£) 
0.842 
0.561 
0.202 
0.685 
7.362-0.16X 
9.652-0.16X 
0.965-0.016X 
0.500 
0.965-0.016X 
12.082-0.192X 
X is the distance from new discharge location to the Trent Falls in kilometer. 
Estimated Operational Costs 
Item 
Labour 
Pumping Costs 
Maintenance Cost 
Total 
Cost (m£) 
0.056 
0.410 
0.050 
0.516 
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Appendix 8 Power cost function of effluent treatment in 
the Selby industries 
Estimated through SPSS 11.0 
Variables Entered/Removed' 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 LNBR3 Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: LNC 
Model Summary 
Model 
Adjusted 
RR Square R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 
. 9715 . 942 . 
931 . 151540 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LNBR 
ANOVAb 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F S Q. 
1 Regression 1.877 1 1.877 81.741 . 0005 
Residual . 115 5 . 
023 
Total 1.992 6 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LNBR 
b. Dependent Variable: LNC 
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Si a. 
1 (Constant) -1.711 . 135 -12.632 . 
000 
LNBR . 660 . 073 . 
971 9.041 . 
000 
a. Dependent Variable: LNC 
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Appendix 9 Linear cost function of effluent treatment in 
the STWs 
Estimated through SPSS 11.0 
Variables Entered/ Removed' 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 BOD REN? Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: COST 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 
. 9828 . 
964 . 960 . 
135780 
a. Predictors: (Constant), BOD_REM 
ANOVAb 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 4.880 1 4.880 264.701 . 0005 
Residual . 184 10 . 
018 
Total 5.064 11 
a. Predictors: (Constant), BOD_REM 
b. Dependent Variable: COST 
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Si a. 
1 (Constant) . 172 . 
055 3.139 . 
011 
BOD REM . 194 . 
012 . 
982 16.270 . 000 
a. Dependent Variable: COST 
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Appendix 10 Effluent treatment capability function 
(logarithmic) of capital stock in the ETPs of the industries 
of Selby 
Estimated through SPSS 11.0 
Variables Entered/RemovecP 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
LNIKSa Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: IBOD 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 
. 924a . 855 . 834 
1.940590 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LNIKS 
ANOVAI' 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 154.924 1 154.924 41.139 . 0003 
Residual 26.361 7 3.766 
L 
Total 181.285 8 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LNIKS 
b. Dependent Variable: IBOD 
Coefficient? 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Si . 
1 (Constant) 3.180 . 764 
4.161 . 004 
LNIKS 3.977 . 620 . 
924 6.414 
. 
000 
a. Dependent Variable: IBOD 
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Appendix 11 Effluent treatment capability function 
(logarithmic) of capital stock in the ETPs of STWs 
Estimated through SPSS 11.0 
Model 
1 
Variables Entered/Removed? 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
fLNSKSa 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: SBOD 
Enter 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 
. 
8765 
. 
768 
. 747 
1.700932 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LNSKS 
ANOVAh 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 105.431 1 105.431 36.441 . 000a 
Residual 31.825 11 2.893 
Total 137.256 12 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LNSKS 
b. Dependent Variable: SBOD 
Coefficient? 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig, 
1 (Constant) -4.108 1.269 -3.237 . 008 LNSKS 3.224 . 534 . 876 6.037 . 000 
a. Dependent Variable: SBOD 
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Appendix 12 Pollution abatement costs function of capital 
stock and investment in the ETPs 
Estimated through SPSS 11.0 
Variables Entered/Removed 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 LNI, LNKa Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: LNC 
Model Summaryh 
Model R RS uare 
Adjusted 
RS uare 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 
. 
9905 . 980 . 
961 . 
207909 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LNI, LNK 
b. Dependent Variable: LNC 
ANOV, ab 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Si a. 
I Regression 4.326 2 2.163 50.043 . 0208 
Residual 
. 086 
2 . 
043 
Total 4.413 4 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LNI, LNK 
b. Dependent Variable: LNC 
Coefficient? 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) -2.684 . 
244 -10.994 . 008 
LNK 
. 
952 . 098 . 
983 9.708 . 010 
LNI 1.654E-02 . 050 . 
033 . 
328 . 774 
a. Dependent Variable: LNC 
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